Abstract

Hierdie saak het minagting van die hofverrigtinge behels waar ’n kontakooreenkoms, wat ’n bevel van die hof gemaak is, deur die respondente oortree is. As gevolg van die aard van die verrigtinge, is daar nie van die hof verwag om die kind se standpunt oor die kontakreëlings met die aansoeker te hanteer nie, en dit is die aspek van die verrigtinge wat hierdie nota ontleed. Hierdie nota is nie daarop gemik om die korrektheid van die beslissing van die hof te ondersoek nie, maar fokus meer op die feite en vrae wat die hof prima facie moes ontleed as die hof nie vasgehou het aan ’n voorafbepaalde formule vir minagting van hofverrigtinge nie. Die prosedure wat gevolg word in minagting van hofverrigtinge is van nature beperk. Artikel 28(2) van die grondwet bepaal: “’n Kind se beste belang is van deurslaggewende belang in elke aangeleentheid wat die kind raak.” Hierdie bespreking beheers elke tersake aspek. Dit sluit minagting van hofverrigtinge in waar ’n bevel oor kontak met ’n minderjarige betrokke is aangesien kontakreëlings en die oortreding daarvan direk “’n kind” in ag neem. Die beperkte omvang van minagting van hofverrigtinge het veroorsaak dat die hof twee belangrike feite mis wat ’n invloed op die kontakbevel kan hê en hierdie is eerstens dat die kind haarself in haar kamer toegesluit het. Sy het geweier om die aansoeker te sien. Tweedens is ’n bevel deur die hof a quo gemaak vir kontak onder toesig. Hierdie twee feite blyk belangrik te wees in die beskerming van die beste belange van ’n kind en word nie hanteer nie. Verder word die moontlikheid dat die respondente se optrede op “ouerlike vervreemding” neergekom het ook met omsigtigheid aangespreek omdat so ’n term as dit té ver geneem word, die kind se stem kan verdring. Ten aansien van die Nederlandse reg word artikel 809 van die Nederlandse Wetboek van Siviele Prosesrecht bespreek en die uitsluiting daarkragtens van kinders jonger as twaalf jaar van familieregtelike verrigtinge. Die ongekwalifiseerde verlaging van die ouderdomsperk mag miskien nie die antwoord wees nie, maar daar behoort herbesin te word oor die algehele uitsluiting van ’n kind se reg om gehoor te word in aangeleenthede waar die kind se belange wel ter sake is.

Abstract

Some judgments do not instil confidence in the mastery of the legal principles that should have been applied. This is one. The rei vindicatio is the primary remedy for the owner who is reclaiming possession of his property from the defendant. The latter is at litis contestatio in control of the object of the claimant’s ownership. The claimant only needs to prove that he is the owner of the thing in question and that the defendant is currently in control of it – ie it is still in esse as an independent thing. It is not necessary for the claimant to prove that the defendant is in unjustified or illegal possession of the thing. If the defendant does want to rely on an alleged legal justification for his control over the object, then the onus is on him to prove it. In this matter, the bank as applicant alleges that it is the owner of a 2016 Hilux vehicle which is currently in control of the first respondent, a panel beater with some salvage interest as a towing service. The bank provided credit to the second respondent for the purchase of the vehicle in July 2016. However, despite the fact that the latter was in control of the vehicle as tenant for the bank as owner, the bank retained ownership over the vehicle until the last instalment had been paid. Because the ownership of the bank was not contested, the bank was not required to indicate how it had attained ownership over the vehicle. In general, banks do not partake in the sale of vehicles but merely finance the acquisition; in this matter it is not self-evident how the bank had acquired the ownership and by way of which derivative mode of acquisition.  The vehicle was towed by the panel beaters a week after the second respondent had taken delivery of the vehicle in question. It had been standing on the premises of the first respondent for almost seven years and it had been exposed to all the elements – it had thus depreciated daily. The second respondent had since defaulted on all his instalment obligations and his liability had increased monthly with the compound interest due. According to the acting judge, it seemed that the second respondent had abandoned the motor vehicle with no intention to pay. Only the holder of a right can abandon it, and at no point in time did the second respondent acquire ownership of this Hilux. Under the credit agreement, his liabilities cannot be unilaterally abandoned either – apparently abandonment does not come into play at all. Notwithstanding numerous requests by the bank to allow it to repossess the vehicle, the first respondent relied on an alleged lien to justify its continued possession. The so-called lien is alleged to be founded on either a tacit agreement or a salvage lien. Not only is it clear that no agreement ever existed between the bank as owner and the panel beater – irrespective of whether the second respondent, as alleged, had agreed to the tow-in service – but a lien can never be founded on an agreement. A lien is no pledge, and in the absence of a real agreement, no limited real right is acquired by the retentor as lien holder, even when all the requirements for a lien had been satisfied. In this case, none of the requirements for a lien had been met. Any agreement between the second and the first respondent in July 2016 would be res inter alios acta as far as the bank is concerned and such agreement cannot bind the bank as owner. Because the bank is contractually entitled to repossess its property without any damage from the buyer as tenant if the latter has defaulted (as in this case since 2016) the bank as owner cannot be enriched by any prolonged retention of its property by the panel beaters – it may only be impoverished. Notwithstanding the jumble of confusion uttered in the judgment, the court came to the correct decision and ordered the immediate release of the vehicle to the bank. In the process, the acting judge botched the relevant legal principles and even mixed-up the identification of the parties involved in this matter to the extent that this judgment does not encourage trust in the judiciary. Furthermore, the judgment should have been edited and proofread by the acting judge before it was posted and published on SAFLII – unfortunately the editing was badly done. In many instances, the reader cannot even guess what the acting judge intended to say. In the final formulation of the order, the second respondent, who was not even in court, was ordered to return the Hilux to the bank forthwith – although it had been standing on the premises of the panel beaters for almost seven years and was clearly not in possession of the second respondent – and the same second respondent was ordered to pay the cost of the suit. A court does have a discretion to compel a retentor to accept alternative security in the form of a guaranteed amount to cover any realistic proven claim, but in the meantime to discharge the object of the lien to the owner. Once the lien holder has fully quantified and proven his claim, he will be entitled to payment in respect of the improvements or safekeeping regarding the object of the lien to the lesser of either his impoverishment sine causa or the owner’s unjustified enrichment, if applicable. As soon as sufficient security has been tendered by the owner, the lien holder has no basis to continue retaining possession of the property and should discharge it to the owner. Although the bank, in this matter, offered to provide a guarantee that a realistic amount would be available to pay any proven claim by the panel beaters in a subsequent action against the bank, the court order does not refer to it at all, leaving the impression that no guarantee was ordered. It is submitted that, although this fact is not motivated in any sense by the acting judge, it was correct given the circumstances. No claim can be proven by the panel beaters against the bank founded on unjustified enrichment or the actio negotiorum gestorum as action resulting from the unauthorised management of the affairs of another. Due to the fact that the requirement of accessority was not met, there was no room to entertain a lien. Consequently, no guarantee to replace or discharge the unjustified lien could come into play.

Abstract

Die belangrike plig wat op lede van die gemeenskap rus om wanneer hulle daartoe in staat is, getuienis in howe te lewer en die reg wat litigante het om hulle op daardie bystand te beroep, is reeds telkens deur die howe bevestig (Meyers v Marcus 2004 5 SA 315 (K) par 22). Die Wet op Hoër Howe 10 van 2013, die Wet op Landdroshowe 32 van 1944, die reëls van daardie onderskeie howe en die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 bevat omvattende bepalings om die teenwoordigheid van getuies te verseker. Benewens ’n getuiedagvaarding word ’n subpoena duces tecum aangewend om ’n getuie te dagvaar om boeke, stukke en dokumente aan die hof voor te lê. Hierdie proses is beskikbaar aan sowel die staat as die verdediging en ’n subpoena duces tecum kan ook aan die teenparty se getuie beteken word indien die getuie in besit is van dokumente waaroor die staat of verdediging voornemens is om te kruisondervra. Die applikante in Transasia Minerals (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Kunene (019883/2023) 2023 ZAGPPHC 216 (24 Maart 2023) het die hof op ’n dringende basis genader ten einde ’n subpoena duces tecum wat op ’n staatsgetuie beteken is deur die regsverteenwoordiger van die beskuldigdes in die streekhofverhoor van S v Kunene en Umsobomvu (Edms) Bpk, ter syde te stel. Die partye is reeds in jarelange regsgedinge betrokke wat verband hou met die verkoop van mineraalregte deur Kunene en Umsobomvu aan Transasia Minerals en Transasia 444. Sekere betalings is aan Umsobomvu gemaak, maar die kontrak is daarna gekanselleer. Transasia het daarop ’n strafsaak teen daardie partye geregistreer en ’n vervolging op aanklagte van diefstal en geldwassery is teen hulle ingestel en die vervolging het ’n aanvang geneem. Ná ’n lang verwyl kon Transasia 444 daarin slaag om ministeriële goedkeuring te verkry vir die oordrag van die regte aan Transasia Minerals. Deel van die beskuldigdes se verweer was dat die ministeriële  goedkeuring wederregtelik verkry is en dat ’n vervalste volmag in die proses aangewend is. Umsobomvu verkry ’n hooggeregshofbevel waarin die departement van minerale sake gelas word om die rekord van die ministeriële aansoek bloot te lê. Transasia doen hierop aansoek om die tersydestelling van dié bevel op ’n tegniese punt, maar die hof wysig bloot die bevel deur te gelas dat slegs die regsverteenwoordigers van Kunene en Umsobomvu toegang tot die dokumente mag verkry en nie ook die partye nie. Hierteen loods Transasia ’n aansoek om verlof om te appelleer na die hoogste hof van appèl. Die hooggeregshofbevel is daardeur outomaties opgeskort, hangende uitslag van die aansoek om verlof en indien toegestaan, afhandeling van die appèl. Intussen roep die staat ’n getuie van die departement van minerale sake in die streekhofverhoor. Die verdediging beteken daarop ’n subpoena duces tecum op die getuie ten einde ’n reeks dokumente aan die hof voor te lê, waaronder ook sommige van die dokumente waaroor die bovermelde dispuut handel. Transasia doen bygevolg aansoek om die subpoena ter syde te stel. ’n Laerhof beskik oor nóg die gemeenregtelike nóg die statutêre bevoegdheid om ’n getuiedagvaarding ter syde te stel. Slegs die hooggeregshof beskik oor daardie magte en sal dit slegs uitoefen indien daar misbruik van die geregtelike proses was. Na oorweging van die feitelike en regsposisie kom die hof tot die gevolgtrekking dat die uitreiking van die subpoena duces tecum inderdaad regsmisbruik daargestel het en word die aansoek toegestaan om die dagvaarding ter syde te stel. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat die verhoorhof in die lig van die feite in die beste posisie sou wees om te besluit, nie alleen oor die relevansie en dus toelaatbaarheid van die dokumente nie, maar ook indien dit wel toegelaat sou word in getuienis, oor die korrekte proses om die dokumente te hanteer ten einde nie inbreuk te maak op die hooggeregshofbevel wat reeds uitgereik is en die hangende appèlproses nie. Dit blyk dat die hof nie behoorlike oorweging geskenk het aan die regsposisie ten aansien van blootlegging aan beskuldigde persone ingevolge die grondwet asook die benadering vasgelê deur die hoogste hof van appèl dat ’n hof versigtig behoort om te gaan by oorweging om ’n dagvaarding vanweë regsmisbruik ter syde te stel nie.

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The judgment in Maqubela v The Master leaves room to revisit some established norms in private law that define under what circumstances a subject may be disqualified and found to be unworthy to benefit financially from his/her behaviour against another – including the deceased. The deceased Maqubela AJ took out a significant life policy (R20 million) on his own life two weeks before his death. At the time of his death he was still married in community of property to his wife but was seriously contemplating divorce. His wife was not only aware of the significant life insurance that had just been taken out, but also of his contemplation of divorce. She was much annoyed about his multiple adulterous affairs over many years and even mentioned as much to the minister of justice the day before his sudden death in a deliberate way so as to discredit him in the eyes of the minister.

After the sudden demise of the insured life under suspicious circumstances, the widow was originally found guilty of premeditated murder of her husband and of the fraudulent production of a document presented to the master of the high court as the last will of the deceased that was proven to be a falsification in every respect. For the second offence she was sentenced by the court of first instance to prison for three years. On appeal the supreme court of appeal upheld her appeal regarding the conviction on the murder charge, but the other conviction remained intact.

In the civil case under discussion the court had to decide whether the widow as claimant was entitled to half of the common estate with inclusion of the R20 million insurance benefit as well as to lay claim as beneficiary under the norms of intestate succession to the widow’s part of the deceased’s estate.

It is submitted that the well-known “bloedige hand” rule, which excludes the person responsible for the death of the deceased from benefiting under the law of succession from the estate of the deceased, is merely an example of the underlying broader principle encapsulated in the text from Roman law “nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam condicionem facere potest” (D 50 17 134 1): “No one is allowed to improve his own condition by his own wrongdoing” or “no woman should profit from her own wrong”. This principle can be found not merely in every civil law legal system but is also recognized in all common-law jurisdictions as can be deduced inter alia from the judgment in Karen L Postlewait v Ohio Valley Medical Center, Inc, a Corporation, et al, and Ohio Valley Medical Center, Inc, a Corporation, and The Estate of Robert L Postlewait, where Maynard JA on 8 Dec 2003 in the appeal to the supreme court of appeal of West Virginia held: “However, the majority equally fails to consider the possibility that Mrs Postlewait’s misconduct in pushing her husband off the porch played a significant role in her husband’s death. Clearly, the chain of events that led to Mr Postlewait’s death were directly put in motion by Mrs Postlewait. Mrs Postlewait filed a medical malpractice/wrongful death action against her husband’s medical providers and successfully negotiated a settlement netting herself more than half a million dollars! Given these circumstances, I am unable to find that Mrs Postlewait is entitled to profit from her husband’s death. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent” (31406). Clearly the claim of Mrs Postlewait to the resulting benefit of more than half a million dollars was unrelated to any claim founded on the law of succession. The quoted Latin maxim is a venerable old maxim in equity and should have been at the root of the judgment in the Maqubela case where there is room to suspect that the old adage still applies: the love of money is the root of all evil.

In light of the proven circumstances surrounding the demise of the late acting judge and the fraudulent attempt by his widow Maqubela to pass herself off as the primary testamentary beneficiary of his estate, reasonableness and equity prescribed that the erstwhile wife may neither lay claim to the significantly enhanced half of the common estate thanks to the life insurance benefit nor claim a child’s share as the widow’s portion of the estate of the deceased as governed by the law of intestate succession. Her conduct regarding the proven crime of the falsification of the will should have excluded her as unworthy beneficiary from any form of financial benefit from her marriage to the deceased including the claim to half of the common estate.

Matthaeus, the most prominent Old Authority on the implications of this principle in Roman-Dutch law, clearly states in Zinspreuken 6:4 that the disqualified unworthy spouse is also excluded from benefitting from the enhanced half of the common estate under the guise of the default principle of a rightful holder of half of the common estate. Modern Dutch law applies the same underlying principle to prevent unjustified enrichment of the wrongdoer. The principle of legal certainty in South African law did not benefit by this judgment. Not merely does it ignore the standing principles of Roman-Dutch law, but it also compares unfavourably with the outcome in related scenarios in comparable other legal systems.