Clearing the interpretative air – The need to make good (air quality) law and to make good law work

Clearing the interpretative air – The need to make good (air quality) law and to make good law work

Author: Jenny Hall

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB LLM PhD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 2, 2024, p. 144-177
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i2a3

Abstract

A corollary of the environmental rule of law requirement that good laws must be passed is that these laws must also be implemented effectively. Effective implementation frequently relies on good bureaucratic decision-making which can be challenging where decisions are non-routine and complex. This challenge is evident in the practical application of so-called “listed activities”, a widely used approach in pollution and waste management regulation to trigger an obligation to obtain an environmental authorisation or licence to undertake the listed activity. When courts hear disputes on the design and implementation of these listed activities, they can play a valuable role in providing guidance on sound decision-making approaches, and course-correcting existing approaches if necessary. For the court’s impact to be realised optimally, however, it is important that judicial decision making itself is based on sound reasoning and that it contains an element of predictability which follows from the employment of a consistent approach to legislative interpretation. For the interpretation of environmental legislation, this contribution proposes a reframing of the purposive interpretative approach set out in the much-cited Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) that aims to achieve what I call ‘substantive ecological purposivism’. It examines three judgments on listed activities passed in terms of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 through the lens of this approach and points out both inconsistencies in the three judgments as well as how the decisions in some instances could have been more closely aligned with the environmental objectives of legislation if the systematic employment of a substantively ecological purposive approach had been adopted.

Not “radical” enough: Disrupting the narrative of Ermelo’s grand transformative potential in public basic education

Not “radical” enough: Disrupting the narrative of Ermelo’s grand transformative potential in public basic education

Author: Lorette Arendse

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM LLD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 2, 2024, p. 178-194
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i2a4

Abstract

The Constitutional Court decision in Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) is often celebrated in education law jurisprudence. The Constitutional Court’s call for the radical transformation of public education is zealously repeated in academic discourse. In particular, the apex Court is lauded for the formulation of principles applicable to school governing bodies on how to develop constitutionally compliant language policies in terms of section 29(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. This provision guarantees the right to education in the language of choice in public educational institutions subject to the criterion of reasonable practicability. In the subsequent decision of Gelyke Kanse v Chairperson of the Senate of the University of Stellenbosch 2019 12 BCLR 1479 (CC), the Constitutional Court evaluated the constitutionality of another language policy, this time in the higher education context, but adopted a markedly different approach to the interpretation of section 29(2). Using a particular conceptualisation of transformation as theoretical lens and by contrasting the judicial approaches in the two Constitutional Court judgments, this contribution advances the idea that the Court in Ermelo was myopic in its approach by failing to recognise that some school governing bodies reinforce systemic racial inequality in public schools through the adoption of language policies.

The divergent approaches of the Constitutional Court to the right to life and ubuntu and the implications for civil society

The divergent approaches of the Constitutional Court to the right to life and ubuntu and the implications for civil society

Authors: Keith Matthee and Shaun de Freitas

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB BD; BProc LLB LLM LLD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 2, 2024, p. 195 – 219
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2023/i2a5

Abstract

There are indications of an unduly deferential attitude towards the justices of the Constitutional Court when they pronounce on profound moral issues which deeply affect the moral fabric of South African society. A key to addressing this deference is to demonstrate the divergent approaches of the Constitutional Court when making such pronouncements. An awareness of these differing approaches has the potential to influence civil society to participate confidently in the process of giving the Constitutional text representative forms of meaning and, in the process, of buttressing democracy. As an illustration of the divergencies stemming from the Constitutional Court regarding fundamental moral matters, the most important of all the rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 has been chosen, namely, the right to life, more specifically pertaining to the death penalty and abortion. Accompanying this is a critical investigation into a foundational hermeneutic chosen by the Constitutional Court when giving content to the right to life, namely, ubuntu. Also, naturally emanating from this contribution is the advancement of right to life jurisprudence in South Africa.

Realising socio-economic rights in an unequal society

Realising socio-economic rights in an unequal society

Author: J Kollapen

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 1, 2024, p. 1 – 20
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i1a1

Abstract

The colonial and apartheid systems created widespread poverty and inequality which, in tandem with each other, shaped the lives of millions of our people. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, beyond recognising this legacy, contains a clear and unconditional commitment to fundamentally changing it. This contribution explores the achievements and challenges in redressing poverty and inequality, two key elements of the legacy of apartheid, which continues to plague South African society 30 years after the first democratic elections. It focuses on the relationship between equality and socio-economic rights, and the evolving constitutional jurisprudence on these rights. It proceeds to examine the implications of the chasm between the public and private spheres of our society in redressing the inequalities in our society, raising the question of redistributive justice. Thereafter this contribution examines the role of the courts in addressing poverty and inequality. It identifies the important role that context-sensitive adjudication can play, while also highlighting the institutional constraints of the judiciary. The contribution concludes by exploring the reasonableness model of review for adjudicating socio-economic rights claims. It identifies the features of reasonableness review that enable courts to promote government accountability for socio-economic rights realisation while respecting the separation of powers doctrine. The paper concludes that while courts have a vital role to play, addressing poverty and inequality is ultimately a joint responsibility shared by the people of this country.

Alternative assessment in undergraduate legal education in South Africa: A positive side effect of the pandemic?

Alternative assessment in undergraduate legal education in South Africa: A positive side effect of the pandemic?

Authors: JG Horn and L van Niekerk

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations:BProc LLB LLM MA (HES) LLD, Senior lecturer, University of the Free State; LLB PG DIP (FINANCIAL PLANNING LAW) LLM MA (HES), Lecturer, University of the Free State
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 1, 2024, p. 21 – 39
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i1a2

Abstract

The global Covid-19 pandemic resulted in a transition to online teaching and learning, which prompted higher education institutions to reconsider their assessment methods. Soon, implementing the most appropriate assessment approach to encourage students to engage with the study material on an ongoing basis and which would lead to a deeper understanding of module content became an exciting challenge in the completely remote learning scenario. Grappling with this challenge, lecturers in the Faculty of Law at the University of the Free State implemented alternative assessment methods in a Legal Skills first-year module and a Law of Property third-year module. By using the action research method to implement change, observe the change and critically reflect on the outcome, the authors report on the valuable lessons that they have learned from this exercise. This contribution provides an account of the benefits and drawbacks of traditional versus alternative assessment methods and a critical perspective on the practicality of using alternative assessment tools in undergraduate programmes.

The meaning of “financial assistance” in terms of section 45 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008

The meaning of “financial assistance” in terms of section 45 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008

Author: Etienne Olivier

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM LLD, Lecturer, University of the Western Cape
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 1, 2024, p. 40 – 60
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i1a3

Abstract

In South African law, a company that wishes to provide financial assistance to one of its directors, a related juristic person, or to a person related to a director or related juristic person, must comply with the requirements contained in section 45 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 to validly execute such a transaction. The Act contains no precise definition of the term “financial assistance”, causing commentators to speculate that the reach of section 45 may be extremely wide. However, in Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Master, Johannesburg High Court 2023 5 SA 88 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal interpreted “financial assistance” narrowly. In this contribution, the Court’s restrictive interpretation of the term is critically analysed. I argue that the Court’s decision was correct and that its interpretation of “financial assistance” is consistent with the objectives of South African company law because it is likely to improve business efficiency without unduly prejudicing a company’s stakeholders. I also propose that the necessity for related-party financial assistance provisions should be reconsidered.