The Shackled Parent? Disputes over Relocation by Separating Parents – Is there a need for Statutory Guidelines?

by | Oct 19, 2019 | SALJ, SALJ V134 I1 2017

The Shackled Parent? Disputes over Relocation by Separating Parents – Is there a need for Statutory Guidelines?

Authors Brigitte Clark

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Oxford Brookes University
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 134 Issue 1, 2017, p. 80 – 115

Abstract

This article focuses on the problems confronting a variety of jurisdictions when one parent wishes to relocate internationally with the children after divorce or separation and, as a result, the parent ‘left behind’will be deprived of access to/contact with his or her children. The article examines relocation in the context not only of its frequently gendered nature, but also of the inconclusive and controversial social-science research about its effects on children. As a result of this examination, the article suggests that national statutory guidance should be drafted, directing the courts to consider (inter alia) the wishes and feelings of the children; the current care-giving responsibilities; the relocating parent’s reasons for wishing to relocate; the non-relocating parent’s reasons for opposing the relocation; and the presence of any domestic violence. An internationally collaborative strategy leading to the establishment of national statutory guidance would appear to be the most effective way in which the law can operate in this area. This would strengthen the impact of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and greater legal certainty could be achieved by the framing of such guidelines, whilst preserving the ultimate discretionary power of the courts to act in the child’s best interests.

The Myth of Rationality: Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Judicial Decision-Making

by | Oct 19, 2019 | SALJ, SALJ V134 I1 2017

The Myth of Rationality: Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Judicial Decision-Making

Authors Willem H Gravett

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, Department of Procedural Law, University of Pretoria
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 134 Issue 1, 2017, p. 53 – 79

Abstract

From Plato until the early 1970s, humankind operated under two broad assumptions: (1) people are generally rational; and (2) when people depart from rationality, emotions are likely to blame. However, in 1974 experimental psychologists started documenting systematic errors in the thinking of ‘normal’ people that they traced to the basic design of the machinery of cognition, rather than to the corruption of thought by emotion. They found that human beings rely on cognitive shortcuts to generate judgements without having to consider all the relevant information, relying instead on a limited set of cues. A range of empirical studies in the United States and Europe show that judicial decision-makers are susceptible to some of these cognitive biases. Even if judges have no conscious prejudice against either litigant, understand the law, and know the facts, they might still make systematically erroneous decisions because of how they — like all human beings — think. The purpose of this article is to start to acquaint the South African judiciary with these traps of the mind. There seems to be no empirical research on the effects of these cognitive biases on judicial decision-making in South Africa. This is a perilous deficiency in scholarship that must be addressed.

The Notion of Absolute and Exclusive Ownership: A Doctrinal Analysis

by | Oct 19, 2019 | SALJ, SALJ V134 I1 2017

The Notion of Absolute and Exclusive Ownership: A Doctrinal Analysis

Authors A J van der Walt, Priviledge Dhliwayo

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Distinguished Professor and South African Research Chair in Property Law, Stellenbosch University; Post-doctoral Research Fellow, Department of Public Law, South African Research Chair in Property Law, Stellenbosch University
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 134 Issue 1, 2017, p. 34 – 52

Abstract

In South African law, ownership is usually described as an absolute and exclusive right. The idea of absoluteness can be understood as an indication that ownership is the most complete real right, to distinguish it from limited real rights, or that ownership allows the owner freedom in using the property, but only in so far as the law allows. However, even with these qualifications it remains problematic to describe ownership as an absolute right. This article explores doctrinal perspectives on limitations on ownership and specifically on the right to exclude. It furthermore considers the idea that the absoluteness of ownership implies that the right to exclude is either absolute or central to ownership. The conclusion is that neither ownership nor the right to exclude is absolute in any meaningful sense because ownership is limited by limited real rights and by constitutional and statutory law. Stated differently, ownership and the right to exclude are limited by and within the legal system in which they function.

The Removal from Office of a President: Reflections on Section 89 of the Constitution

by | Oct 19, 2019 | SALJ, SALJ V134 I1 2017

The Removal from Office of a President: Reflections on Section 89 of the Constitution

Authors Loammi Wolf

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Research Associate, Sanlam Centre for Public Management and Governance, University of Johannesburg
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 134 Issue 1, 2017, p. 1 – 33

Abstract

Section 89 of the Constitution regulates the removal from office of the President. The origins of the removal procedures date back to the previous constitutions at a time when the offices of the nominal head of state (State President) and the head of the executive (Prime Minister) were still separated. After the two offices were merged by the 1983 Constitution, the procedures and grounds for the removal from office of the executive President were slightly adapted, but there is little clarity on the difference between a motion of no confidence and the removal from office of the President. The lack of clarity on the nature of these powers also prevails in the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions. It is common cause that the rationale of a motion of no confidence is that the members of Parliament, who elect the leader of the executive and give him or her a mandate to govern, may withdraw that mandate when the Cabinet loses the confidence of Parliament — in both instances with a simple majority vote. It is therefore difficult to justify a two-thirds-majority requirement for the removal from office of the President for a serious violation of the Constitution or the law or for serious misconduct. It can hardly be justified in a constitutional state. The real difficulty is the way in which s 89 of the Constitution has been conceptualised: it deals with the President’s fitness to hold office and the character of the power to examine that is essentially judicial in nature. Unlike measures available to the legislature to hold the executive accountable with a censure motion, a motion of no confidence (s 102) or summons to appear before Parliament (s 56), the seriousness of removal grounds is judged in terms of the principle of proportionality, which functions as a curb on the abuse of power.