Sandra Fredman Comparative Human Rights Law (2018)
Sandra Fredman Comparative Human Rights Law (2018)
Author D M Davis
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: N/A
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 137 Issue 4, p. 792-796
Abstract
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ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: N/A
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 137 Issue 4, p. 792-796
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ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: N/A
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 137 Issue 4, p. 797-806
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ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: N/A
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 137 Issue 4, p. 807-810
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ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: PhD graduate, University of KwaZulu-Natal; Senior Lecturer in Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 137 Issue 3, p. 371-388
The amendment of the Uniform Rules of Court to include service by electronic mail has raised the interesting question of service through electronic media other than electronic mail. Recent developments have partially answered this question with regard to substituted service via Facebook. However, it is still a relatively novel concept and has not yet been extended to WhatsApp in South Africa. This note examines the criteria employed in determining the likelihood of accomplishing substituted service via WhatsApp. First, the principles underlying substituted service are examined, followed by an assessment of the impact and reach of social media platforms, a summary of the initial moves to incorporate them into South African procedural law, and a description of the technical attributes of WhatsApp. Several judgments from around the world, tentatively embracing service via WhatsApp, are then discussed, followed by an assessment of the standards that need to be met in order to ensure effective service, and the factors that a court needs to consider when faced with such a request. The note concludes that a reasonable degree of certainty that service can be achieved by WhatsApp exists, and that it could therefore be an effective medium for substituted service.
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, Department of Private Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 137 Issue 3, p. 389-406
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Amendment Bill provides that spouses in polygamous marriages concluded before the commencement of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 have joint rights of ownership, management and control over marital property. The Bill creates uncertainty by failing to explain what is meant by joint rights of ownership and control, which uncertainty is exacerbated by the incorporation of the terms ‘marital’, ‘personal’, ‘house’ and ‘family’ property without concrete definitions of these terms. The burden will fall to courts to re-imagine the antiquated definitions of these concepts in the current socioeconomic context. Moreover, the amendments are not reconciled within the existing legal framework. Consequently, women in polygamous marriages concluded before the Act’s commencement may, counter-intuitively, have greater rights than those women in polygamous marriages concluded after the commencement of the Act. The note thus argues for substantial revisions before the Bill is passed.
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Director, Werksmans Attorneys
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 137 Issue 3, p. 407-423
In this case note, the author discusses the unreported high court case of Musanga v Minister of Labour. The applicants were a group of asylum seekers who challenged the constitutionality of long-standing statutory provisions and institutional conduct that effectively excluded them from being able to claim benefits from the Unemployment Insurance Fund (‘UIF’), despite the fact that they had contributed to the UIF during their employment. The note analyses the arguments made by the applicants to establish that their constitutional rights to equality, human dignity and access to social security (as encapsulated in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) had been unjustifiably infringed. The note also considers the counter-arguments by the respondents who opposed the application. Having outlined and evaluated the parties’ respective arguments, the author summarises the salient aspects of the court order which, importantly, confirmed (i) the constitutional invalidity of the exclusionary provisions and conduct, and (ii) that asylum seekers are entitled to claim benefits from the UIF. The note highlights the importance of the case in realizing South Africa’s social-justice ambitions.