Abstract

This overview covers the following:
1 Equality
2 Personal freedom and security
3 Dignity
4 Freedom of expression
5 Children’s rights
6 Access to information
7 Access to courts
8 Arrested, detained and accused persons

Abstract

In South Africa road-running has developed into a very popular sport over the last few years. Those participating in it range from novices to professionals, the homeless to billionaires. Notwithstanding the vast numbers of participants, spectators and other bystanders present at road-running events, very few injuries and fatalities have thus far been recorded, and then exclusively in respect of participants. Cases of injuries or fatalities to spectators and bystanders can rather be expected in other forms of sport and recreation such as cricket, rugby, golf and car races, although our jurisprudence is devoid of any such examples, with one exception, namely Clark v Welsh (1975 4 SA 469 (W); 1976 3 SA 484 (A)), containing extensive obiter dicta applicable to spectator injuries. In the USA there have been some development regarding the law applicable to spectator injuries, while English law contains only a few judgments dealing specifically with this topic. In both American and English law it would appear that delictual liability for the causing of injury to spectators and other bystanders is mostly dependent on a finding of negligence, although the doctrine of volenti non fit iniuria also features in some cases.

In the case at hand, Kalmer, a well-known top South African Olympian, seriously injured a spectator/bystander, Salie, who had negligently stepped into the runners’ path, by running into her at full speed during the annual Spar ladies’ race in Cape Town. In the Cape Town high court Salie failed in her damages claim against both Western Province Athletics who had organised the event, and Kalmer. The court found no negligence in the conduct of both defendants. Salie subsequently passed away and her appeal to the full Cape court was brought by Davids in her capacity as executrix of the latter’s deceased estate. The appeal partially succeeded, as the court found Kalmer to have been negligent. The court issued an order based on section 1(1)(a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act in terms of which the appellant could recover only 30 per cent of proven damages in view of a finding of 70 per cent contributory negligence on Salie’s part.

Gamble J first dealt with the claim against Kalmer. After meticulously analysing the evidence, he found that she had been negligent because she could have avoided the accident by keeping a better lookout – based on case law applicable to the drivers of motor vehicles in collision cases, with reference inter alia to drivers’ reaction times. Furthermore, it was held that the injured Salie had not been a spectator in the strict sense of the word, but an occasional bystander, rendering the case law applicable to spectators useless. It is argued that the court erred in this regard, mainly because the analogy drawn between the conduct of an athlete such as Kalmer and the driver of a motor vehicle in ordinary traffic is a strained one. A better analogy would have been that of a racing driver during the Monte Carlo F1 race, or a cyclist in the Tour de France contest. Furthermore, the court contradicted itself in characterising Salie as a disconnected bystander on the one hand, and someone fully aware of her surroundings on the other hand. It is further argued that the outcome of this appeal would mean that top athletes who have developed a successful running style over a prolonged period – which style has the effect that they cannot keep a proper lookout over longer distances (as in this case) – would have to adapt their style according to the specific venues of events, which is unacceptable as it would adversely affect their performance.

Although the court favoured Kalmer (or her insurer) with its reduction of the amount of damages to be proven by 70 per cent, she was held responsible for the appellant’s legal costs. Furthermore, the reduced amount of damages will probably still be considerable. This is an extremely unfair outcome for a top performer who merely exercised her sport in an accepted way to achieve her best performance. It is suggested that Kalmer should have presented expert evidence on the effect of running style and related factors on performance, which would have enabled her to prove that her style was acceptable and should not have been found to form the basis of negligence.

Abstract

In the case under discussion the insured two weeks before his death took out a large life policy on his own life. At the time of his death he was married in community of property to his wife. The Gauteng local division was called upon to decide whether or not the proceeds of the life policy fell into the joint estate of the spouses. The decision of the court was that the proceeds did not fall into the joint estate because it was paid after the joint estate was dissolved by the death of the spouse. The court relied on a few prior decisions to the same effect.

After an analysis of the principles involved we suggest that the proceeds should in principle form part of the spouses’ former joint estate. The life insurance policy was concluded during the subsistence of the marriage in community of property. The policy conferred on the insured the right to the sum insured on

his death. This right vested on conclusion of the contract, although it was subject to a time clause and it became enforceable only upon the death of the life insured. It is not a fictitious but an existing right which is capable of being ceded. This right falls into the joint estate: it was created by the policy prior to the death of the spouse and consequently prior to the dissolution of the marriage in community of property. There was indeed no other estate into which this right could have fallen. This means that the spouses were equally entitled to and liable under the contract of insurance. It was, so to speak, a debt due to the former joint estate. Hence each spouse must in principle receive one half of the death benefit.

The issue involved has not yet been finally laid to rest, although the supreme court of appeal approvingly referred to the decisions on which the court in the Maqubela case relied. The widow of the late insured also claimed that since the deceased left no will, she was entitled to inherit from her late husband’s estate as an intestate heir. The question arose whether she was entitled to benefit from the death of her husband. This aspect is not dealt with in the present discussion but in a separate article (Sonnekus “Gierigheid is die wortel van alle kwaad” 2023 TSAR 175).

Abstract

Direkteure se uitoefening van hul nuutgevonde bevoegdhede om ’n maatskappy se aantal gemagtigde aandele te verhoog, is in CDH Invest NV v Petrotank South Africa (Pty) Ltd (2019 4 SA 436 (HHA)) deur die hoogste hof van appèl in oënskou geneem. Die appèlhof het die uitspraak van die hof a quo bekragtig en beslis dat direkteure hierdie magte te goeder trou, in die beste belang van die maatskappy en vir ’n behoorlike doel moet uitoefen, soos hul vertrouenspligte vereis. Die betrokke maatskappy het meer aandele “uitgereik” as die aantal aandele wat deur sy akte gemagtig is en die direksie het die probleem probeer oplos deur die aantal gemagtigde aandele agterna te vermeerder.

Die skrywers voer aan dat die howe onvoldoende aandag gegee het aan die beginsel dat fidusiêre pligte aan die maatskappy verskuldig is eerder as aan individuele aandeelhouers. Die hof het ook nie die magtiging van verdere aandele en die potensiële toekomstige uitreiking daarvan, wat afsonderlike magte met afsonderlike doeleindes en gevolge is, behoorlik onderskei nie. ’n Verdere probleem is dat die

direkteure se werklike doel vergelyk is met hul bedrieglik verklaarde oogmerk in plaas daarvan om dit te vergelyk met die objektiewe behoorlike doel waarvoor die bevoegdheid verleen is.

Die uitsprake ignoreer die uitdruklike statutêre gevolge van ’n uitreiking wat die aantal gemagtigde aandele oorskry, insluitend dat die uitreiking ’n nietigheid is en die aandelesertifikate en inskrywings in die aandeleregister nietig is. Sodra die tydsensitiewe geleentheid tot terugwerkende magtiging ingevolge artikel 36(2) van die Maatskappywet afgeloop is, kan nóg die direksie nóg ’n hof die ongeldigheid van die uitreiking regstel. Dit is waarom die wysiging wat in die konsep maatskappywysigingswetsontwerp van 2021 beoog word om ’n hof in staat te stel om ’n onreëlmatige uitreiking en toewysing van aandele te bekragtig, ’n welkome toevoeging tot die wet sal wees. Totdat daardie oplossing egter ingevoer is, kan enige poging om ’n ongeldige uitreiking deur die agterdeur reg te stel egter nie ’n behoorlike doel daarstel nie.

Ander maatskappyregtelike kwessies wat deur die feite van hierdie saak geopper word, word kortliks oorweeg. Die skrywers stel voor dat die onderdrukkingsremedie in artikel 163 ’n beter oplossing vir die minderheidsaandeelhouer se besware kon bied omdat dit ’n oorweging behels van die belange van ’n aandeelhouer eerder as die maatskappy se beste belange. Ten slotte word aan die hand gedoen dat die bevoegdhede wat aan die direksie verleen is om aandele te magtig en uit te reik, behou moet word omdat dit eerstens onderhewig is aan direkteure se vertrouensverpligting en tweedens omdat beide hierdie magte deur die aandeelhouers beperk kan word by wyse van gepaste bepalings van die akte van die maatskappy.

Abstract

Kenia is ’n land wat al op verskeie terreine vele bekendes opgelewer het. Hulle is veral welbekend vir die wêreldklas middel- en langafstandatlete wat hulle oplewer. Dit sou daarom nie vreemd wees nie, indien bemarkers sou poog om die gelykenisse van bekende persone te gebruik in hulle bemarkingsveldtogte. Dit sou egter nie ’n Olimpiese atleet of ander beroemde persoon wees wat sou poog om die reg op identiteit in hierdie verband te beskerm nie. Inteendeel, dit sou ’n nederige motorfietsafleweringsbestuurder wees wat ’n finansiële instelling tot orde sou roep omdat hulle sonder toestemming sy foto in hulle bemarkingsmateriaal gebruik het.

Alhoewel die Keniaanse deliktereg gegrond is op die Engelse law of torts, vermy die hof in die Rafiki– saak die enge benadering van die Engelse howe, waarvolgens die ongemagtigde gebruik van iemand se beeld vir bemarking slegs ’n eisoorsaak daarstel indien dit sou neerkom op aanklamping. Die Keniaanse hof wend hom veel eerder tot die Suid-Afrikaanse reg en steun vir gesag op die uitsprake van die Suid-Afrikaanse howe in Grütter v Lombard (2007 4 SA 89 (HHA)) en W v Atoll Media (Pty) Ltd (2010 4 All SA 548 (WKK)).

Die hof in die Rafiki-saak beslis dat die ongemagtigde gebruik van sy foto ’n skending is van sy reg op privaatheid, soos vervat in artikel 31 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Kenia. Voorts bevind die hof, met verwysing na die uitspraak van die Suid-Afrikaanse konstitusionele hof in MM v MN (2013 4 SA 415 (KH)), dat die ongemagtigde gebruik van sy foto ook ’n skending is van sy reg op menswaardigheid soos vervat in artikel 28 van die Keniaanse grondwet.

Op hierdie wyse ontwikkel howe in Afrika-lande pragmatiese oplossings wat die individu teen uitbuiting beskerm. Die beginsels wat aldus neergelê word, vergelyk goed met die omvattende beskerming wat in verskeie Amerikaanse deelstate teen ongemagtigde gebruik van iemand se beeld in bemarkingsmateriaal verleen word.

Abstract

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