Beneficial Ownership Disclosure and Trusts

Beneficial Ownership Disclosure and Trusts

Author: Aneria Bouwer

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Senior Consultant, Bowmans Attorneys
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 15 Issue 3, 2024, p. 1 – 8

Abstract

This article deals with the obligation of trustees to submit an electronic register of the beneficial owners of a trust to the Master of the High Court. The article explores the aim of these disclosure requirements and considers the application of the beneficial ownership definition in the Trust Property Control Act to employee share ownership plan trusts. The writer laments the fact that share ownership plans are not excluded from these disclosure obligations, taking into account the comprehensive tax reporting obligations of a share ownership plan.

 

The Companies Second Amendment Act 17 of 2024: Ameliorating the Timebarring Regime under Sections 77 and 162 of the Companies Act

The Companies Second Amendment Act 17 of 2024: Ameliorating the Timebarring Regime under Sections 77 and 162 of the Companies Act

Author: Milton Seligson SC and Matthew Blumberg SC

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Honorary Member, Cape Bar; Member, Cape Bar
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 15 Issue 3, 2024, p. 9 – 22

Abstract

A director owes duties to the company of which he or she is director. These include, in the main, a fiduciary duty and a duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. This is the position at common law, as well as under the Companies Act. Sections 77 and 162 of the Companies Act contain the two principal remedies for breach of these duties. Section 77 provides for the director concerned to be liable for loss sustained by the company as a consequence of the breach. Section 162 provides for the director to be declared delinquent or under probation. Both sections have time-barring provisions. In terms of the existing section 77(7), proceedings by the company concerned to recover loss from the director may not be commenced more than three years after the act or omission that gave rise to the liability — i e irrespective of when the company did, or could have, acquired knowledge of the act or omission in question. In terms of the existing section 162(2)(a), stakeholders in a particular company wishing to bring delinquency proceedings against an individual who was, but no longer is, a director of the company, are required to do so within 24 months of the date on which the individual ceased to be a director — i e, even if the stakeholder concerned did not have knowledge of the delinquent conduct, and could not reasonably have acquired it, within the stipulated 24-month period. These time-barring provisions have the potential to operate harshly — and so it has been contended, unconstitutionally. In light thereof, and following recommendations by the Zondo Commission, the time-periods have been revisited, and substantially ameliorated, in the recently enacted Companies Second Amendment Act. As part of these amendments, a discretion is now conferred on the court, in the context of both remedies, to extend the relevant time-period on good cause shown. The article analyses the existing time-barring regime (i e, that are currently in place and which will remain in place until the Companies Second Amendment Act comes into operation); identifies the deficiencies in that regime and the likely rationale for amendment thereof; and explores the pros and cons of the more flexible time-barring regime introduced by the Companies Second Amendment Act.

 

VAT, Indemnity Payments and Capitec Bank: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (Part 2)

VAT, Indemnity Payments and Capitec Bank: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (Part 2)

Author: Des Kruger

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Independent Consultant
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 15 Issue 3, 2024, p. 23 – 30

Abstract

In the previous edition of this journal, the writer dealt with the substantive issue that was required to be addressed by the Constitutional Court in Capitec Bank Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, namely whether Capitec Bank Ltd was entitled to claim a deduction under section 16(3)(c) of the Value-Added Tax Act, 1991, in respect of amounts credited to borrowers accounts under a loan cover arrangement on the happening of specified events, namely the death or retrenchment of the borrower. Capitec had essentially undertaken to apply the claim proceeds derived by it under a credit life policy entered into with an insurer against the indebtedness of the borrower on his or her death or retrenchment. No consideration was payable for the loan cover by Capitec. This Part of the article address the remaining issues dealt with in this seminal case, namely apportionment, capitalisation and supplies for no consideration. It is, with respect, submitted that the court addressed these related issues succinctly and appropriately. As regards apportionment, the court held that while section 16(3)(c) did not deal specifically with apportionment, it would in essence be fair and reasonable to do so given that the loan cover related to the bank’s taxable and exempt activities. As noted by the writer, the court’s dicta is apposite as regards supplies that fall to be dealt with under section 8(15). Section 8(15) provides that where a single supply of goods or services would, if separate considerations had been payable, been standard rated and zero rated, each part of the single supply is deemed to be a separate supply. However, there are no rules as to how the consideration related to each notional separate supply is to be determined. Rogers J in Capitec Bank provides a practical answer — apportionment under general principals. As regards capitalisation, Rogers J held that the components of the borrowers’ accounts retain their character of interest (exempt) and fees (taxable) and fell to be dealt as such for VAT purposes. While the writer acknowledges the correctness of the analysis and conclusion arrived at by the court, he notes that this approach gives rise to issues where a trust makes distributions to a beneficiary after many years out of capitalised trust capital and is required to apply Binding General Ruiling No 16 (‘BGR 16’) in relation to that distribution. BGR 16 provides for a mandatory apportionment methodology, the so-called turnover-based method. The writer suggest this is something that needs to be considered by SARS. The final issue relates to supplies made for no consideration. The court confirmed that a supply for no consideration does not per se mean that the underlying supply is not an ‘enterprise’ (taxable) supply in every circumstance. Rather, it must be considered to what extent the free supply is a part of the enterprise (taxable) activities carried on by the vendor. Where for example, a vendor gives a free giveaway to encourage the purchase of the vendor’s wares, the supply of the giveaways for no consideration is still in the course or furtherance of the vendor’s enterprise, albeit for nil consideration (section 10(23)). In the context of the Capitec Bank case, the court had accepted that the supply of the loan cover related to both taxable and non-taxable supplies.

 

VAT, Indemnity Payments and Capitec Bank: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (Part 1)

VAT, Indemnity Payments and Capitec Bank: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (Part 1)

Author: Des Kruger

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Independent Consultant
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 15 Issue 2, 2024, p. 1 – 14

Abstract

The recent Constitutional Court decision in Capitec Bank Limited v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service is seminal, but is, with respect, unfortunately wrongly decided (the bad). That said, Rogers J, in a unanimous judgment, has provided clarity in regard to a number of VAT provisions (the good and the bad), most notable the treatment of a supply for no consideration and the application for apportionment outside the ambit of the Value- Added Tax Act, 1991 (VAT Act), amongst others. In essence Capitec Bank sought a deduction under section 16(3)(c) of the VAT Act of amounts credited to borrowers accounts under a loan cover arrangement on the happening of specified events, namely the death or retrenchment of the borrower. Capitec Bank has essentially undertaken to apply the claim proceeds derived by it under a credit life policy entered into with an insurer against the indebtedness of the borrower on his or her death or retrenchment. Section 16(3)(c) provides for a deduction against a vendor’s output tax of any amounts paid to a person to indemnify that person under a ‘contract of ‘insurance’. The deduction is equal to the tax fraction (15/115) of such indemnity payments. Importantly, the deduction is only available if the ‘contract of insurance’ under which the payments are made is a taxable supply. SARS sought to disallow the deduction on the grounds that the ‘contract of insurance’ was not a taxable supply as it was not a supply made in the course or furtherance of any ‘enterprise’ carried on by the bank. SARS argued that as no consideration was charged for the loan cover, it could not be said that Capitec Bank was carrying on an enterprise in relation to its loan cover activities. In addition, SARS argued that the loan cover was so closely connected to its exempt activity of providing loans (an exempt supply), that the provision of the loan cover similarly constituted an exempt supply. An exempt supply is specifically excluded from the ambit of the definition of ‘enterprise’. Capitec Bank naturally sought to counter such arguments by submitting that the supply of the loan cover free-of-charge did not disqualify the supply as being a taxable supply, relying, inter alia, on the provisions of section 10(23) of the VAT Act. As regards the argument by SARS that the supply of the loan cover was an exempt supply, Capitec Bank argued that the loan cover related to its overall business that comprised both exempt (loans) and taxable (fee) activities and as such was not in itself an exempt supply.

 

Circular Cash Flows: A Primer

Circular Cash Flows: A Primer

Author: Ed Liptak

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Independent Consultant
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 15 Issue 2, 2024, p. 15 – 23

Abstract

Tax shelter schemes based upon circular cash flows presented a significant problem when the current general anti-avoidance rule (‘GAAR’) was enacted in 2006. It was hoped that by including a non-exclusive list of the most common characteristics of these schemes in the GAAR itself it would give the South African Revenue Service (‘SARS‘) the tools to identify and stop these arrangements and, more importantly, to deter taxpayers from entering into them in the first place. Unfortunately, experience has shown that practitioners and commentators — and even SARS from time to time — continue to overlook or ignore the telltale signs of circular cash flows. This article is intended to be a primer on that score.

 

The Enviroserv Case: A Shift in Interpretation of What is a Process of Manufacture

The Enviroserv Case: A Shift in Interpretation of What is a Process of Manufacture

Author: Michael Rudnicki

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Tax Executive, Bowman’s Attorneys, Johannesburg
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 15 Issue 2, 2024, p. 24 – 30

Abstract

This article explores the case of Enviroserv Waste Management (Pty) Limited v the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service in relation to the facts,
the outcome and the principles developed therein. The case focuses on the business of waste management services conducted by Enviroserv and whether the decomposition and biodegradation of waste in the cells within a landfill site constitute a process of manufacture or a similar process. The article considers the objective transformation of the input into the process as considered in some of the older court decisions. In those decisions the court argued that an article must be ‘essentially different’ from the article that existed before it had undergone the process. The more recent cases focus on the nature, form, shape or utility of the article and that a non-physical transformation could also be an essential difference in a product. The disputed issue related to whether the process that took place in the cells constituted plant used directly in a process of manufacture or a similar process, as contemplated in section 12C of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (‘the Act’). SARS argued that the cells are a storage facility, and that leachate is a byproduct of the waste disposal process. The Commissioner further argued that the cells are buildings and not plant. The provisions of section 12C do not apply to buildings. Section 12C provides a taxpayer a deduction of 20% per annum of the cost of machinery or plant, owned by the taxpayer and used directly in a process of manufacture or a similar process. The court considered the meanings of ‘process’ and ‘manufacture’, which are not defined in the Act from various precedent, to be something made which is different from that out of which it is made. The court held that the process undertaken by Enviroserv constituted a process of separation of the leachate from the solid waste. SARS argued that the cells are ‘waste disposal assets’, defined in section 37B of the Act, are not ‘plant’ as defined in section 12C and are akin to dumps or reservoirs contemplated in the section. Defining features of section 37B are that assets are used in a process that is ancillary to a process of manufacture and are required by environmental law. The provisions of section 12C do not have such requirement. The court also did not find it necessary to consider whether the structure was permanent. The focus was on the process undertaken inside the cell and that this process was intended and desired by the taxpayer within its manufacturing process and therefore not ancillary thereto.