The right to bail pending trial in Uganda

The right to bail pending trial in Uganda

Author: Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: LLB (Makerere) LLM (Pretoria) LLM (Free State) LLD (Western Cape), Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 34 Issue 3, p. 461 – 481
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v34/i3a3

Abstract

Article 23(6)(a) of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) states that an arrested person is ‘entitled’ to apply to court for bail (discretionary bail). Articles 23(b) and (c) require a court to release on bail a person who has been awaiting trial in custody for a specified number of days (mandatory bail). Jurisprudence of Ugandan courts on bail pending trial shows that courts have dealt with two main issues: the right to bail or to apply for bail; and the conditions for granting of discretionary bail pending trial. The Supreme Court has held that an accused has a right to apply for bail. In this article, the author argues that the drafting history of Article 23(6)(a) shows that an accused has a right to bail (as opposed to just apply for bail). The author also demonstrates how courts have been inconsistent in many cases when dealing with the conditions for granting of discretionary bail pending trial. It is argued further that since the Ugandan government is increasingly re-arresting opposition politicians who have been granted bail by the high court, Ugandan courts may explore the possibility of granting anticipatory bail. It is also argued that the drafting history of Articles 129(d) and 210 of the Constitution shows that courts martial are courts of judicature and subordinate to the high court which means, inter alia, that the high court has the power to release an accused on bail should the general court martial refuse to release him/her on bail.

Quantification of damages for unlawful arrest and detention: South Africa, Namibia and Eswatini/Swaziland (3)

Quantification of damages for unlawful arrest and detention: South Africa, Namibia and Eswatini/Swaziland (3)

Author: Chuks Okpaluba

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: LLB, LLM (London), PhD (West Indies), Research Fellow, Centre for Human Rights, University of the Free State
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 34 Issue 2, p. 169 – 190
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v34/i2a1

Abstract

Having concentrated in the last two parts on the South African jurisprudence on quantification of damages for unlawful arrest and detention wherein a wealth of decided cases were encountered dealing with both the liability question and the quantification exercise, it is the preserve of this third part to discuss the developments in Namibia and Eswatini (Swaziland). Among the cases that stand out for discussion in the Namibian jurisdiction are: Gabriel v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 (2) NR 648 (HC); Iyambo v Minister of Safety and Security 2013 (2) NR 562 (HC); Sheefeni v Council of the Municipality of Windhoek 2015 (4) NR 1170 (HC) and Lazarus v Government of the Republic of Namibia 2018 (1) NR 38 (HC). Similarly, the most important cases from the Eswatini jurisdiction include Mfanafuthi Mabuza v Commissioner of Police (39/06) [2006] SZSC 25 (16 November 2006), which concerned detention classified in the Swazi criminal law as a ‘non-bailable offence’. The other two are Zulu v Government of Swaziland (656/2004) [2016] SZHC 99 (24 June 2016) and Myeni v COP (3064/2007) [2017] SZHC 259 (14 December 2017) where extensive deliberations on quantification and awards were made on different heads of damage.

Fine margins between right and rogue: The right to resist an unlawful arrest and the liberty to assault a police officer in Botswana

Fine margins between right and rogue: The right to resist an unlawful arrest and the liberty to assault a police officer in Botswana

Author: Baboki Jonathan Dambe

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: LLB (University of Botswana) LLM (Edinburgh), Lecturer in Law, Department of Law, University of Botswana
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 34 Issue 2, p. 191 – 213
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v34/i2a2

Abstract

On the face of it, the contention that a person is entitled to resist arrest and may, in certain circumstances, have defensible justification for assaulting a police officer, appears incongruous with law and order. Yet, the common law recognises and preserves the right of every individual to resist unlawful arrest and exonerates the individual if they assault a police officer in the process of rebuffing such unlawful arrest. This paper interrogates the scope and application of this right in Botswana. It highlights the delicate balance that must be struck between the exercise of this common law right and the protection of police officers from assaults in the lawful execution of their duties. This is done through an assessment of relevant statutory provisions, local cases, and the approaches adopted in other jurisdictions that recognise the right to resist an unlawful arrest. The paper also briefly explores the civil remedies that are available to an individual who has been subjected to an unlawful arrest and detention.