The treatment of facts in administrative-law review

ARTICLE

The treatment of facts in administrative-law review

Authors: Glenn Penfold & Cora Hoexter

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Partner, Webber Wentzel; Visiting Adjunct Professor, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg; Part-time Professor, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 3, p. 496-525
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i3a5

Abstract

Despite the practical importance of facts and evidence to judicial review, scant attention has been given to these themes in South African administrative law. This accords with a tendency to neglect factual questions in public-law scholarship more generally. With reference to the two main pathways to judicial review, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 and the constitutional principle of legality, this article explores the South African courts’ treatment of facts in administrative-law review and offers suggestions as to how some factual questions might best be approached in future. First, the article considers two grounds of review that relate to facts in an explicit way and that illustrate the courts’ supervision of facts relied upon by administrators in the course of their decision-making. Secondly, courts sometimes scrutinise the expected impact of an administrative act or the administrator’s consideration of its benefits and costs, especially when the review challenge is based on the substantive grounds of rationality or reasonableness. Thirdly, in relation to remedy the article examines the relevance of facts and information when a court is deciding whether to set aside administrative action and whether an order of substitution is justified.

Realizing South Africa’s contribution to the global biodiversity framework’s area-based targets — The potential impact of new screening trends linked to strategic infrastructure projects, corridors and zones

ARTICLE

Realizing South Africa’s contribution to the global biodiversity framework’s area-based targets — The potential impact of new screening trends linked to strategic infrastructure projects, corridors and zones

Author: Alexander Paterson

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor, Institute of Marine and Environmental Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 3, p. 526-553
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i3a6

Abstract

South Africa supported the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework in December 2022. Area-based conservation measures form the focus of its Target 3, which calls on countries to ensure that at least 30 per cent of their territory of high biodiversity value is effectively conserved and managed in protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures by 2030. South Africa will need to more than triple its current land coverage within these areas in the next six years to achieve this target, and it has mapped priority focus areas for expansion to enable it to do so. The government is concurrently seeking to facilitate the roll-out of certain strategic infrastructure projects (‘SIPs’) linked to renewable energy, electricity grid and gas pipeline infrastructure within certain identified strategic infrastructure corridors and zones. Heavy reliance is placed on environmental impact assessment (‘EIA’) screening processes to subject activities linked to these SIPs undertaken in these corridors and zones to fast-track EIA approval processes or exclusions. Overlaying the maps depicting land of high biodiversity value, which is vital for achieving Target 3, with those outlining the strategic infrastructure corridors and zones, highlights potential conflict. This article critically analyses whether the new screening processes and associated tweaks to the general EIA and approval process linked to the SIPs have the potential to manage and mitigate these potential conflicts. The analysis highlights several challenges linked both to their foundation (including reliance on strategic environmental assessments and screening tools) and the array of procedural safeguards embedded within them. Cumulatively, these challenges hold the potential to undermine South Africa’s efforts to realize Target 3.

A critical appraisal of the parole system and its compliance with section 165 of the Constitution

ARTICLE

A critical appraisal of the parole system and its compliance with section 165 of the Constitution

Author: Loammi Wolf

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Research Associate, UFS Centre for Human Rights, University of the Free State
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 3, p. 554-588
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i3a7

Abstract

In terms of state organisation under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the administration of justice, which encompasses the powers of the judiciary and the prosecuting authority, is clearly demarcated from the executive. Section 165(5) of the Constitution explicitly states that an order or decision of a court ‘binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies’. Sentencing is a judicial power, and the discretion to grant parole is also a judicial power. The legislature attempted to reform the 1959 parole system, which conferred parole powers upon executive state organs, with the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 but failed to align the granting of parole with the constitutional norms of ss 165 and 35(2) of the Constitution. Instead, the legislature conferred these powers upon executive state organs in contravention of s 165(4). In practice, the executive is therefore usurping judicial power, although s 165(3) proscribes any organ of state from interfering with the functioning of the courts. The granting of parole cannot be transformed into some kind of ‘administrative action’ of the executive taken under s 85(2) of the Constitution. The rights of detained sentenced offenders are protected by s 35(2) of the Constitution, which offers relief for unlawful detention. Section 33 upholds just administrative action and does not apply to criminal justice.

Propping up the crumbling city: Sectional title law, residential building governance and local government

ARTICLE

Propping up the crumbling city: Sectional title law, residential building governance and local government

Author: Marius Pieterse

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 3, p. 589-621
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i3a8

Abstract

This article considers the interface between urban local government and sectional title, focusing specifically on the governance of residential apartment blocks in urban areas. It argues that the governance of sectional title schemes is currently wrongly depicted in South African law as being predominantly ‘private’ and contractual in nature. Based on a historical overview and qualitative case study of apartment building governance in centrally located suburbs in the city of Johannesburg, the article argues that building governance ought to be reconceptualised as being located primarily within a public-law paradigm, more specifically as forming part of the ‘special cluster of relationships’ that govern service delivery in South African cities and that give rise to public-law rights and responsibilities, ultimately sourced in the Constitution, for all the relevant parties. This would imply that the relationship between cities and sectional title schemes ought to be viewed as one between local government and rights-bearing stakeholders (rather than customers or residential subjects). Moreover, it would require that sectional title schemes’ governing agents be both adequately empowered and adequately held accountable, under administrative and constitutional law, for exercising their governance functions.

J Smit, E O Alemika, C Botha, G Ngantweni & G van Mollendorf (eds) Policing in Africa — Towards an African Epistemology (2022)

BOOK NOTICE

J Smit, E O Alemika, C Botha, G Ngantweni & G van Mollendorf (eds) Policing in Africa — Towards an African Epistemology (2022)

Author: Elrena van der Spuy

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Centre of Criminology, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 3, p. 630-633
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i3a10

Abstract

None

A brief overview of collective consumer redress in the European Union and South Africa and moving towards the increased use of consumer class action in South Africa (part 1)

A brief overview of collective consumer redress in the European Union and South Africa and moving towards the increased use of consumer class action in South Africa – part 1*

Author: T Broodryk

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Professor in Private Law, Stellenbosch University
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 3, 2024, p. 410-426
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2024/i3a1

Abstract

Hierdie tweedelige artikel bied ’n oorsig oor kollektiewe verbruikersregstelling in die Europese Unie en in Suid-Afrika. Dit bekyk redes waarom in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg die bestaande klasaksie onderbenut bly as ’n meganisme om verbruikersgeskille mee op te los. In die afgelope sowat 30 jaar, is slegs twee sertifiseringsuitsprake in verbruikersklasaksies gelewer wat oor ’n geskil handel wat beheers word deur artikel 4(1) van die Wet op Verbruikersbeskerming. Die onlangs uitgereikte aanwysing oor kollektiewe regstelling om die kollektiewe belange van verbruikers te beskerm van die Europese Unie, is aanduidend dat dit vir die Europese Unie ’n prioriteit is om verbruikersbelange te beskerm en dat ’n omvattende benadering verkieslik is om kollektiewe verbruikersregstelling in lidlande te hanteer.
Die gebrek aan wetgewende regulering van die Suid-Afrikaanse klasaksie soos ook van die meganisme vir verbruikersklasaksie wat in die Wet op Verbruikersbeskerming vervat is, bring mee dat die klasaksie sedert die instelling daarvan meer as ’n dekade gelede, steeds onderbenut bly. Ander faktore wat tot die onderbenutting van die verbruikersklasaksie bydra, is onder meer die onduidelike formulering van die Wet op Verbruikersbeskerming, verbruikers se gebrek aan kennis ten aansien van hul regte ingevolge die Wet op Verbruikersbeskerming en die afwesigheid van voldoende hulpbronne om verbruikers in staat te stel om hulle regte af te dwing, onder meer deur middel van so ’n klasaksie. Op hulle beurt belemmer al hierdie faktore toegang tot geregtigheid, wat juis die primêre doel van Suid-Afrika se klasaksie is.
Deel een van hierdie tweedelige artikel handel oor die ontwikkeling van kollektiewe regstelling in die Europese Unie asook die besonderhede van die aanwysing betreffende kollektiewe regstelling van die Europese Unie. In deel twee oorweeg die outeur kollektiewe regstelling in Suid-Afrika. Daarin ondersoek die outeur verder die redes waarom Suid-Afrika se klasaksie onderbenut bly as ’n meganisme om verbruikersgeskille op te los. Die bespreking bevat ook voorstelle, onder andere gebaseer op die Europese ervaring, vir die toenemende benutting van die Suid-Afrikaanse verbruikersklasaksie. Dit behels, onder andere, die regulering van die meganisme deur wetgewing asook die bemagtiging van Suid-Afrikaners om hul sodoende in staat te stel om hul regte, soos vervat in die Wet op Verbruikersbeskerming, uit te oefen.
Die oogmerk van die outeur met die artikel is om ’n bydrae te lewer tot die toenemende benutting van die Suid-Afrikaanse verbruikersklasaksie om sodoende toegang tot geregtigheid vir Suid-Afrikaanse verbruikers te help bewerkstellig.

Bydraende nalatigheid as regsbeperking of ’n kwalifisering van die premis dat iedereen sy eie skade dra?

Bydraende nalatigheid as regsbeperking of ’n kwalifisering van die premis dat iedereen sy eie skade dra?

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Professor in Privaatreg, Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 3, 2024, p. 427-452
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2024/i3a2

Abstract

In principle, every adult should be self-supporting, responsible for his own destiny and must live within his means. He may not without special circumstances, eg by meeting all the requirements for delictual liability by another as tortfeasor or by concluding a contract of private risk insurance, expect others to act as debtors liable for any setback that he may encounter as part of the risks of living – including an act of God. In accordance with this norm, in principle damage rests where it falls, and each bears his own harm – casum sentit dominus (res perit domino).
It is not unusual for a vehicle owner to lease his vehicle to a lessee subject to the requirement that the latter is responsible to take out comprehensive insurance cover for the vehicle for the duration of the lease agreement. Normally, however, an owner may be expected to limit his risks by taking out comprehensive insurance in respect of his own property. Since the same damage cannot be compensated twice, it is a waste to take out insurance against the same risk from two different insurers. In a particular matter it may be tax-prudent for the lessee to offset the premium expenses of comprehensive insurance of the lease object against his business’s profit. The lessee may therefore agree with the owner that not the owner but he as lessee will insure the vehicle comprehensively for the duration of the lease. It is advisable, however, that the lease agreement provides as a condition that the insurer will without delay be informed of the lease agreement and that the comprehensive insurance will be for the benefit of the owner although the lessee will be paying the premiums for the insurance cover. After all, any damage that results will materialise primarily in the estate of the owner as identified “third” party. At most the insurable interest of the lessee is to safeguard himself against any personal liability for loss resulting from damage to the leased vehicle whilst in his possession.
In a recent decision the court of appeal in Brussels held that, in the absence of such a clause for the benefit of the owner as third party, the owner had no claim against the insurer for indemnity after the lessee failed to disclose that the ownership of the insured vehicle rested not with him but with the undisclosed third party. The insurer was not obliged to indemnify the lessee in any sense because the latter as non-owner suffered no damage as a result of the total loss of the vehicle. As the insurance was for the damage to the vehicle allegedly as an asset of the lessee, it did not cover the lessee’s personal liability against the lessor as owner either.
Although in casu the owner in principle could still rely on his rei vindicatio to repossess the wreck of his vehicle after it was written off in an accident by the lessee, this claim was illusory because the wreck had been sold by the insurer after being fraudulently misled by the lessee regarding the ownership of the vehicle and the amount of the sale was paid to the lessee as presumed owner. The fraudster’s estate was subsequently liquidated and the owner could not successfully claim any damages for the breach of contract and the resulting loss from the fraudulent erstwhile lessee. Although the court held that the insurer in the circumstances acted negligently with regard to the transfer of the amount realised with the sale of the wreck, the court also frowned upon the laxness of the owner who, notwithstanding the express provision in the lease agreement, did nothing for a whole year to ensure that the contractual obligation by the lessee was met with regard to the comprehensive insurance and the additional clause for his benefit as the disclosed owner. This laxness of the owner to protect his own interests was termed a contributory cause for his eventual loss regarding the value of the leased vehicle.
In insurance law, the principle applies that the insured has an obligation to take all reasonable steps to keep the potential risk that any loss may materialise relating to the insured risk as small as possible. This applies to the prevention of the risk materialising at all as well as to the limitation of the resulting harm after the event. This implies a critical reconsideration of the automatic application of the fault principle defined as contributory negligence as the governing principle for the apportionment of damages in circumstances where the resulting damage to the claimant was caused partly as a result of his own “fault” as well as by the contributing cause of the defendant’s conduct. (For argument’s sake the inconvenient formulation of “own fault” with regard to the claimant’s conduct that can never be “tortious” to himself and should accordingly not be labelled “negligent” because only tortious conduct can be negligent, is retained as that is not the centre of this discourse.) Notwithstanding the fact that the conduct of the defendant fell short of what the reasonable person would have done to prevent the incurring of damage, the contributory conduct of the claimant causing the damage as it materialised should play a decisive role in shifting the burden of the harm.
If the relative weight of the “fault” of the parties involved is not used as the determinative criterion to find whether and to what extent the damage suffered by the claimant should be transferred onto the defendant, but rather the extent to which the relevant conduct of the involved parties was the leading cause of the eventual damage, it may indicate that the claimant’s laxness in the Brussels case should have limited or even excluded a successful claim for damages against the insurer as defendant. Had the owner of the vehicle in the Brussels case diligently ensured that the contractual obligation was met by the lessee with whom he freely entered into the lease agreement at his own risk, the owner would not have suffered any damage. A valid comprehensive insurance policy would have been in place to indemnify him as owner as was provided for in the agreement. In those circumstances there would not have been any negligence by the insurer, who was misled by the fraudulent act of the lessee to use falsified sales invoices pretending to be the registered owner of the vehicle to be insured to be indemnified. After the materialisation of the insured risk the owner’s damage would have been covered thanks to the clause for the benefit of it as third party. In the absence of reasonable diligent behaviour by the owner, the premise res perit domino may be decisive.

A theory of (subjective) rights to minerals in South Africa

A theory of (subjective) rights to minerals in South Africa

Author: PJ Badenhorst

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Associate Professor of Law, Deakin University; Honorary Professor of Law, Mandela University
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 3, 2024, p. 453-468
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2024/i3a3

Abstract

Ingevolge die staat se bewaringsmag (imperium ofte wel administratiewe magte) kragtens die Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 van 2002 is die staat bevoeg om nuwe kategorieë regte ten aansien van minerale aan aansoekers te verleen, naamlik prospekteerregte, mynregte, permitte en toestemmings. Die wetgewer onderskei tussen prospekteerregte en mynregte, aan die een kant, en toestemmings en permitte, aan die ander kant: prospekteerregte en mynregte word toegeken (“granted”) terwyl toestemmings en permittte deur die staat uitgereik (“issued”) word. Prospekteerregte en mynregte moet geregistreer word terwyl toestemmings en permitte aangeteken kan word. Die Wet op die Registrasie van Myntitels 16 van 1967 maak voorsiening vir die registrasie van prospekteerregte en mynregte en die aantekening van toestemmings en permitte ten aansien van minerale. Prospekteerregte en mynregte kan met ’n verband beswaar word terwyl dit nie moontlik is met permitte en toestemmings nie.
Die artikel ondersoek die inhoud van die staat se bewaringsmag teen die agtergrond van die toekenning of uitreiking van prospekteerregte, mynregte, permitte en toestemmings ten aansien van minerale. Die bevoegdhede van die staat uit hoofde van die bewaringsmag word bespreek. ’n Teorie van mineraalregte word ontwikkel deur die inhoudsbevoegdhede van prospekteerregte, mynregte, permitte en toestemmings te isoleer. Die teenwoordigheid van hierdie bevoegdhede in regte, permitte en toestemmings word aangetoon. In die ontwikkeling van so ’n teorie moet voorts duidelik onderskei word tussen administratiewe regte, persoonlike regte en beperkte saaklike regte. Die artikel verduidelik wat juridies plaasvind wanneer regte, permitte en toestemmings ten aansien van minerale aanvanklik (administratiefregtelik) toegeken of uitgereik word. Die statutêre verpligting wat uit sodanige administratiewe handeling voortspruit, word aangetoon.
Tydens die sluit van ’n prospekteerkontrak of mynkontrak word persoonlike regte geskep terwyl beperkte saaklike regte by registrasie tot stand kom. Die standpunt word gehuldig dat administratiewe regte nie omgetower word in saaklike regte met registrasie nie en dat die onderskeid tussen persoonlike regte en saaklike regte tydens kontraksluiting en registrasie nie misken behoort te word nie.
Die beperking van die bevoegdhede van die staat se administratiewe magte met die registrasie van prospekteerregte en mynregte word bespreek. Verdere beperkings van die staat se magte word ook uitgespel. Die artikel ondersoek ook die moontlike beperking van die bevoegdhede van die staat se magte tydens die aantekening van permitte of toestemmings.
Daar word geargumenteer dat sekere toestemmings en permitte ook as saaklike regte erken moet word. Hierdie beskouing word ondersteun deur te fokus op die objek van ’n reg uit hoofde van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Die slotbeskouing is dat indien die staat se bevoegdhede kragtens die staat se bewaringsmag geïsoleer word, kan dit as vertrekpunt gebruik word om die regsaard en inhoud van regte, permitte en toestemmings dogmaties te verduidelik.

Error 404 or an error in judgment? An ethical framework for the use of ChatGPT in the legal profession

Error 404 or an error in judgment? An ethical framework for the use of ChatGPT in the legal profession

Author: M Van Eck

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Associate Professor of Private Law, University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 3, 2024, p. 469-490
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2024/i3a4

Abstract

Daar is geen kortpaaie om reg te praktiseer nie, maar dit is nie ongewoon dat regspraktisyns bystand of raad vir hul werk soek nie. Dit kan gedoen word deur kollegas asook tradisionele regsdatabasisse te nader. Onlangs het die gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensie tegnologie egter waargenome “kortpaaie” vir regsnavorsing verskaf. Die gebruik van tegnologieë, soos ChatGPT, vir regsnavorsing is ’n nuwe kwessie wat in verskeie hofsake in Suid-Afrika, die Verenigde State, die Verenigde Koninkryk asook Kanada afgespeel het.
In hierdie artikel word die gerapporteerde gevalle van die gebruik van ChatGPT in hierdie jurisdiksies ondersoek om die etiese en professionele slaggate in regspraktisyns se gebruik van ChatGPT vir regsnavorsing te bepaal. Hier word die risiko’s van die gebruik van ChatGPT vir regsnavorsing uitgelig; spesifiek die gebruik van vals of vervaardigde informasie en regsake, wat grootliks voortspruit uit ChatGPT se tegniese tekortkominge. Tog is daar voorbeelde waar regspraktisyns ChatGPT gebruik het sonder om die resultate te verifieer, wat daartoe gelei het dat regspraktisyns in verskeie gevalle aanspreeklik gehou is vir sulke gedrag. Teen hierdie agtergrond bied die artikel ’n etiese en professionele raamwerk vir die gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensie tegnologieë in die regspraktyk,
wat opgesom kan word as: (i) daar is niks verkeerd om kunsmatige intelligensie tegnologie te gebruik in ’n regspraktyk nie, maar alhoewel die gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensie tegnologie aanvaarbaar is, kan die blinde aanvaarding van sulke inligting etiese en professionele uitdagings skep, (ii) ’n regspraktisyn moet bewus wees of kunsmatige intelligensie tegnologie gebruik word in die voorbereiding van hof- of ander dokumente, (iii) daar is geen plek vir sorgeloosheid in die gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensie tegnologieë nie, aangesien sulke sorgeloosheid kan lei tot die misleiding van die hof en medepraktisyns, (iv) waar kunsmatige intelligensie tegnologie gebruik is om hof- of ander dokumente voor te berei, moet ’n regspraktisyn verseker dat toepaslike stappe geneem word om die akkuraatheid van die inligting van kunsmatige intelligensie stelsels te verifieer, en (v) ’n regspraktisyn het algemene verantwoordelikheid oor die toesig van alle regsdienste wat gelewer word, ongeag of hulp van ander mense of kunsmatige intelligensie tegnologie ontvang word.
Onkunde van ’n regspraktisyn se etiese en professionele pligte in hierdie omstandighede is geen verskoning nie, veral in verband met die vermoëns en beperkings van kunsmatige intelligensie tegnologie. Nietemin, regspraktisyns kan nie verwyder word van die regspraktyk nie en dit is die regspraktisyn se verantwoordelikheid om die inligting te verifieer, ongeag die bron van die inligting. Indien hierdie etiese en professionele pligte nie nagekom word nie, kan regspraktisyns onderworpe wees aan sanksies en dissiplinêre stappe.