Social justice as an antidote to poverty and inequality: 30 years into democracy, what still needs to be done?

Social justice as an antidote to poverty and inequality: 30 years into democracy, what still needs to be done?

Author: Kholeka Gcaleka

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 2, 2024, p. 93-114
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i2a1

Abstract

Thirty years after South Africa’s first democratic elections, the nation grapples with the paradox of being “democratic, yet unequal and impoverished”. This contribution examines the persistent socio-economic disparities that continue to plague South African society. Despite the progress made since apartheid, the deep-rooted legacies of injustice remain evident in the high levels of poverty and inequality. The concept of social justice, enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, is more than a moral imperative. It is a legally enforceable right that encompasses access to basic necessities like housing, healthcare, and education. However, translating constitutional promises into tangible improvements for the most vulnerable citizens remains a significant challenge. Social justice is not solely the responsibility of the Government. It is a collective mission for all South Africans to rectify past injustices and build a society based on democratic values, equality, and fundamental human rights. The role of institutions like the Public Protector of South Africa in upholding accountability and ensuring the protection of citizens’ rights is highlighted as crucial for the realisation of social justice.

Learning from protected areas – Distilling lessons for a potential future OECM statutory framework in South Africa

Learning from protected areas – Distilling lessons for a potential future OECM statutory framework in South Africa

Author: Alexander Paterson

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BSocSci LLB LLM PhD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 2, 2024, p. 115-143
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i2a2

Abstract

As 2030 rapidly approaches, governments are grappling with how, within the short remaining timeframe, to meet their commitments under the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. The Global Biodiversity Framework’s Target 3 commits governments to incorporate at least 30% of their territory in two main forms of area-based instruments: protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures (“OECMs”). The former are relatively well understood. The origins of the international system for protected areas dates back several decades. There exists extensive international guidance highlighting, amongst many things, the important role and influence of law on protected areas. This has in turn informed the domestic development, implementation and refinement of protected areas legislation in many countries. In stark contrast, OECMs are a far newer phenomenon. The concept was only formally defined in 2018 and no international guidance exists framing the role and influence of law on OECMs. Owing to their contemporaneity, governments are still in the process of contemplating how to provide for the domestic recognition of OECMs. Some commentators have called for deeper reflection on the role and influence of law in enabling, securing, regulating and supporting OECMs. Three potential reasons underpin these calls, namely that both constitute area-based instruments with the majority of their definitional elements being very similar in nature; if law has historically had an important role and influence on protected areas, lessons could potentially be drawn from this experience in the context of OECMs; and both count towards the same 30×30 target, with the inherent logic being that to ensure some measure of equivalence and consistency in treatment, both must be enabled, secured, regulated and supported through law. Using South Africa as a case study, the article explores lessons that could be learnt from the implementation of, and reforms to, the country’s protected areas legislation, for any future OECM statutory framework. The discussion of these potential lessons is broken down under an array of themes, namely system planning and site selection; recognition and long-term security; governance diversity; management, monitoring and reporting; and financing and incentives.

Clearing the interpretative air – The need to make good (air quality) law and to make good law work

Clearing the interpretative air – The need to make good (air quality) law and to make good law work

Author: Jenny Hall

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB LLM PhD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 2, 2024, p. 144-177
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i2a3

Abstract

A corollary of the environmental rule of law requirement that good laws must be passed is that these laws must also be implemented effectively. Effective implementation frequently relies on good bureaucratic decision-making which can be challenging where decisions are non-routine and complex. This challenge is evident in the practical application of so-called “listed activities”, a widely used approach in pollution and waste management regulation to trigger an obligation to obtain an environmental authorisation or licence to undertake the listed activity. When courts hear disputes on the design and implementation of these listed activities, they can play a valuable role in providing guidance on sound decision-making approaches, and course-correcting existing approaches if necessary. For the court’s impact to be realised optimally, however, it is important that judicial decision making itself is based on sound reasoning and that it contains an element of predictability which follows from the employment of a consistent approach to legislative interpretation. For the interpretation of environmental legislation, this contribution proposes a reframing of the purposive interpretative approach set out in the much-cited Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) that aims to achieve what I call ‘substantive ecological purposivism’. It examines three judgments on listed activities passed in terms of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 through the lens of this approach and points out both inconsistencies in the three judgments as well as how the decisions in some instances could have been more closely aligned with the environmental objectives of legislation if the systematic employment of a substantively ecological purposive approach had been adopted.

Not “radical” enough: Disrupting the narrative of Ermelo’s grand transformative potential in public basic education

Not “radical” enough: Disrupting the narrative of Ermelo’s grand transformative potential in public basic education

Author: Lorette Arendse

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM LLD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 2, 2024, p. 178-194
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i2a4

Abstract

The Constitutional Court decision in Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) is often celebrated in education law jurisprudence. The Constitutional Court’s call for the radical transformation of public education is zealously repeated in academic discourse. In particular, the apex Court is lauded for the formulation of principles applicable to school governing bodies on how to develop constitutionally compliant language policies in terms of section 29(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. This provision guarantees the right to education in the language of choice in public educational institutions subject to the criterion of reasonable practicability. In the subsequent decision of Gelyke Kanse v Chairperson of the Senate of the University of Stellenbosch 2019 12 BCLR 1479 (CC), the Constitutional Court evaluated the constitutionality of another language policy, this time in the higher education context, but adopted a markedly different approach to the interpretation of section 29(2). Using a particular conceptualisation of transformation as theoretical lens and by contrasting the judicial approaches in the two Constitutional Court judgments, this contribution advances the idea that the Court in Ermelo was myopic in its approach by failing to recognise that some school governing bodies reinforce systemic racial inequality in public schools through the adoption of language policies.

The divergent approaches of the Constitutional Court to the right to life and ubuntu and the implications for civil society

The divergent approaches of the Constitutional Court to the right to life and ubuntu and the implications for civil society

Authors: Keith Matthee and Shaun de Freitas

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB BD; BProc LLB LLM LLD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 2, 2024, p. 195 – 219
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2023/i2a5

Abstract

There are indications of an unduly deferential attitude towards the justices of the Constitutional Court when they pronounce on profound moral issues which deeply affect the moral fabric of South African society. A key to addressing this deference is to demonstrate the divergent approaches of the Constitutional Court when making such pronouncements. An awareness of these differing approaches has the potential to influence civil society to participate confidently in the process of giving the Constitutional text representative forms of meaning and, in the process, of buttressing democracy. As an illustration of the divergencies stemming from the Constitutional Court regarding fundamental moral matters, the most important of all the rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 has been chosen, namely, the right to life, more specifically pertaining to the death penalty and abortion. Accompanying this is a critical investigation into a foundational hermeneutic chosen by the Constitutional Court when giving content to the right to life, namely, ubuntu. Also, naturally emanating from this contribution is the advancement of right to life jurisprudence in South Africa.