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Abstract

The recognition of and respect for the party autonomy of every legal subject of majority not limited by any personal cognitive handicap is part and parcel of the foundation of an orderly legal community governed by the rule of law. “Making rules of law discretionary or subject to value judgments may be destructive of the rule of law” (Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) 481E).
The discretionary power of a divorce court under section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 stems from before the current constitutional dispensation. Almost thirty years after the acceptance of the constitutional values of the current system, it was hoped that as time went by, the transitional exception dating to 1984 that exhibits clear elements of arbitrariness would be relied on with declining frequency. There is only a limited number of marriages still in existence concluded before November 1984 with an ante-nuptial contract providing for the proverbial “cold exclusion of all benefits” that could potentially at this late stage in the spouses’ lives be expected to end in the divorce court justifying a reliance on this section. The act limits the discretionary power to explicit conditions: it can be considered only where the divorce concerned a marriage concluded before the commencement of Act 88 of 1984 with an ante-nuptial contract that excluded accrual sharing and any form of asset sharing and in the absence of any agreement at any time between the erstwhile spouses regarding the division of their assets. Provided these conditions are met, the court can order that such assets, or such part of the assets of the other party as the court may deem just, be transferred to the first-mentioned party (s 7(3)).
In all these circumstances a valid ante-nuptial contract exists to which both parties agreed in the presence of a notary public and the applicant in reality never acquired any claim to the other party’s assets. The applicant in addition represented to the other spouse, the notary public and the public at large a claim would never be made to any of the respondent’s assets. “Reasonableness and fairness are not freestanding requirements for the exercise of a contractual right. … Acceptance of the notion that judges can refuse to enforce a contractual provision merely because it offends their personal sense of fairness and equity will give rise to legal and commercial uncertainty” (Potgieter v Potgieter NO 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) 650F-H).
In Greyling v Minister of Home Affairs ((40023/21) 2022 ZAGPPHC 311 (11 May 2022)) the court regarded the upholding of the claim of the applicant contrary to the explicit misrepresentation by the applicant that she is in agreement with the terms contained in the notarially registered ante-nuptial contract of 1989 governing the marriage, potentially fair. The court ordered the first condition in section 7(3) of Act 70 of 1979, limiting its application to pre-November 1984 marriages, unconstitutional.
This judgment may be popular and in line with what the woman in the street might regard as fair, presumably abandoning the principle of pacta sunt servanda as well as the principles underlying estoppel, but does not bode well for the upholding of the rule of law. “The court does not as yet sit, as under a palm tree, to exercise a general discretion to do what the man in the street, on a general overview of the case, might regard as fair” (Springette v Defoe 1992 2 FLR 388 391).

It is argued that legal certainty will not be enhanced should the constitutional court confirm this judgment. An alleged reliance on principles or policy exclusively based on common law jurisdictions as justification for the recognition of such a discretionary power under these circumstances, without any consideration of the position under civil law systems which indeed share common roots with specifically the South African private law system is once more an example of the demise of our jurisprudence where legal professionals seem to be unable to do proper, relevant and reliable comparative legal research.
Since the husband in the Greyling case did not even oppose the claim of his spouse (all prior to a divorce application) and chose to abide by the court’s decision, it is indeed strange that the court refrained from referring to and recognising that the parties could at any stage since 1989, have relied on section 21(1) of Act 88 of 1984 to have effected a change in their matrimonial property regime. It reeks of misuse of the court process for the court, under these circumstances, to hold as unconstitutional that part of section 7(3) as being the only possible remedy for the claimant against the perceived injustice she would be suffering on divorcing her husband because of their matrimonial property regime, is mind-blowing. The only benefit of not relying on section 21(1) would be to not be bound by the requirements contained in section 21(1)(a-c) – there are sound reasons for the proposed change; sufficient notice of the proposed change has been given to all the creditors of the spouses; and no other person will be prejudiced by the proposed change – and that would constitute misuse. Section 36(1)(e) of the constitution provides that the rights in the bill of rights may be limited but only in terms of a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom (party autonomy), taking into account all relevant factors, including less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. It is clearly not the case in instances like these.

Abstract

Die eerste saak wat riglyne verskaf oor die interpretasie van artikel 10(13) van die Wet op Handelsmerke van 1993 is onlangs in die hoogste hof van appél in LA Group (Pty) Ltd v Stable Brands (Pty) Ltd beslis. Die beslissing het ook ’n mate van duidelikheid verskaf oor die tipe gebruik van ’n handelsmerk wat as aanvaarbare bewys van gebruik beskou sal word wanneer die geldigheid van ’n handelsmerk betwis word op grond van nie-gebruik. Wat die Polo-saak hoogs ongewoon maak, indien nie uniek nie, is dat dit nie die eienaar van die handelsmerk, naamlik Ralph Lauren, was wat sy reputasie in die POLO-merke wou bevestig nie, maar ’n derde party, naamlik die respondent in die saak. Dit is na alle waarskynlikheid die eerste keer dat ’n derde party poog om die reputasie van ’n beweerde buitelandse, bekende, ongeregistreerde handelsmerk te beskerm.
Daar was twee uitsprake wat artikel 10(13) verskillend geïnterpreteer het, en dus tot verskillende gevolgtrekkings oor die feite gekom het. Hierdie artikel sal beide die minderheids- en meerderheidsuitsprake krities bespreek. ’n Aspek van die uitspraak wat kommer wek by beide die minderheids- en meerderheidsuitspraak is die oënskynlik doelbewuste vermyding van enige bespreking van die territorialiteit van handelsmerke, meer spesifiek enige vermelding van artikels 35 en 36(2) van die Wet op Handelsmerke van 1993. Op ’n letterlike interpretasie blyk die minderheid korrek te wees dat artikel 10(13) van wye belang kan wees, maar dit het nie daarin geslaag om duidelikheid te verskaf oor die moontlike wisselwerking tussen artikels 10(13) en 35, aan een kant, en artikel 36(2), aan die ander kant nie. Die versuim om die interpretasie van artikel 10(13) van die Wet op Handelsmerke van 1993 te versoen met artikel 35 (en a 36(2)) kan ernstige kommer oor die omvang van artikel 35 in die toekoms laat ontstaan. Aangesien dit nie die eienaar van die beweerd geskonde handelsmerk was wat die klaer was nie, laat die saak ook kwessies ontstaan oor die bewyslas in die vestiging van die vereiste reputasie in hierdie tipe gevalle.
Gegewe die leerstuk van die territorialiteit van handelsmerke, is ’n sekere vlak van verbruikersverwarring onvermydelik.

Abstract

With the adoption of the interim constitution in 1993, much was made of the transformative function which the new constitution, and more particularly, the bill of rights, would fulfil. There were calls to reform the law of contract, whether by means of codification, piecemeal legislation or judicial reform. This contribution focuses on judicial reform of the law of contract and the apparent lack of change since the advent of the new constitutional dispensation.
The search for a means to mitigate the strict application of the law of contract is not new. The Romans found that strict application of the law of contract could sometimes lead to unfair results. Eventually, Roman law developed a remedy, known as the exceptio doli, to mitigate the strict application of the law of contract. The courts in South Africa, from the outset, had to deal with instances where strict application of the law of contract would apparently lead to harsh results. To this end, the courts also turned to the Roman exceptio doli, but eventually, the appellate division ruled in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas (1988 3 SA 580 (A)) that the exceptio doli is not part of the South African law of contract. Since then, and particularly since the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, parties have sought to rely on the values underlying the constitution, good faith, reasonableness and equity, in an attempt to seek redress from what they viewed as the harsh effects of the law of contract.
Some trends began to develop: firstly, in some instances, judges displayed a shocking lack of knowledge of the law of contract; secondly, parties or the courts sometimes unnecessarily invoked the constitution when the common law of contract would have produced the same result; thirdly, a clear pattern of conservative majority and liberal minority opinions emerged in judgments of the courts; and lastly, the courts have tended to follow an all-or-nothing approach to matters dealing with contracts. However, in a minority opinion in Beadica 231 CC v Trustees, Oregon Trust (2020 5 SA 247 (CC)), Froneman J proposed a more nuanced approach in terms of which contractual matters can be resolved by proportionate adjustment of the contract. This kind of approach has been followed in Germany and it is proposed that the German concept of ergänzende Vertragsauslegung can guide the courts in South Africa to give greater effect to the values underlying the constitution, good faith, reasonableness and equity.

Abstract

Geldwassery is ’n transnasionale misdaad waarteen Suid-Afrika nie immuun is nie. Geldwassery word makliker gemaak deur die wegval van geografiese grense en tegnologiese ontwikkelings, asook die gebruik van virtuele geldeenhede as ’n betaalmiddel vir goedere en dienste. Anders as die Suid-Afrikaanse Rand, gesteun deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Reserwebank, is virtuele geldeenhede (soos Bitcoin) tans ongereguleerd en nie amptelik ingevolge die Wet op die Suid-Afrikaanse Reserwebank nie. Die aard van kripto-geldeenhede as ontasbare bates wat in elektroniese vorm binne ’n gerekenariseerde netwerk bestaan, stel die benutters daarvan in staat om dit onmiddellik oor die grenslose internet oor te dra met die klik van ’n knoppie op ’n elektroniese toestel (soos, ’n rekenaar, skootrekenaar of selfoon).
Die wêreldwye web is ’n ongereguleerde elektroniese omgewing. In hierdie ekosisteem is daar verbeterde anonimiteit en die vrye vloei van gedigitaliseerde eiendom is byna onnaspeurbaar. Hierdie kenmerke is aantreklik vir sindikate, bendes en individue wie se optrede daarop gemik is om die opbrengs van misdaad transnasionaal, en buite die formeel gereguleerde finansiële stelsels te verskuif. Om sy internasionale verpligtinge na te kom, het die Suid-Afrikaanse regering wette gepromulgeer wat daarop gemik is om die plaag van geldwassery te bekamp.
In hierdie artikel toon die outeur dat die magte wat regulasies 3(3) en 19(1) van die Deviesebeheerregulasies, 1961 uitgevaardig ingevolge die Wet op Betaalmiddels en Wisselkoerse 9 van 1933 toeken, belangrike wapens is in die arsenaal van wetstoepassingsagentskappe wat as funksie het om geldwassery en ander ekonomiese misdade te bekamp. Hierdie magte maak egter inbreuk op regte van privaatheid en op die belange wat in artikel 14 van die grondwet verskans is. Die privaatheid van ’n persoon, sy huis- en sake omgewing moet deur agente van die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens gerespekteer word wanneer hul die magte tot wetstoepassing onder die regulasies uitoefen. Hoewel inkomste uit belasting deurslaggewend is vir die bereiking van grondwetlike doelwitte, moet die toepassing van wette wat ontwerp is om Suid-Afrika se belastingbasis te beskerm, binne die orde van die grondwet plaasvind. Gevolglik toon hierdie artikel dat op die reg op privaatheid, soos beskerm in artikel 14 van die grondwet, inbreuk gemaak word deur regulasies 3(3) en 19(1). Indien korrek, maak dit dié bepalings prima facie onwettig. Enige staatsinstelling wat op die beperking staatmaak moet die beperking regverdig. Dit is ’n besondere onus. Daarom bly die vraag of op ’n proporsionele beoordeling van mededingende belange die beperkings op privaatheid wat deur regulasies 3(3) en 19(1) toegelaat word, die grondwetlikheidstoets slaag, met inagneming van alle tersaaklike faktore wat in artikel 36(1) van die grondwet vervat is. Dit is ’n verdere grondwetlike aangeleentheid wat deeglike ontleding in ’n toekomstige artikel vereis.

Abstract

It is not uncommon for environmental judgments to be dominated by a particular theme at certain periods of time. Sometimes there are clear reasons. For example, after an understandable lag between the trigger for litigation and the litigation itself, between 2005 to 2008 many judgments related to the implementation of the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, 1998, as lengthy application processes were finalised. However, sometimes clusters of judgments occur which do not seem to be capable of being traced to a single trigger and suggest either more symptomatic dynamics at play or a coincidental congruence.
This is the case for environmental judgments that were handed down between June 2021 and May 2022. The judgments cover a variety of issues ranging from law-making to bureaucratic decision-making and implementation responses. Nevertheless, one has a sense when reading them that many of the judgments are characterised by discontent with government’s approach to environmental management. Apart from the odd private dispute, one cannot help but gain the impression that a thread running through many of the judgments is a frustration at the purported failure of government to take the views and needs of ordinary people into account when they make decisions that impact on the environment – and a willingness to take such grievances to court. The theme of the judgments in the last year might well be described as “the year of pushing back”.
When viewed as a cluster the judgments may be disconcerting in one respect and raise questions as to whether the environmental justice project is alive and well, or not. However, it is precisely these types of challenges that test the robustness of the transformative approach envisaged by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; provide an opportunity for jurisprudential development; and shed light on the extent to which the courts are willing to safeguard the realisation of the environmental right. In the overview of key environmental judgments which were handed down in the last year below, whether public or private, the disputes may accordingly also be reframed as having another common denominator – and that is that they all bear some importance for the realisation of the democratic environmental rule of law.