A superfluous concept? The inherent jurisdiction of the South African superior courts as upper guardians of children

by | Apr 7, 2024 | SALJ, SALJ V141 I2 2024

A superfluous concept? The inherent jurisdiction of the South African superior courts as upper guardians of children

Authors: Julia Sloth-Nielsen & Brigitte Clark

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor of Law, University of Huddersfield; Emeritus Professor, University of the Western Cape; Associate Professor, School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal; Honorary Visiting Researcher, Oxford Brookes University
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 2, p. 391-414
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i2a6

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between the role of the superior courts as upper guardians of minors and the constitutionally enshrined right of South African children to have their best interests considered paramount in any matter concerning them. The powerful procedural role of the superior courts in this regard is not subject to review or appeal, enabling the courts to intervene of their own accord on behalf of and to protect all children in their jurisdiction. The article examines whether this upper guardianship role has become superfluous and outdated in light of the constitutional requirement that courts consider the paramountcy of the child’s best interests as an independent right. The High Court’s upper guardianship role provides a more flexible legal basis for judicial intervention, as the case law reviewed in this article indicates. It is also supported by s 173 of the Constitution, which refers to the inherent powers of courts to protect and regulate their own process and to develop the common law, and by s 45(4) of the Children’s Act. Furthermore, the superior courts, as courts of record, enable the development of a system of precedent-based child law, providing judicial reasons for all decisions and justifying the retention of the common-law inherent jurisdiction of the High Court as the upper guardian of children. We conclude that there is a residual role for the continued existence of the powers of the superior courts to act as upper guardians of the children within their jurisdiction, the constitutional best-interests standard notwithstanding.

On making, reporting, and repeating defamatory statements

by | Jan 28, 2024 | SALJ, SALJ V141 I1 2024

On making, reporting, and repeating defamatory statements

Author: Anton Fagan

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: WP Schreiner Professor of Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 1, p. 1-14
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i1a1

Abstract

This note starts by distinguishing the making from the reporting of a defamatory statement, and both of these from the repetition of one. Thereafter, having introduced the general rule that a defendant who made or reported a defamatory statement about a plaintiff to a third party cannot avoid liability on the ground that she was merely repeating a statement made by a fourth party, the note goes on to discuss certain already-existing exceptions, and possible exceptions, to this rule. Finally, the note looks at whether our law should acknowledge a further exception, namely where a defendant repeated a defamatory statement by reporting it, while knowing it to be false, but did so only in order to refute it.

A consideration of the Registrar’s powers in matters relating to the National Credit Act: An analysis of Gcasamba v Mercedes-Benz Financial Services (Pty) Ltd and Ngandela v Absa Bank Ltd

by | Jan 28, 2024 | SALJ, SALJ V141 I1 2024

A consideration of the Registrar’s powers in matters relating to the National Credit Act: An analysis of Gcasamba v Mercedes-Benz Financial Services (Pty) Ltd and Ngandela v Absa Bank Ltd

Author: Ciresh Singh

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Associate Professor, University of South Africa
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 1, p. 15-23
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i1a2

Abstract

Section 23 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, read with rule 31(5) of the Uniform Rules of Court, empowers the Registrar of the High Court, save in exceptional circumstances involving residential property, to grant default judgments. The purpose of this rule is to prevent the overburdening of the court roll and judicial workload by allowing Registrars the discretion to grant default judgments in uncomplicated, undefended matters. In recent judgments in Gcashamba v Mercedes-Benz Financial Services SA (Pty) Ltd & another 2023 (1) SA 141 (FB) and Ngandela v Absa Bank Ltd & another [2023] ZAECELLC 6, the courts both found that a Registrar is not empowered to grant default judgments in matters relating to the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. The question thus arises whether the National Credit Act has changed and effectively reduced the Registrar’s powers. The implications of these judgments are far-reaching. Not only do they appear to have lessened the powers of the Registrar, but they also have the effect of increasing the administrative workload of judges and potentially delaying the enforcement process of credit agreements subject to the National Credit Act.