Aantekeninge: Die internet of things en afstandbeheerde afskakel van toestelle – kontrakteervryheid en ander geykte regsbeginsels by spolie, vergeet en/of verwar?

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

Aantekeninge: Die internet of things en afstandbeheerde afskakel van toestelle – kontrakteervryheid en ander geykte regsbeginsels by spolie, vergeet en/of verwar?

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 96-113
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a6

Abstract

The internet of things enables the owner or possessor of devices (ie movable property) to remotely disable them when they are under the unlawful physical control of unauthorised persons. In this article the author reviews more that 2 000 years of legal history to show that those erstwhile authorised holders who ceased to be such holders and still have the devices under their unlawful physical control are not treated by the law as lasting possessors with long lasting status as possessors in durable and peaceful possession who are able to bring the mandament van spolie against the owner or possessor for an order to reactivate the devices. The same applies to the thief caught red-handed by the owner, the latter is not the spoliator but the spoliatus. Freedom to contract is one of the fundamental competencies of legal subjects who have attained majority. Unless a contractor is exercising the alleged freedom in a way that is in conflict with public policy, contracting parties are free to construct the clauses to their agreement at will, and a contracting party cannot plead mala fides after representing to his/her counter-party consensus with the terms of their agreement. Since Roman law times an owner can come to an agreement with a subject renting his property on the terms of the rent agreement. The owner of a car may rent his vehicle to the lessee after agreeing on what the daily rent will be, how many kilometres will be included in the daily tariff and what every additional kilometre will cost. It may also be agreed that the rented vehicle may not be used for cross-border travel because of the risk of hijacking involved and it may be agreed that any breach of the contract will entitle the owner to switch off the engine management system via a built-in remote control system to prevent any further use of the vehicle in contravention of the terms of the contract. Many a secondary or tertiary institution has incorporated into the terms and conditions of the agreement with its students, governing the use of the tablets or computers provided by the institution to the disadvantaged students who are unable to acquire their own devices, the possibility of remotely freezing the device when it is misused or fraudulently being disposed of to a third party under the guise of alleged theft by an unknown person. The disabling of the device should not be classified as spoliation by the institution as the real spoliatus if it was agreed that the student will merely hold the device on behalf of the owner as legal possessor.  Although it has been the legal position since Roman law times that the lessee in principle only holds the rented object on behalf of the owner as the legal possessor, nothing prevents a risk-averse owner from including ex abundanti cautela a clause in the agreement stating that he retains possession throughout the rental period and the lessee only acts as his vassal or holder exercising the corpus element of possession on behalf of the owner as legal possessor. The owner will throughout the term of the rent have the animus domini and the lessee merely the animus tenendi.  If in such circumstances the lessee in contravention of the stated terms of the agreement does enter the prohibited border-crossing area with the rented vehicle, he should not be heard to complain about spoliation if the owner uses the agreed-to remote-control function to prevent the vehicle from crossing the border. In reality the owner as spoliatus was merely exercising contra spolie to regain control over his vehicle after the erstwhile lessee had spoliated the owner by this clandestine change in the lessee’s animus from the animus tenendi to the animus rem sibi habendi without the consent of the owner and in contravention of the well-known rule nemo sibi ipse causam possessionis mutare potest. The erstwhile lessee should not be sanctioned in his self-righteous conduct as the active spoliator by a successful application to court for the mandament van spolie. Up to the clandestine change of his animus the lessee had never been in peaceful undisturbed legal possession of the vehicle or computer device. A spoliation order against a party other than the spoliator is logically beyond the scope of the purpose of the mandament to prevent a person from taking the law into his own hands, because he was merely the holder on behalf of the owner while the owner was throughout the legal possessor.  The only remedies available to the erstwhile lessee should be contractual remedies if he asserts that the owner acted in breach of the contract by remotely switching off the vehicle engine management functions. A spoliation order is not available if it is being used to enforce a merely personal right, such as a contractual right of a lessee to use the rented object in accordance with the lease agreement. The risk of long court delays should also not be shifted onto the prudent owner in such circumstances, resulting in the erstwhile lessee continuing to self-righteously misuse the property of the lessor with the added risk that when the latter does succeed to court in three years’ time the vehicle is long lost and unretrievable after the illegal border crossing and the erstwhile lessee is a hopelessly insolvent peregrinus. The same principles apply when the breach of contract is founded on any other misconduct of the lessee. Notwithstanding a clear term incorporated in the applicable rent agreement allowing the owner of the Scania trucks forming the crux of the case under discussion, in its sole discretion to be entitled to terminate the rental agreement forthwith by a relevant breach of contract, to remotely disable the vehicles and take immediate possession of the abandoned disabled vehicles at the cost of the hirer, the court awarded the erstwhile lessee the mandament van spolie against the owner who disabled and retrieved its vehicles after a clear breach of contract by the erstwhile lessee. It bodes ill for institutions and owners of property made available to their students or lessees who are by agreement merely holding on behalf of the owner as legal possessor if this unconvincing decision should be seen as a new precedent regarding contra spolie. The legal possessor can never simultaneously be defined as the spoliator of his own property that was per agreement to be held by another as his vassal if the latter in reality clandestinely changed his animus tenendi and by doing so acted as the legal spoliator against the owner as spoliatus. The court order against the owner to return the trucks and their keys, with the operating systems activated, to the applicant’s possession who has not been in possession before the spoliation, is unconvincing.

Aantekeninge: The distribution of educational qualifications and earning power upon divorce

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

Aantekeninge: The distribution of educational qualifications and earning power upon divorce

Author: E Bonthuys

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of the Witwatersrand
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 114-124
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a7

Abstract

 ’n Onlangse uitspraak van ’n Malawiese hof in Tewesa v Tewesa het beslis dat ’n vrou geregtig was op finansiële vergoeding vir die bydrae wat sy gemaak het tot haar man se tersiêre kwalifikasies, nadat hy, kort na sy gradeplegtigheid ’n egskeidingsgeding aanhangig gemaak het. Alhoewel die rede vir hierdie beslissing nie baie duidelik uit die saak blyk nie, is dit nogtans ’n interessante ontwikkeling en bespreek die outeur met hierdie bydrae die moontlikhede vir ’n soortgelyke beslissing in ’n Suid-Afrikaanse hof.  Die ekonomiese waarde van kwalifikasies en ander verdienvermoëns word tans nie as ’n bate gesien wat by egskeiding verdeel kan word nie, maar verlies aan toekomstige verdienvermoë is al vir ’n geruime tyd in verskeie reëls van die kontraktereg, deliktereg en versekeringsreg erken én vergoed. Daar is ook (redelik vae) aanduidings dat dieselfde konsep in familiereg erkenning begin verwerf, veral in sake oor universele vennootskappe tussen ongetroude pare.  In hierdie bydrae word ondersoek tot welke mate die huidige egskeidingsreg so ’n eis sou kon akkommodeer. ’n Eis vir verbeurdverklaring van voordele ingevolge artikel 9(1) van die Wet op Egskeiding in dieselfde omstandighede as dié in die Tewesa-saak sou moontlik kon slaag in gevalle waar ’n hof die man se optrede as ernstige wangedrag sou beskou. Die wye diskresie wat howe het om ’n herverdeling van bates ingevolge artikel 7(3) van die Egskeidingswet te bewerkstellig en die fokus van hierdie wetsbepaling op bydraes tot die ander eggenoot se boedel sou ook moontlik tot erkenning van ’n soortgelyke eis lei, maar daar is ’n aantal probleme wat die toepaslikheid van beide hierdie bepalings van die wet kon belemmer. Meer belowend is ’n eis vir onderhoud na egskeiding ingevolge artikel 7(2) van dieselfde wet omdat dit ’n hof toelaat om beide die bestaande en toekomstige verdienvermoëns van beide gades in ag te neem. ’n Onderhoudsbevel wat gekombineer is met ’n bevel vir herverdeling onder die sogenaamde skoonbreuk-beginsel toon die grootste potensiaal om hierdie soort van eise aan te spreek. Die laaste gedeelte van die bydrae ondersoek die breër kwessie van eise vir verdienvermoë, spesifiek of die gade wat die bydrae gemaak het moet eis vir haar eie verminderde verdienvermoë, en of sy sou kon kies om te eis vir haar eggenoot se vergrote verdienvermoë.

Regspraak: Can the body corporate insist that the purchaser of a sectional title unit at a sale in execution pay or secure not only outstanding levies but also other amounts the body corporate claims are due by the unit owner such as interest on arrears, legal costs and interest on non-paid legal costs before the body corporate will issue the levy clearance certificate for transfer required in terms of section 15b3(a)(i)(aa) of the Sectional Titles Act?

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

Regspraak: Can the body corporate insist that the purchaser of a sectional title unit at a sale in execution pay or secure not only outstanding levies but also other amounts the body corporate claims are due by the unit owner such as interest on arrears, legal costs and interest on non-paid legal costs before the body corporate will issue the levy clearance certificate for transfer required in terms of section 15b3(a)(i)(aa) of the Sectional Titles Act?

Author: CJ Van der Merwe

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of Stellenbosch
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 125-139
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a8

Abstract

 Ingevolge artikel 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) van die Wet op Deeltitels mag die registrateur nie oordrag van ’n deeltiteleenheid registreer nie tensy ’n transportbesorger bevestig dat die regspersoon gesertifiseer het dat alle gelde verskuldig ten opsigte van die bedoelde eenheid betaal is of dat sekerheidstelling vir betaling tot bevrediging van die regspersoon verskaf is. By die eksekusieverkoping in die Marsh Rose-saak het die koper, Steinmuller, onderneem om sekerheidstelling te verskaf dat alle gelde verskuldig aan die regspersoon deur die vorige eienaar deur hom betaal sal word. Toe Steinmuller en die regspersoon nie kon ooreenkom oor die bedrag van die sekerheidstelling nie, nader Steinmuller die hof a quo vir ’n toepaslike bevel en die hof beslis dat Steinmuller R250 000 in die trustrekening van sy prokureur moet betaal as onherroeplike sekerheidstelling vir betaling van die geld verskuldig aan die regspersoon. Op appèl na die volbank van die hooggeregshof in Johannesburg, bevestig die meerderheidsuitspraak dat die hof moet besluit of die regter a quo bevoeg was om te bepaal dat skuld wat aan Steinmuller gedelegeer is, slegs agterstallige heffings insluit. Volgens die minderheiduitspraak moet die bedrag wat as sekerheidstelling aangebied word nie slegs agterstallige heffings nie, maar álle gelde verskuldig deur die vorige eienaar insluit. Volgens die minderheidsuitspraak berus hierdie standpunt op ’n algemene aanspraak op sekerheidstelling en die feit dat die regspersoon geregtig is op alle gelde vir sy finansiële voortbestaan. Daar word aangetoon dat hierdie aanspraak slegs betrekking het op gevalle waar die eienaar van die eenheid insolvent is en alle gelde ingevolge artikel 89(1) van die Wet op Insolvensie as deel van die koste van tegeldemaking aan die regspersoon uitbetaal moet word, voordat oordrag kan geskied.  Die meerderheidsuitspraak is korrek dat slegs die verskuldigde skuld van die vorige eienaar aan Steinmuller gedelegeer is. Wat regskoste betref beslis die meerderheidsuitspraak dat slegs regskoste wat getakseer is deur die regspersoon of waarop die partye ingevolge reël 25(4) van Aanhangsel 1 van die Regulasies op die Wet op die Bestuur van Deeltitelskemas ooreengekom het, afgedwing kan word. Die meerderheidsuitspraak beslis verder dat rente op agterstallige heffings en nie-betaalde regskoste slegs verskuldig is indien dit bevestig word deur ’n skriftelike trusteebesluit ingevolge reël 21(3)(c) van Aanhangsel 1 van die Regulasies op die Wet op die Bestuur van Deeltitelskemas. Ten slotte word aangevoer dat die regspersoon in plaas van die hofaansoek, die goedkoper en spoediger proses ingevolge artikel 39(1)(c) van die Wet op die Ombuddiens vir Gemeenskapskemas kon gevolg het. Volgens daardie proses sou die beregter moes bepaal of die skuld gedelegeer aan Steinmuller verkeerdelik bepaal is of onredelik was en indien wel, dit tot die korrekte bedrag aanpas.

Regspraak: Huweliksgoedereregtelike bedeling lukraak terugwerkend gewysig én die betrokkenes se handelingsbevoegdheid só verminder?

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

Regspraak: Huweliksgoedereregtelike bedeling lukraak terugwerkend gewysig én die betrokkenes se handelingsbevoegdheid só verminder?

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 140-156
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a9

Abstract

Legal certainty will be severely jeopardised should it be possible at whim to proclaim the applicable matrimonial property regime governing spouses’ assets and liabilities to have been changed retroactively. The legislature prescribed clearly defined prerequisites to be met before any change regarding a couple’s matrimonial property regime can be sanctioned by the high court and then only for the future, but never with retrospective force. Under the dualistic systems that apply in South Africa since 1652 it has always been recognised that individuals living according to customary or indigenous law may by default govern their matrimonial property regimes and the law of husband  and wife according to the applicable norms of indigenous law. By default these marriages were out of community of property although a couple could agree to change the default position and have their consensus in this regard registered.  The couple M was married according to customary law in the erstwhile Eastern Cape in 1980 and the marriage was never registered. The default position should accordingly govern the matrimonial property regime of the couple resulting in no community of property and no accrual system. The husband’s legal capacity and competencies were consequently not restricted by the qualifications contained in section 15 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 because that chapter of the act was not applicable to a customary marriage concluded in 1980 and which is by default out of community of property. When the husband as registered sole owner in 2010 entered into a valid sale agreement to transfer his immovable property on the Cape Flats to the first respondent nothing hampered or restricted the parties’ capacity to enter into the applicable obligatory or real agreements. The property was subsequently validly transferred in the Deeds Register to the purchaser. The plaintiff’s claim as widow of the seller who since passed away, to have the property “retransferred” into her name because the sale and transfer was allegedly in contravention of section 15 of Act 88 of 1984, is unconvincing although the court held otherwise. The crux of the matter is not whether the first respondent should be safeguarded against the consequences of an alleged invalid agreement by the husband who acted without the involvement of his wife in 2010 by a reliance on section 15(9)(a) of that act. The emphasis should have been on how the alleged amendment of section 7(2) of Act 120 of 1998 in June 2021 could be deemed to apply retrospectively after the sale and transfer had validly been concluded for eleven years before the poorly formulated amendment of the act became law in June 2021. A contract of sale that was validly concluded cannot retrospectively become invalid because the legislature changed the requirements for the type of contract more than a decade later.  The court’s point of departure for its judgment is, however, that the deceased was married in community of property: “The Recognition of Customary Marriages Amendment Act 1 of 2021, which came into operation on 1 June 2021, among others, amended section 7 of the RCMA that all marriages, which were entered into before or after the enactment of the RCMA, are regarded as in community of property unless such consequences are specifically excluded by the spouses in an antenuptial contract” (par 20). This, notwithstanding the clear legal position regarding the default matrimonial property regime for all indigenous marriages concluded before the commencement of Act 120 of 1998: out of community of property. The legislature was supposed to adhere to the decision of the constitutional court in 2017 in Ramuhovhi v President of the Republic of South Africa (2018 2 SA 1 (CC)) to amend section 7(1) of Act 120 of 1998 with regard to polygamous marriages and not to alter the legal position regarding monogamous marriages that were governed without any found negative consequences by section 7(2) of that act. Although the legislature neglected to explicitly declare that this amendment of section 7(2) should have no impact retrospectively, the implications of this poorly conceived judgment will necessitate a re-opening of all the millions of estates of people who have been married according to a customary marriage since 1652 because all those marriages will now be deemed to have been in community of property with the consequential implications for the distribution of all assets of the spouses involved with the dissolution of the marriages after the demise of the dying spouse. The legislature would have caused less harm if it read with comprehension the clear order of the constitutional court: “In terms of s 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, this order does not invalidate a winding up of a deceased estate that has been finalised or the transfer of marital property that has been effected.”

Regspraak: Vicarious liability once again – a seemingly uncontentious case marred by judicial errors

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

Regspraak: Vicarious liability once again – a seemingly uncontentious case marred by judicial errors

Author: J Scott

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of South Africa
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 157-170
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a10

Abstract

 LRM v The Mnquma Local Municipality handel oor ’n geval waar ’n sekuriteitsbeampte, Tukani, in diens van die Mnquma-distriksmunisipaliteit, gedurende die nagtelike ure ’n vriend van hom te hulp gesnel het toe laasgenoemde deur ’n aanvaller met ’n mes bedreig is. Ten einde die aanvaller af te skrik, het Tukani eers twee skote met sy dienspistool in die lug afgevuur, maar toe die aanvaller geensins daardeur afgeskrik is nie, het hy ’n derde skoot gemik na die padoppervlakte langs die aanvaller se voete. Die koeël het egter opgeslaan vanaf die harde oppervlak en die muur van ’n voorafvervaardigde huis aan die oorkant van die pad deurboor, waar dit die slapende N in sy kop getref het. N het ernstige breinskade opgedoen. Sy vader (LRM) het namens N en in eie naam ’n deliktuele eis teen die munisipaliteit as Tukani se werkgewer ingestel. N se moeder (DJM) en suster (MM) wat teenwoordig was tydens die gebeure en die verwonding van N gadegeslaan en beleef het, het vorderinge weens erge trauma en senuskok teen die munisipaliteit ingestel. Die hof het op sterkte van die bewoording van dokumentasie wat Tukani se dienskontrak uitgemaak het tot die gevolgtrekking geraak dat die handeling wat hy verrig het binne die bestek van sy diensverhouding uitgevoer is. Versigtigheidshalwe het die hof egter beslis dat indien dit nie die geval sou wees nie, Tukani se handeling in voldoende noue verband met sy werkgewer se onderneming gestaan het om laasgenoemde middellik aanspreeklik te kon stel. Verder het die hof aandag bestee aan wat dit as “onregmatigheid” (“unlawfulness”) bestempel het. Ongelukkig is hierdie gedeelte van die uitspraak uiters onsamehangend, byvoorbeeld deurdat die hof die locus classicus van uitsprake wat met nalatigheid verband hou – te wete Kruger v Coetzee – voorgehou het as sou dit op onregmatigheid betrekking hê, welke bevinding as ’n growwe flater bestempel kan word.  Die logiese gevolgtrekking wat ’n mens kan maak uit die hof se behandeling van “onregmatigheid” – te wete ’n onvolledige oorsig van die nalatigheids- en kousaliteitsvereistes vir deliktuele aanspreeklikheid – is dat hierdie delikselemente verwar is met die begrip “delik”, ’n uitkoms waarvoor daar géén gesag bestaan nie en trouens as totaal onaanvaarbaar beskou kan word. Dele van dié bondige uitspraak, byvoorbeeld waar die hof tot ’n positiewe bevinding van feitelike en juridiese kousaliteit geraak het, kom neer op blote feitebevindings (decisiones) waarvoor daar geen verduideliking (ratio decidendi in tegniese sin) verskaf is nie. Dit is opmerklik dat die hof geen bevinding van onregmatigheid van Tukani se optrede gemaak het nie, ofskoon toepassing van die normaal tersake reëls sou aandui dat sy handeling wél onregmatig was weens die feit dat sy positiewe gedrag wat nadeel veroorsaak het ingevolge gevestigde reg prima facie onregmatig was en die taak aan die verweerder oorgelaat is om sodanige vermoede te weerlê, wat kennelik nie gebeur het nie. Daar kan instemming betuig word met die hof se uiteindelike bevinding dat die verweerder middellik aanspreeklik is.  In sy uitspraak het regter Smith ook versuim om ’n onderskeid te tref tussen die aard van die verskillende vorderinge wat teen die verweerder ingestel is, te wete N se eis op grond van liggaamlike beserings, LRM se eis weens die verswaring van sy onderhoudsplig teenoor N as gevolg van Tukani se handeling en, les bes, DJM en MM se vorderinge weens die veroorsaking van trauma en senuskok.  Ofskoon hierdie uitspraak as rapporteerbaar en van belang vir ander regters aangemerk is, is dit hoogs twyfelagtig dat dit enige nuttige doel sal dien as gesag vir die oplossing van probleme rakende middellike aanspreeklikheid, of die bepaling van deliktuele aanspreeklikheid deur oorweging van die aan- of afwesigheid van die erkende delikselemente.