Situated in time and space [Discussion of Gongqose v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2018 5 SA 104 (SCA)]

Situated in time and space [Discussion of Gongqose v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2018 5 SA 104 (SCA)]

Author: Lindani Mhlanga

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB LLM LLD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 3, 2024, p. 273-288
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i3a4

Abstract

This contribution draws inspiration from a recently published book chapter, “The Trans-Temporality of Land Ownership in South Africa” by GE Kamdem Kamga and I de Villiers, which I have had the pleasure of reading and responding to in its formative stages. The chapter critically examines the evolving concept of land ownership within the suburbs of Bloemfontein, South Africa, particularly through the lens of time. Drawing from interviews conducted in the Cape Stands area, the chapter reveals how residents assert land ownership based not only on conventional legal instruments, such as title deeds, but also on non-traditional grounds like inheritance and longterm occupation. This exploration highlights the dual role of time in both entrenching inequality and offering a pathway to remedy it. The chapter juxtaposes conventional formal and informal understandings of land ownership, arguing that the passage of time has blurred the lines between this distinction, making it increasingly irrelevant in the eyes of those in possession. Building on this thesis, this contribution investigates whether the passage of time has, indeed, created the necessary space to reframe our understanding of land ownership, with the potential to address longstanding structural inequalities in South Africa. Using the landmark case of Gongqose v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2018 5 SA 104 (SCA) as a focal point, the contribution explores the viability of this temporal space in facilitating transformative outcomes. It critically examines whether time has passed without any significant changes in traditional patterns of land ownership or whether there has been meaningful progress in creating opportunities to rethink and restructure land ownership in a more equitable and just manner.

An examination of decolonisation and Africanisation in the legal context

An examination of decolonisation and Africanisation in the legal context

Author: Fanelesibonge Craig Mabaso

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM PhD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 3, 2024, p. 289-298
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2023/i3a5

Abstract

#Feesmustfall and #Rhodesmustfall were student-led movements that stimulated a necessary discussion of decolonisation, Africanisation and a reimagined post-colonial South Africa. While other academic fields have engaged in rigorous research on decolonisation and Africanisation, there has been very little research on decolonisation and Africanisation from a legal perspective. This contribution focuses on the decolonisation and Africanisation of the law in particular because the law is a sociopolitical construct that regulates all spheres of a person’s life, as well as the relationships that people have with each other and with the state. It is these spaces that were colonised, the law along with physical violence being the primary instrument of colonisation. With this in mind, any discussion of decolonisation necessitates a discussion of decolonising the law. The contribution will also examine the notion of Africanisation and its relationship to decolonisation.

A Legal Analysis of Local Government’s Housing Roles, Powers, Functions and Responsibilities in South Africa

A Legal Analysis of Local Government’s Housing Roles, Powers, Functions and Responsibilities in South Africa

Author: Paul Mudau

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, Department of Public, Constitutional and International Law, University of South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 1 – 41
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a1

Abstract

This article undertakes a comprehensive legal analysis of local government’s housing roles, powers, functions and responsibilities in South Africa. It outlines the place and role of local government in South Africa’s constitutional framework of multi-level governance and the decentralisation of housing powers to local government. Although the functional area of housing is listed as a ‘concurrent competency’ of the national and provincial spheres of government in terms of Part A of Schedule 4 of the constitution, local government still has significant housing roles and responsibilities emanating from court judgments and national legislation. Primarily, these roles and responsibilities are conferred by the Housing Act 107 of 1997, the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008, and other relevant legislation. Virtually, all municipalities may exercise attendant housing powers. Depending on the ability to demonstrate the capacity to administer one of the housing programmes, municipalities may ultimately be assigned to fulfil the housing functions or powers on behalf of provinces. Using a desktop-based qualitative research approach, the article employs documentary analysis and case law review to critically evaluate the legal framework and its application. Findings highlight gaps in the current legal framework, inadequate resource allocation and capacity constraints hindering local governments’ ability to effectively address housing needs. Recommendations are made for legislative reforms, decentralisation of housing powers, capacity building, and intergovernmental co-ordination to enhance local government’s housing roles, powers, functions and responsibilities. This research contributes to the ongoing debate on local government’s role in addressing South Africa’s housing challenges, providing valuable insights for policymakers, practitioners and scholars.

When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries

When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries

When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries

Author: Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 42 – 102
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a2

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Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries
Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 42–102
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a2

Abstract

Generally, the decision of the highest/apex court in a country is final. However, courts are staffed by human beings, and it is natural to err. It is not uncommon for apex courts to make mistakes. Legislation and case law from African countries show that courts can ‘escape’ the consequences of their mistake in one of the three ways. First, by departing from a previous erroneous/outdated decision (in a subsequent case). Second, by invoking the ‘slip rule’ to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. Three, which is the focus of this article, by reviewing/rescinding their decisions. In this case, one of the parties to a judgment asks a court to re-open the case he/she has lost and set aside its decision. As the discussion below shows, this remedy is available to, among other things, protect the right of access to justice (courts) to prevent an injustice, or. to protect the integrity of the court. This ultimately contributes to the entrenchment of the rule of law. This article shows that African countries have adopted five different approaches in dealing with the apex courts’ powers to review their decisions. First, the constitutions of some African countries such as Ghana, Eswatini, the Gambia and Namibia expressly allow courts to review their decisions. Second, in some countries such as Uganda, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe the apex courts’ power/jurisdiction to review their decisions is provided for in their respective rules. Third, in some countries such as Lesotho, Seychelles, Zambia, and Sierra Leone neither the constitutions nor the rules empower apex courts to review their decisions. However, courts have invoked their inherent powers as the basis to review their decisions. Fourth, in Kenya, the Supreme Court’s powers to review its decisions are provided for in legislation and rules of the court. Finally, in Nigeria, the Supreme Court rules prohibit it from reviewing its decisions. However, the Supreme Court held that it has inherent powers to review its decisions. This article shows that, irrespective of the source(s) of the power, case law from all the courts show that there is consensus that apex courts will review their decision(s), whether criminal or civil, if it is in the interests of justice to do so. Different grounds/reasons are invoked to explain why it is in the interests of justice to review a court’s decision. In some countries the list of the grounds of review is closed whereas in others it is open. In some countries, judges often disagree on the issue of whether the apex court’s power to review its decisions is categorised as ‘inherent jurisdiction’ or ‘inherent power.’ In this article, it is argued that in countries where legislation empowers courts to review their decisions, they have jurisdiction. Inherent powers exist in countries where legislation is silent on court’s powers to review their decisions. Although finality of litigation is a very important principle, achieving the ends of justice is more important. Thus, apex courts should not be very conservative when developing principles on reviewing their decisions.

Presence as a Ground for Jurisdiction in Common Law Africa

Presence as a Ground for Jurisdiction in Common Law Africa

Authors: Thomas Kojo Quansah and Theophilus Edwin Coleman

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: LLB (Ghana) LLM (UJ); Lecturer, Law School, University of Professional Studies, Accra, Ghana; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law, New York (USA); Senior Research Associate, Research Centre for Private International Law in Emerging Countries (RCPILEC), Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 103 – 145
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a3

Abstract

Before rendering a binding judgment against a party, a court must have personal jurisdiction over that party. Courts may assume jurisdiction over a person in various ways. The oldest and most contentious method is the personal service of the defendant with the court process while they are present in the state. This basis is known as the mere presence, temporary presence, or physical presence rule, which originates from English common law. Under common law, the defendant’s presence within the court’s jurisdiction remains one of the primary bases for the court to assume jurisdiction over a civil action. The physical presence grounds for jurisdiction have recently faced significant challenges and criticisms from some scholars. Others contend that it is still relevant, primarily for the reasons behind its original justification. There is also the question of how the presence of a legal person is determined for establishing a court’s jurisdiction. Considering the foregoing, re-examining presence as a ground for jurisdiction appears warranted. This article, therefore, investigates presence as a basis for jurisdiction, its history, and the presence of natural and legal persons. Given the various common law countries with somewhat divergent approaches, a comparative study of relevant countries will be conducted, leading to pertinent observations, remarks, and recommendations regarding the way forward. With recent technological developments and advancements in common law African countries, this article explores whether the presence doctrine is an appropriate tool for courts to exercise jurisdiction.