Abstract

 In Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd (2023 5 BCLR 527 (KH), 2023 4 SA 325 (KH)) is ’n appèl oorweeg teen die bekragtiging deur die hoogste hof van appèl van die hooggeregshof se verlening van ’n interdik teen Eskom om die vermindering van kragtoevoer na die Lekwa en Ngwathe munisipaliteite op te skort, hangende die uitslag van ’n hersieningsaansoek in die hooggeregshof van Eskom se besluit om die toevoer te verminder. Eskom het die kragtoevoer ingevolge artikel 21(5) van die Wet op die Regulering van Elektrisiteit 4 van 2006 drasties verminder omdat die munisipaliteite nie hulle finansiële verpligtinge teenoor Eskom nagekom het nie. Die konstitusionele hof het die verlening van die interdik bekragtig. Die uitspraak van die hof is onderteken deur vyf regters en die mindersheiduitspraak is gesteun deur vier regters. Daar was eenstemmigheid in die uitsprake dat die vermindering van die kragtoevoer ’n uiters nadelige uitwerking gehad het op die watertoevoer, riolering, versorging van siekes en bejaardes, besoedeling van die Vaalrivier, onderwys en ekonomiese bedrywighede – ’n humanitêre en omgewingsramp was aan die ontwikkel.

In die hoofuitspraak is beslis dat die applikante die hof daarvan oortuig het dat verskillende handvesregte van die inwoners feitelik aangetas of bedreig was, naamlik die regte op menswaardigheid, lewe, toegang tot gesondheidsorg, voedsel, water, onderwys en op ’n omgewing wat nie skadelik vir gesondheid en welsyn is nie. Insoverre hier ook sosiale regte ter sprake was, was dit ’n geval van direkte skending of bedreiging en nie ’n geval van ’n versuim om die regte te bevorder en te verwesenlik nie. Volgens die minderheidsuitspraak kon die applikante nie bewys dat hulle steun op ’n prima facie reg nie. Die enigste reg waarop die applikante volgens die minderheid kon steun, is ’n reg op elektrisiteit en die minderheid kon nie daarvan oortuig word dat só ’n reg in die handves van regte of enige ander regsreël erken word nie.

Die minderheid se eng benadering hou geen rekening met die feit dat die beskermingsvelde van handvesregte so oorvleuel dat dieselfde handeling meerdere regte kan aantas en dat grondwette dikwels afsonderlike regte waarborg vir sekere persone (bv kinders) of teen aantasting deur sekere handelinge (bv die administratiewe handelinge en handelinge om die pleging van misdade te ondersoek en te straf) nie.

Sosiale regte beskerm gedrag en belange, byvoorbeeld lewe, menswaardigheid en fisiese en psigiese integriteit teen inmenging deur optrede binne die raamwerk van byvoorbeeld toegang tot geskikte behuising, gesondheidsorg, voedsel, water, maatskaplike sekerheid en onderwys. ’n Argument dat elektrisiteitsvoorsiening beskou kan word as ’n instrument om sekere handvesregte te beskerm of te bevorder, is volgens die minderheid onaanvaarbaar omdat instrumente om regte te bevorder nie deel van die “subjek van regte” is nie en, word in dieselfde paragraaf bygevoeg, omdat die staat ’n wye diskresie het om te besluit watter metodes gevolg moet word. Die vereiste in artikels 26(2) en 27(2) dat die staatsmaatreëls redelik moet wees, is aangehaal maar nie verduidelik nie.

Die sosiale regte in die grondwet is soos al die ander regte verskans en beregbaar en die beperkings wat gestel word ten opsigte van die uitoefening van diskresies om regte te beperk, moet altyd uitgespel word. Die minderheid se lukrake benadering en waarskuwing oor die wye bevoegdheid van die staat sal hopelik nie in toekomstige hofbeslissings gevolg word nie.

Abstract

 This is one of the rare cases in which the plaintiff based his action on Aquilian, and not pauperien principles after suffering a broken wrist when he fell during an effort to retreat when accosted by two small dogs belonging to the defendant. The barking dogs threatened the plaintiff while he was standing on the sidewalk next to the defendant’s property, after they had escaped through the gate of the property which had been opened to allow the latter’s wife access.

The court had difficulty in determining the true factual situation, because the sets of evidence presented by the opposing parties were irreconcilable. On the strength of the methodology presented in the leading judgment of Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Group Ltd v Martell et Cie the court unconvincingly opted to accept the plaintiff’s version. The defendant was also prevented from presenting arguments in respect of certain traits of the dogs, due to defects in his heads of argument.

Although the court indirectly addressed the issue of wrongfulness, its main thrust was an attempt to decide whether the owner had been negligent in failing to keep his dogs under control and preventing them from threatening the defendant and other members of public. Relying on the definition of negligence presented in Mukheiber v Raath, which displays a preference for the concrete approach to foreseeability, the court concluded that the defendant had been negligent and is therefore liable to compensate the plaintiff in such sum as may be agreed or determined in due course.

It is illustrated how the court failed in presenting a judgment in accordance with a method suggested by Bosielo JA in a paper presented in 2013, which contains the following steps: (a) introduction; (b) facts; (c) issues; (d) law; (e) application; (f) remedy; and (g) order (earning the acronym IFILARO). Of particular note is the court’s failure to present a concise but sufficiently detailed account of the facts, and to apply relevant legal rules and principles to the facts. It is intimated that if the existing case law had been thoroughly scrutinised and applied, a finding that the harm in casu had not been reasonably foreseeable to the diligens paterfamilias might have followed, rendering the defendant not liable.

Abstract

Die onderhawige saak handel oor ’n appèl na die konstitusionele hof teen ’n uitspraak van die hoogste hof van appèl. Die Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit as voorganger van die latere Universiteit van Johannesburg het grond aan Auckland Park Theological Seminary verhuur en die kern geskilpunt was of laasgenoemde sy vorderingsreg kon sedeer. Dit het die konstitusionele hof genoodsaak om die huurkontrak en die bedinge daarvan uit te lê. Die konstitusionele hof aanvaar in beginsel die sogenaamde objektiewe benadering tot die uitleg van ’n kontrak soos uiteengesit in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (2012 4 SA 593 (HHA)). Anders as die hoogste hof van appèl in die Endumeni-saak sien die konstitusionele hof egter nie die bedoeling van die partye as ’n blote mite nie aangesien die doel van uitleg volgens die hof juis is om die werklike bedoeling van die kontraktante vas te stel. Vir die hof is “context everything” en die hof neem ’n veel liberaler houding as voorheen in teenoor die toelating van kontekstuele getuienis sonder om die “parol evidence rule” oorboord te werp.
Die relatief onlangse aanvaarding van die objektiewe benadering in die regspraak is ’n belangrike ontwikkeling en die meriete daarvan word in die bydrae bespreek. Die hof toon dat ’n reg nie vir sessie vatbaar is nie as daar ’n uitdruklike of stilswyende beding in die kontrak is wat sessie uitsluit en ook as die delectus personae-beginsel toepaslik is. Volgens die konstitusionele hof geld die delectus personae-leer waar die reg wat gesedeer staan te word persoonlik van aard is.
In casu bevind die hof dat dit die partye se bedoeling was dat Auckland Park Theological Seminary se reg uit hoofde van die huurkontrak persoonlik van aard is. Gevolglik beslis die hof dat die betrokke reg op grond van die delectus personae-beginsel nie vir sessie vatbaar is nie. Daar word egter aan die hand gedoen dat as dit die bedoeling van die partye is om ’n eg persoonlike reg te skep, daar na alle waarskynlikheid ’n stilswyende verbod op sessie afgelei sal kan word met die gevolg dat sessie om dié rede uitgesluit is. Voorts word voorgestel dat die delectus personae-leer beperk word tot gevalle waar die skuldenaar nie sonder benadeling sy skuld aan ’n voorgestelde sessionaris kan voldoen nie. Ongelukkig is die regspraak nie volkome duidelik oor die aard en omvang van die delectus personae-leer nie.

Abstract

Die begrip diplomatieke immuniteit en die gepaardgaande voordele wat dit aan die state, hul regerings en amptenare bied, lê aan die wortel van die bespreking. In die saak wat bespreek word, is die hooggeregshof van Uganda besig met die vraag of die regering van die Verenigde Koninkryk geregtig was op immuniteit in die omstandighede van die saak. Die saak is aan die hof voorgelê in ’n aansoek om verlof om te appelleer. As die aansoeker (die verweerder voor regter Mugambe), het die Verenigde Koninkryk se regering geargumenteer dat die uitspraak van daardie hof – wat beslis het dat die regering aanspreeklik was teenoor die respondent (in die hof van eerste instansie) in onregmatige daad – verkeerd was in beide feite en die reg; en dat daar vrae was wat deur ’n appèlhof aangespreek moes word.
Verlof tot appèl is toegestaan. Die beginsels van die internasionale reg, soos dit uit verskeie bronne afgelei kan word; insluitend regspraak, die Weense Konvensie oor Diplomatiese Betrekkinge, en die Ugandese en Suid-Afrikaanse weergawes daarvan, word bespreek. Daar word voorgestel dat die uitspraak van regter Mugambe in die hof van eerste instansie verkeerd was. Die regering van die Verenigde Koninkryk was geregtig op immuniteit. Daar word geargumenteer dat ’n diplomaat en sy private woning nie in die uitsonderings ingesluit word nie, soos per die Ugandese plaaslike, statutêre bepalings – wat in pari materia is met die Weense Konvensie.
Bowendien is die opinio juris in hierdie verband dat die aard of vorm van die betrokke transaksie of goedere wat gekoop word, ondersoek moet word, sodat aanspreeklikheid in elke saak bepaal word. Dit is moelik om te bepaal hoe bepaalde koopsake uiteindelik deur die regering of staatsdepartment gebruik sal word. Die hoop word uitgespreek dat regsgeleerdes regdeur die wêreld sal baat by die uitspraak van die hof.

Abstract

The owner who wanted to sell her used luxury bush trailer agreed with an accredited agent of the manufacturer of the trailer to park it on their premises in Wellington where it would be available for viewing by prospective buyers. She explicitly agreed with the manager of the company that she would retain all registration documents regarding the trailer and would personally enter into the final obligatory and real agreements when a suitable interested buyer was identified. It was, however, agreed that the finalisation of the asking price would be at the discretion of the agent, provided that she received her indicated set reserved minimum price. This would allow the agent to negotiate with an interested buyer for a price that would leave it with some profit.
When an interested buyer was identified, the agent, however, neglected to inform the buyer of the conditions and refrained to disclose that neither he nor the agency held the necessary ius disponendi to transfer ownership, although he accepted the transferred sum as significantly inflated final payment for the purchased trailer. He never disclosed to the owner that her trailer had found a buyer and was no longer in his possession. Nor did he transfer the amount as agreed to the account of the owner. When she discovered the fraud, she immediately instituted the rei vindicatio to retrieve her property. There was no real agreement between the owner and the buyer and consequently she retained her ownership and should be entitled to the rei vindicatio as remedy. The buyer could rely on his remedy under the law of contract (for eviction) because he was not placed in vacua possessio and was entitled to restitution of the amount paid. He was thus not without remedy.
The court, however, dismissed the owner’s application for the rei vindicatio with costs because in the court’s judgment the poor buyer was entitled to the defence of his bona fides. South African law does not recognise the bona fides of a buyer as a separate mode of acquisition of ownership. The recognised defence of estoppel is not mentioned by name in the judgment, although some of the case law that was referred to concerned that defence. The judgment, however, does not instil confidence that all the requirements for that defence had been mastered. At the very least the judgment does not disclose how the court was satisfied that those requirements were all met. The mere fact that the buyer alleged that he had been misled by the agent to believe that, in exchange for the transfer of the full asking price he would receive ownership of the trailer, is irrelevant, as would be the excuse of the receiver of stolen goods who was gullible enough to think the thief selling the stolen property had the ius disponendi to transfer ownership. The judgment does not disclose how the buyer would be able to renew the yearly registration of the trailer because the true owner was still holding back all the relevant registration documents and the successful reliance on estoppel does not alter the material legal position regarding the ownership.
Clearly the misrepresentation of a fraudulent third party should not result in the effective loss of the owner’s entitlements to her property. The defence of estoppel can successfully be relied on against the rei vindicatio of the owner only if the estoppel asserter can prove that he acted to his detriment because of the misrepresentation of the owner as estoppel denier, who acted negligently. The misrepresentation must have been so flagrant that the reasonable person in his position as the estoppel asserter would also have acted to his detriment on it.
In this matter the judgment does not disclose how the court established that the reasonable person in the position of the true owner of the trailer would have acted otherwise to prevent an unknown third party as prospective buyer from being misled by the fraudulent agent who pretended to be either the owner or authorised agent with ius disponendi. What more could the owner have done than to retain all the relevant registration documents to forewarn third parties of the limited powers of the agency? Attaching large neon-coloured stickers to the vehicle to publish the limited powers of the agency does not seem practical. It is submitted that no negligence can be found in the conduct of the owner, because it was on par with what could be expected from the reasonable person in her shoes. It is submitted that the reasonable person in the position of the buyer would by contrast not have been so gullible as to transfer the significant amount of the asking price without ascertaining that the alleged seller had the registration documents to transfer ownership as proof of his ius disponendi.

Abstract

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