ISSN: 1996-2126
Affiliations: Foreign Affairs Officer, US Department of State
Source: South African Journal on Human Rights, Volume 28 Issue 3, 2012, p. 586 – 590
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ISSN: 1996-2126
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
Source: South African Journal on Human Rights, Volume 28 Issue 3, 2012, p. 553 – 585
There has been limited research into the activity of South Africa’s national independent human rights institutions (NIHRIs) and their roles in protecting and promoting the rights of children. This article attempts to address this gap by analysing the mandate and the effectiveness of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in respect of children’s rights. The mandate and the work of the SAHRC are assessed against the guidelines issued by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child. The article shows that the SAHRC largely complies with the above general guidelines, although improvements are required in terms of the specificity of the mandate pertaining to children, priority given to the rights of children, the diversity of rights issues addressed by the SAHRC, as well as promoting, protecting and monitoring the right of the child to be heard. Positive practices from foreign jurisdictions are used to suggest improvements to the activity of the Commission.
ISSN: 1996-2126
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Rhodes University
Source: South African Journal on Human Rights, Volume 28 Issue 3, 2012, p. 532 – 552
The development of reproductive technologies in the last century, such as effective contraceptive methods, artificial insemination, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, amongst others, has fundamentally reshaped traditional concepts of reproduction parenthood and has raised practical and ethical concerns. This article describes one such development, namely, post-mortem gamete retrieval (PMGR) for the purposes of posthumous reproduction. In exploring the particular concerns arising from this technology, I argue that South Africa lacks a coherent, considered approach to the issue. In considering models adopted in overseas jurisdictions, and the various bases for the legalisation of such a procedure, I adopt an interest theory of rights to argue for restricted access to such a technology in suitable circumstances.
ISSN: 1996-2126
Affiliations: Lecturer in Delict, Law of Negotiable Instruments and Banking Law, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: South African Journal on Human Rights, Volume 28 Issue 3, 2012, p. 506 – 531
The human experience is informed by the sex assigned to an individual at birth, either as a male or female, and societal perceptions attached to sex and gender. However, this basic premise does not hold true for those individuals who do not develop from their assigned sex such as transsexual and transgendered individuals. South African law, as informed by the Constitution, has comparatively developed extensively regarding the accommodation of the ‘transsexual experience’ and allows post-operative transsexual and transgendered individuals to change their assigned sex in terms of the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003 and the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992. However, this legal framework is based on prevailing gender stereotypes and constructs that conflate the notions of sex, gender and sexual orientation. As such, the current legal framework does not allow pre-operative transsexual and transgendered individuals to change their assigned sex, which is arguably discriminatory and inconsistent with the Constitution. This framework ignores the valid reasons of individuals not choosing to undergo invasive ‘sex change’ operations and can therefore be challenged on a myriad of constitutional guarantees. It is doubted, however, whether any future laws will meet these individuals’ needs unless there is a clearer understanding of the concepts of sex, gender and sexual orientation and their interaction with each other. It is proposed that the application of Francisco Valdez’s eight-point strategy to dissipate these conflations in law would lead possibly to the elimination of existing legal discriminations.
ISSN: 1996-2126
Affiliations: Research Fellow, University of the Witwatersrand Centre for Ethics
Source: South African Journal on Human Rights, Volume 28 Issue 3, 2012, p. 483 – 505
Most theorists of human rights believe that human rights are subject to a feasibility constraint. But they tend not to say much about what such a constraint means, or its consequences for a theory of human rights. This lack of clarity has allowed feasibility to become a rhetorical weapon in the hands of conservatives who oppose egalitarian conceptions of human rights. I analyse the concept of a feasibility constraint and argue that a strict feasibility constraint over theories of human rights is not justified. Arguments against egalitarian conceptions of human rights that depend on such a feasibility constraint are therefore flawed.
ISSN: 1996-2126
Affiliations: Adjunct Professor, Nelson Mandela School of Law, University of Fort Hare
Source: South African Journal on Human Rights, Volume 28 Issue 3, 2012, p. 458 – 482
To what extent does the law protect the liberty of a person in lawful incarceration? This question arises at the backdrop of the importance the common law and modern constitutions attach to the right to personal liberty. Simply put, does a prisoner enjoy the right to residual liberty under the constitutional and common law systems where the prison authorities have imposed restraints not permitted by the law authorising incarceration in the first instance? The answers to these questions elicit a sharp division. Canadian and South African courts operating a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a Bill of Rights respectively have held that the right to residual liberty exists. Yet, in spite of the emphasis English courts place on the right to personal liberties, they deny the existence of the right to residual liberty of a prisoner. Recent cases from the now defunct House of Lords and the Court of Appeal show that actions for damages based on the violation of that right fail in English courts unless the plaintiff can link the alleged wrongful act to an existing tort. That notwithstanding, a plaintiff who bases his claim on the tort of false imprisonment is bound to fail but if he alleges misfeasance in public office and goes further to prove the high threshold of that tort, his action might succeed.