Bail pending appeal in Uganda

by | Feb 20, 2022 | SACJ, SACJ V34 I2 2021

Bail pending appeal in Uganda

Author: Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: LLB (Makerere) LLM (UP) LLM (UFS) LLD (UWC), Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 34 Issue 2, p. 307 – 338
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v34/i2a7

Abstract

Article 23(6) of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) provides that an arrested person is ‘entitled’ to apply to court for bail. However, it is silent on the issue of bail pending appeal. Bail pending appeal is provided for in the Magistrates Courts Act, the Judicature Act and the Criminal Procedure Code Act. Although the Supreme Court, the highest court in Uganda, provided criteria for granting bail pending appeal, some high court and Court of Appeal judges, who are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, have ignored these criteria. There are conflicting high court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court judgments on the questions of whether art 23(6) is applicable to bail pending appeal and whether the right to be presumed innocent is applicable to a person who is applying for bail pending appeal. There are notable controversies in the rich jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on bail pending appeal. In October 2020, one of the justices of the Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court does not have the jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal and that Rule 6(2)(a), which empowers the Supreme Court to grant bail pending appeal, is unconstitutional. In November 2020, another Supreme Court justice granted an applicant bail pending appeal without even referring to her colleague’s decision which held that the court did not have jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal. This article examines the jurisprudence developed by the courts of Uganda on the subject. The discussion focuses on the following issues: courts with jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal; the right to bail pending appeal; the presumption of innocence and bail pending appeal; and conditions for granting bail pending appeal.

Lay participation in the South African criminal justice system: An assessment of the assessor system

by | Feb 20, 2022 | SACJ, SACJ V34 I2 2021

Lay participation in the South African criminal justice system: An assessment of the assessor system

Authors: B Tshehla & MC Marumoagae

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: B Proc (North) LLM (UCT), Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand; LLB LLM (Wits) LLM (NWU) PhD (UCT) AIPSA Diploma in Insolvency Law and Practice (UP), Associate Professor, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 34 Issue 2, p. 339 – 361
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v34/i2a8

Abstract

This paper sets out to demonstrate that the South African assessor system is not structured in a manner that holds the promise of adequately catering for the intended goal of promoting lay participation by community members in the adjudication of criminal cases. It identifies several challenges with the current assessor system in South Africa such as the unjustifiable differentiation between the assessor system in the magistrates’ courts and the high court which undermines this system as a form of lay participation. In the high court, assessors are required to have experience in the administration of justice or some other skill deemed useful in the case tried. This is not required of assessors in the magistrates’ courts. The paper also illustrates that there are no legislative guidelines on the appointment of assessors which leads to wide discretion being given to presiding officers in the appointment of assessors, which could potentially lead to the adoption of different approaches to similar cases. The key argument presented is that the discretion enjoyed by presiding officers when considering whether to use assessors should be limited by legislation. Most importantly, it is argued that that the legislature should consider reforming the assessor system with a view to establishing a system that will be equally applicable to both the high court and magistrates’ courts as the current differentiation seems unjustifiable.