ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 140 Issue 4, p. 912-920
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v140/i4a11
None
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor, Department of Private Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 140 Issue 3, p. 465-480
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v140/i3a1
In South African law, a beneficiary may be disqualified from inheriting for killing the deceased, forging the deceased’s will, or acting in a morally reprehensible manner towards the deceased. In Smit v The Master of the High Court, Western Cape [2022] 4 All SA 146 (WCC), the court disqualified a wife from inheriting from her deceased husband because she had conspired to kill him. The court also disqualified her for forging his testamentary documents and his mother’s will. In addition, the court held that she was not entitled to claim maintenance and other benefits from his estate. This note critically evaluates the theoretical underpinnings of the court’s findings, with regard to the facts and the evidence in the case.
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Associate Professor, University of South Africa
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 140 Issue 3, p. 481-494
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v140/i3a2
In South African Human Rights Commission v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2023 (3) SA 36 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that a bank is not obliged to take a foreclosure matter to the magistrate’s court, even if the magistrate’s court has jurisdiction over the matter. The apex court confirmed that a court is not entitled to decline to hear a matter properly brought before it because another court has concurrent jurisdiction. Before this decision, the Gauteng and Eastern Cape Divisions of the High Court both found that the High Court was entitled to decline to hear a matter if the matter fell within the jurisdiction of a magistrate’s court. These decisions were taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which upheld the appeal and found that the High Court has no power to refuse to hear a matter falling within its jurisdiction on the ground that another court has concurrent jurisdiction. The Constitutional Court has now confirmed the decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal, finding that complex matters such as foreclosure applications deserve more judicial scrutiny, and ought to be heard by the High Court.
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal; Visiting Scholar, Petrie-Flom Center, Harvard Law School
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 140 Issue 3, p. 495-504
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v140/i3a3
Regulation 18 of the Regulations Relating to the Artificial Fertilisation of Persons provides for an ownership scheme in reproductive material — eggs, sperm and embryos — outside the human body. Within this regulatory scheme, the following question is pertinent: can ownership of reproductive material, once acquired in terms of reg 18, be transferred to someone else? To answer this question, reg 18 is analysed using well-established tools of statutory interpretation. The conclusion drawn is that a broad interpretation of reg 18 should be followed that allows for the transfer of ownership. Attention is drawn to case law that contradicts this conclusion, but it is shown that the rationale for the relevant decision lacks any depth. Accordingly, the decision should urgently be challenged in the public interest.
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Associate Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 140 Issue 3, p. 505-520
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v140/i3a4
This note acts as a reply to the critique levelled at the Pretoria Crits by Willem Gravett in two articles published in 2018. The note begins by summarising Gravett’s objections to the Pretoria Crits’ views about the South African legal system and the teaching of law in South African universities. Thereafter, errors of argument are identified that undermine, or are even destructive of, Gravett’s critique. In the course of his five-part rebuttal, the author remedies certain misconceptions about the Pretoria Crits’ views and beliefs. He also identifies how the Pretoria Crits have made important critical contributions to a broader understanding of the nature of South Africa’s legal system and the challenges of teaching law in a transforming society.
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape; Director, Cheadle Thompson & Haysom Inc; Associate, Cheadle Thompson & Haysom Inc; Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political
Science; Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 140 Issue 3, p. 521-549
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v140/i3a5
This article is intended as a catalyst to re-open a debate that was closed perfunctorily and prematurely in the 2000s: is increasing the profits of an already profitable company an operational requirement for purposes of the LRA? We review key retrenchment judgments in these scenarios over the past 20 years and advance two main arguments. First, the debate should be re-opened because the current position that increasing profits is an operational requirement for purposes of the LRA is based on obiter remarks that have been elevated, without in-depth inquiry, to the position of binding authority. Secondly, if the debate is re-opened, there are compelling reasons why increasing profits of an already profitable company should not constitute an operational requirement. To this end, we employ an interdisciplinary approach that combines legal and economic knowledge and demonstrates that, despite earlier opinions, the current position is destructive to the LRA, the position unduly favours employers, and the judicial and scholarly assumptions about the effects of increasing company profits are not always economically correct. Ultimately, we argue that courts’ approach to retrenchments in the case of already profitable companies must be revisited with less deference to employers and with an openness to exploring different understandings of the definition of operational requirements in the LRA.