The unfortunate dearth of judicial precedent in transfer pricing continues

The unfortunate dearth of judicial precedent in transfer pricing continues

Author: Thabo Legwaila

ISSN: 1996-2185
Affiliations: Professor, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: South African Mercantile Law Journal, Volume 35 Issue 1, 2023, p. 74 – 93
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAMLJ/v35/i1a4

Abstract

Despite what could be hailed as the first two transfer pricing cases in South Africa, the unfortunate dearth of judicial precedent in South Africa regrettably continues. Transfer pricing is one of the most complex areas of tax alongside provisions dealing with controlled foreign companies, foreign exchange gains and losses, currency conversions, financial instruments, and corporate reorganisations. In fact, as the list goes on, it is just more apposite to say ‘tax is complex’, period. With regard to transfer pricing in particular, the complexity is amplified by the fact that transfer pricing is not even tax per se. It is an economic allocation of contribution through the value chain. It is through transfer pricing that each contributor in the value chain gets an adequate return for their contribution in the value chain. Once that allocation is complete, the tax provisions are applied to the returns of each contributor according to the tax laws of the countries in which they are taxable. A transfer price is a price set by a taxpayer when selling to, buying from or sharing resources with a related person. A transfer price is contrasted with a market price, which is the price set in the marketplace for the transfer of goods and services between unrelated persons where each party strives to get the utmost possible benefit from the transaction (see Arnold & McIntyre, International Tax Primer (Kluwer Law International 2002) 55; Danzinger, International Income Tax (Butterworths 1991) 303–307). Transfer prices are not negotiated in a free open market and as such have the propensity to deviate from prices agreed upon by non-related trading partners in comparable transactions under the same circumstances (Oguttu, International Tax Law: Offshore Tax Avoidance in South Africa (Juta 2015) 213). Unless prevented from doing so, related persons engaged in cross-border transactions can avoid the income taxes of a country through a manipulation of prices, mainly by shifting profits to low tax countries and expenses to high tax countries. To combat this, tax authorities across the globe have the power to adjust, in appropriate cases, the transfer prices set by related persons (Arnold & McIntyre, (Kluwer 2002) 55. In what can be welcomed as the first transfer pricing case in the South African courts, the South Johannesburg High Court had an opportunity to decide on the applicability of s 31(7) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (‘the Act’; any reference to a section or subsection are to the Act, unless otherwise stated, or the context indicates otherwise) to a debt owed by a foreign company to a South African company. The applicable provision excludes debt instruments that contain core characteristics of debt instruments from the application of transfer pricing provisions. In the second case, the same court missed out on an opportunity to gauge the legitimacy of the revenue collector to use s 31(2) of the Act to adjust prices charged between a taxpayer and third parties that are not related to the taxpayer.

Do taxpayers have to pay tax when SARS has not complied with sections 92, 95 and 96 of the Tax Administration Act? Nondabula v Commissioner: SARS & another explained

Do taxpayers have to pay tax when SARS has not complied with sections 92, 95 and 96 of the Tax Administration Act? Nondabula v Commissioner: SARS & another explained

Author: Moseki Maleka

ISSN: 1996-2185
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, University of South Africa
Source: South African Mercantile Law Journal, Volume 35 Issue 1, 2023, p. 94 – 109
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAMLJ/v35/i1a5

Abstract

Section 3 of the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 (‘SARS Act’) provides that the South African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) is empowered to administer and collect taxes in South Africa. The Commissioner for SARS (‘the Commissioner’) is empowered to invoke the collection methods in terms of ss 164 and 179 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (‘the TAA’).

Retraction of a ‘hot-headed resignation’ caused by depression: Lessons from Cairncross/Legal and Tax (Pty) Ltd 2019 (2) BALR 137 (CCMA)

Retraction of a ‘hot-headed resignation’ caused by depression: Lessons from Cairncross/Legal and Tax (Pty) Ltd 2019 (2) BALR 137 (CCMA)

Author: Mafanywa Jeffrey Mangammbi

ISSN: 1996-2185
Affiliations: Department of Mercantile & Labour Law, University of Limpopo
Source: South African Mercantile Law Journal, Volume 35 Issue 1, 2023, p. 110 – 122
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAMLJ/v35/i1a6

Abstract

Unlike its celebrated siblings, Metropolitan Health Risk Management v Majatladi 2015 (36) ILJ 958 (LAC) (‘Majatladi’), National Health Laboratory Service v Yona (2015) 36 ILJ 2259 (LAC) (‘Yona’) and HC Heat Exchangers (Pty) Ltd v Araujo 2020 (3) BLLR 280 (LC) (‘HC Heat Exchangers’), Cairncross/Legal and Tax (Pty) Ltd 2019 (2) BALR 137 (CCMA) (‘Cairncross’) is the black sheep of the constructive dismissal family. The arbitration award in Cairncross brings into sharp focus emotional distress in the context of constructive dismissal. Cairncross provides a platform to isolate some of the critical issues that have arisen in recent times concerning constructive dismissal. First, there is a troublesome jurisdictional puzzle: Has the employee resigned or was he or she dismissed? Secondly, the case deals with the vexed question of what would constitute intolerable circumstances to continue the employment relationship, and in particular, whether work-related stress could form the basis of a constructive dismissal claim. In the case under scrutiny, the employee had claimed that her depression was attributable to the unbearable working environment. The basis of her claim of intolerability of continued employment was that an employer has a common-law and statutory duty to provide a safe working environment, which it had failed to deliver. Lastly, Cairncross also brings to the fore a consideration of the effect of tendering a resignation and the aggrieved employee’s subsequent attempt to withdraw it. The question that is answered is whether an employer’s failure to accept the withdrawal of resignation by an employee suffering from work-related stress constitutes a type of constructive dismissal.

Running out of colour in a passing-off claim: Koni Multinational Brands (Pty) Ltd v Beiersdorf AG

Running out of colour in a passing-off claim: Koni Multinational Brands (Pty) Ltd v Beiersdorf AG

Author: Nomthandazo Mahlangu

ISSN: 1996-2185
Affiliations: Lecturer, North-West University
Source: South African Mercantile Law Journal, Volume 34 Issue 3, 2022, p. 305 – 331
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAMLJ/v34/i3a1

Abstract

The appeal in Koni Multinational Brands (Pty) Ltd v Beiersdorf AG 2021 JDR 0414 (SCA) turned on whether Beiersdorf could stop Koni from selling its product in a get-up much like that of NIVEA MEN by asserting unlawful competition in the form of passing off. This question is answered by analysing case law on assessing the acquisition of distinctiveness. Given the lack of South African cases on this form of acquisition, reference is made to cases from other common-law jurisdictions. The discussion evaluates whether evidence presented by Beiersdorf supports the decision that the features in question are distinctive of its products. The findings illustrate that even a long-standing use of a trade mark which is not inherently distinctive will not make it distinctive. The decision in Koni is significant because it (incorrectly) bestows the use of specific colours on one enterprise to the exclusion of its competitors.

Setting boundaries for image misappropriations through online catfishing

Setting boundaries for image misappropriations through online catfishing

Authors: Lisa Ndyulo & Nomalanga Mashinini

ISSN: 1996-2185
Affiliations: LLM Graduate, Rhodes University; Senior Lecturer in Law, Rhodes University
Source: South African Mercantile Law Journal, Volume 34 Issue 3, 2022, p. 332 – 347
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAMLJ/v34/i3a2

Abstract

Social networking platforms have popularised catfishing, which entails creating and using a fake social media account to exploit other users. Catfishing involves acts of online misappropriation because the traits of a person’s identity, such as a name and photograph, can be used by a catfish to pose as another person to deceive other users. Image rights are frequently affected by such acts of impersonation. This article determines whether mere misappropriation of identity suffices as a cause of action for image rights violations. The South African courts must clarify whether mere misappropriation constitutes a ground for violating identity in catfishing cases. Thus, the courts should recognise mere misappropriation as sufficient to yield a claim when the falsification and commercial exploitation of identity cannot be proven. Such an approach will allow for the speedy resolution of disputes and will also ensure that justice is served before the plaintiff suffers irreparable harm as a result of image misappropriations on social media.

A purposive perspective on piercing the corporate veil under Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008

A purposive perspective on piercing the corporate veil under Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008

Author: Etienne Olivier

ISSN: 1996-2185
Affiliations: Lecturer, Department of Mercantile and Labour Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape
Source: South African Mercantile Law Journal, Volume 34 Issue 3, 2022, p. 348 – 381
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAMLJ/v34/i3a3

Abstract

Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) is a statutory version of the common-law remedy of piercing the corporate veil. Unfortunately, the legislature, by leaving undefined the phrases ‘interested person’, ‘unconscionable abuse’ and ‘any further order necessary to give effect to the declaration’ in s 20(9) of the Act, has left room for uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the section. After discussing the purpose of s 20(9) of the Act, the article makes recommendations for how the statutory veil-piercing remedy should be interpreted. The article suggests the inclusion in the Act of an extensive and open-ended definition of ‘unconscionable abuse’ that describes categories of abuse sufficient to justify piercing of the corporate veil. It is argued that the term ‘interested person’ should be read to exclude a company’s controllers acting for their own benefit when the controllers themselves have committed the unconscionable abuse. It is argued further that a court’s power to grant ‘any further order’ in addition to a disregarding of separate legal personality should be limited to orders that are necessary to provide adequate relief for the litigant that invokes s 20(9), namely impositions of rights and liabilities.