Die beoogde sui generis-beskerming van inheemse kennisbates in die suidafrikaanse intellektuele goederereg

Die beoogde sui generis-beskerming van inheemse kennisbates in die suidafrikaanse intellektuele goederereg

Author Andries Raath and Pieter Brits

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BJuris LLB MA DPhil, Afgetrede Senior Professor en Navorsingsgenoot, Departemente Publiekreg en Geskiedenis, Universiteit van die Vrystaat; BCom BCom (Hons) LLB LLM, Senior Dosent, Handelsreg, Universiteit van die Vrystaat
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 31 Issue 1, 2020, p. 110 – 137

Abstract

The indigenous knowledge movement argues in favour of the recognition of the plurality of knowledge manifested in indigenous communities. However, this assumption presupposes a universal indigenous knowledge which asserts a manifestation of indigenous knowledge in counterpoint to that of “the West” as if all expressions of traditional knowledge form part of a single system of anti-European knowledge resources. The arguments in favour of the sui generis protection of indigenous knowledge base their demands on the assumption that ethnic group entities have lasting and comprehensive rights on cultural products and ideas, that the relationship of such group entities to their cultural assets are describable as forms of ownership to cultural identity, and that indigenous knowledge gathered by missionaries, anthropologists and film makers prior to the promulgation of laws protecting indigenous knowledge does not meet the required standards of informed consent. In this article, the authors argue that these assumptions undergirding the proposed South African legislation on the protection of indigenous knowledge are flawed. The authors voice their concerns about the continued expansion of intellectual property rights and the progressive invasion of knowledge in the public domain. In addition, the absence of an internationally acceptable definition of the indigenous entities qualifying for sui generis protection, harbours the potential of abuse by majority cultures appropriating the rights of indigenous minorities to their economic advantage. In the proposed South African legislative project such appropriation causes further marginalisation of the true indigenous peoples of the region. Regarding the envisaged protection of cultural expressions of indigenous peoples, the authors advocate the treatment of such expressions as part of the public domain, so that anyone may have access to them and contribute to their development and evolvement. The authors support the adoption of an approach that will help to protect the public domain without contributing to the progressive expansion of the scope of intellectual property rights on the one hand and provide indigenous people with the opportunity to reap economic benefit from their traditional cultural products on the other.

Personal cost orders: protecting the public purse

Personal cost orders: protecting the public purse

Author Wesley Vos

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BCom LLB cum laude, Candidate Attorney: Bowmans
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 31 Issue 1, 2020, p. 138 – 157

Abstract

South African courts are employing a novel instrument in the fight against corruption, such instrument being the imposition of a personal costs order against state officials. This article briefly discusses corruption and accountability in state institutions and argues that ordering personal cost orders against state officials is a promising prospect in the fight against corruption. Personal cost orders are then analysed by addressing eight concerns that arise when such orders are imposed. These concerns are: what the legal basis is for being held personally liable for costs; whether there is a uniform test to be applied when considering a personal cost order; whether such an order can be made on a punitive scale; the joinder of affected parties; whether it can be imposed without the matter being heard in open court; the power of courts to impose such an order; whether it infringes on the separation of powers doctrine; and lastly, whether it could lead to an ineffective system of public administration. The article concludes by finding that there is no legislative deficit in the fight against corruption and finds that until officials are held personally accountable for their misfeasance, they will continue to exploit their position as they are protected by their public office. This “protection” and inclination to misappropriate public funds might fall away if officials are ordered to pay legal costs in their personal capacity.

Unfettered discretion is paramount: the governance relationship between the private equity firm and the underlying portfolio investee company

Unfettered discretion is paramount: the governance relationship between the private equity firm and the underlying portfolio investee company

Author Wentzel Oaker

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB LLM LLD Post-Doctoral Law Fellow, Stellenbosch University, Visiting Post-Doctoral Law Fellow, Duke University
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 31 Issue 1, 2020, p. 158 – 176

Abstract

One of the features of private equity investing is the private equity firm appointing individual(s) to serve on the board of directors of the underlying portfolio investee companies to manage the interest of the private equity fund and ultimately to act in the best interests of the fund’s investors. This article discusses the statutory and common-law duties of a director, including the specific issues related to the interrelation between private equity firms and the portfolio companies in which they invest. However, in the context of a private equity fund, this expectation can often be problematic because directors must exercise their duties with unfettered discretion. Directors cannot, without the consent of the company, fetter their discretion in relation to the exercise of their powers, and cannot bind themselves to vote in a particular way at future board meetings. Therefore, a director who is appointed to represent certain shareholders (albeit a private equity fund(s)), is still obliged to exercise his or her discretion and must act positively to protect the interests of the company even if they conflict with those of the people who elected him or her.

Tyrannical masters no more? Promissory insurance warranties after Viking Inshore Fishing (PTY) LTD v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co LTD

Tyrannical masters no more? Promissory insurance warranties after Viking Inshore Fishing (PTY) LTD v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co LTD

Author Graham Glover

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB PhD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Rhodes University
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 30 Issue 3, 2019, p. 333 – 360

Abstract

In this article, the implications of the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”)in Viking Inshore Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd for the law on promissory insurance warranties are considered. The article begins with an overview of the traditional position, which has been that such warranties are to be strictly interpreted and enforced, no matter the harshness of the result. Thereafter, the article discusses the contrasting decisions in Viking Inshore Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd in the Western Cape High Court and the SCA. Wallis JA suggested on appeal that the strict traditional approach to promissory warranties was no longer appropriate, but without having to decide the point. The article next considers the implications of an obiter dictum of the SCA, in a matter relating to a court exercising admiralty jurisdiction, on insurance law in general. Thereafter, the article proposes that Wallis JA’s comments indicate an important change to our law on promissory warranties, specifically in relation to the need for there to be a causal link between the insured’s breach of the warranty and the loss suffered, before an insurer may exercise the power to repudiate the contract. Although others have made the causal-link argument before, this article tries to explain and situate this development in two doctrinal contexts: the modern law on contractual interpretation; and the doctrine of public policy. A supplementary argument relates to the drawing together of the law on promissory warranties with the rules relating to cancellation for major breach, in cases where an insurer pursues that remedy.

Reconsidering the state’s liability for harm arising from crime: the potential development of the law of delict

Reconsidering the state’s liability for harm arising from crime: the potential development of the law of delict

Author Bernard Wessels

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA (Hons) LLB (Stell) BCL (Oxon) LLD (Stell), Lecturer in Private Law, Stellenbosch University
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 30 Issue 3, 2019, p. 361 – 391

Abstract

This article evaluates the compensatory relief South African law currently provides to crime victims. To obtain compensation for harm arising from crime, a victim may institute a common-law delictual claim against the perpetrator of the crime. Because the perpetrator is unlikely to be in a financial position to compensate, crime victims have had to develop an alternative strategy. Essentially, they have argued that it is the state, rather than the perpetrator, that should be held delictually liable for harm arising from crime. More specifically, they have argued that the state should be held vicariously liable in delict on the basis that its employees culpably and wrongfully caused the victim’s harm, either by action or inaction. This article evaluates this development of the common law and argues that the expanding delictual liability of the state for harm arising from crime is undesirable. The common-law delictual claim is not the crime victim’s only option for compensation. The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides crime victims with a degree of procedural assistance in claiming compensation from the perpetrator and the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 seeks to introduce measures to combat organised crime activities and provides for the recovery of the proceeds of unlawful activities. The article analyses the existing statutory mechanisms to claim compensation for harm arising from crime and finds that it is unsatisfactory from a crime victim compensation perspective. Against this background, the article suggests that it may be sensible to consider an alternative method to secure compensation for crime victims. From a comparative legal perspective, the most popular alternative solution appears to be the enactment of a statutory crime victim compensation scheme. The article examines some of the theoretical concerns that require consideration, if such a proposal were to be taken seriously by the legislature.