Responding to the call for legislative development to alleviate the challenges with wage deduction as civil debt enforcement mechanism in South Africa: formulating a cohesive emolument attachment order act

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

Responding to the call for legislative development to alleviate the challenges with wage deduction as civil debt enforcement mechanism in South Africa: formulating a cohesive emolument attachment order act

Author: S Van der Merwe

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Senior lecturer, Stellenbosch University Law Clinic
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 60-78
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a4

Abstract

Krediteure se voorkeur vir die Suid-Afrikaanse besoldigingsbeslagleggingsbevel as ’n siviele skuldinvorderingsmetode kan waarskynlik onder andere toegeskryf word aan die vatbaarheid daarvan vir ernstige debiteure-uitbuiting. Hierdie misbruik het die afgelope dekade uitgebreide ingryping deur die howe en wetgewer genoodsaak. Ten spyte van die positiewe wysigings aan die Wet op Landdroshowe in 2018, geniet besoldigingsbeslagleggingsbevel-debiteure steeds nie voldoende beskerming teen uitbuiting nie. In hierdie verband is verskeie beroepe gedoen op organisasies soos die regspraktykraad, die wetgewer en die howe, wat waardevolle geleenthede verbeur het om die saak van besoldigingsbeslagleggingsbevel-skuldenaarbeskerming te bevorder. Hierdie beskerming ontbreek veral waar besoldigingsbeslagleggingsbevele uitgereik is voor die vereiste geregtelike toesig en daarna apaties daartoe afgedwing word. Hierdie situasie stel gewetenlose invorderingsagentskappe in staat om eensydig enige en alle koste wat hulle kan vervaardig teen die debiteur te hef, aangesien hierdie koste gewoonlik nie takseer of geverifieer word na die uitreiking van ’n besoldigingsbeslagleggingsbevel nie.  Pogings om hierdie misbruike reg te stel, is met groot weerstand begroet en was grootliks onsuksesvol. Sowel die regspraktykraad as die howe, en spesifiek die hoogste hof van appèl, het versuim om die dringende heersende bekommernisse aan te spreek deur die verantwoordelikheid vir regstellende stappe voor die deur van die wetgewer te lê. Die skrywer stem saam dat die mislukkings in hierdie verband nou wetgewende ingryping noodsaak. Trouens, die besoldigingsbeslagleggingsbevel-proses het ’n dringende behoefte aan verdere wetgewende hervorming, spesifiek gefokus op gevorderde skuldenaarbeskerming.  In hierdie bydrae word gereageer op die oproep om wetgewende ingryping deur wetgewende ontwikkeling voor te stel om die ernstige en heersende kommer met die besoldigingsbeslagleggingsbevel-stelsel te verlig. Die omvang van die vereiste wetgewende ontwikkeling en die rol van die omvattende omgewing word oorweeg, voordat die spesifieke inhoud van die voorgestelde ontwikkeling bespreek word. Die skrywer bepleit wetgewende herstrukturering in die vorm van die ontwikkeling en proklamasie van ’n nuwe wet, die voorgestelde Wet op Besoldigingsbeslagleggingsbevele, met omvattende regulasies wat uitsluitlik toegewy is aan die regulering van die besoldigingsbeslagleggingsbevel-meganisme en die relevante proses.

The essential religious practices test used by the judiciary in India: restricting or advancing the constitutional protection of religious freedom?

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

The essential religious practices test used by the judiciary in India: restricting or advancing the constitutional protection of religious freedom?

Author: R Henrico

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Associate Professor in the Department of Public Law and Jurisprudence, University of the Western Cape
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 79-95
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a5

Abstract

Godsdiensvryheid word in Indië, onderhewig aan bepaalde beperkings soos openbare orde, sedelikheid en gesondheid, grondwetlik beskerm. Die ryk kulturele samestelling van die Indiese gemeenskap, deurtrek van ’n menigte godsdienstige gelowe en praktyke, het aanleiding gegee tot kommer dat sekulêre aangeleenthede wat met godsdienstige praktyke geassosieer kan word, nie van regulering deur die staat vrygestel moet word nie. Die uitdrukking “wesenlik godsdienstig”, wat bedoel was om die sekulêre van die godsdienstige aangeleenthede te onderskei, moes die basis vorm vir wat bekend sou word as die noodsaaklike godsdiensbeoefeningstoets.  Die Indiese hooggeregshof is die beskermheer van die grondwet. Ten spyte daarvan dat dit geen regsplegingsmagte ten opsigte van sosio-ekonomiese regte het nie, het die hof die voormelde oor die jare afgedwing, en daardeur bygedra tot maatskaplike hervormings. Aanvanklik aangewend as “wesenlik godsdienstig”, was die toets later toegepas as “noodsaaklik vir godsdiens”. Toepassing van die toets deur die howe het in sekere gevalle ook bygedra tot verskeie sosiale hervormings, alhoewel die legitimiteit van die toets steeds ’n bron van onsekerheid is. In watter vorm ook al toegepas, bevraagteken dit die nimlike basis waarop die howe – as beskermers van die grondwetlike reg op godsdiensvryheid – wettig ’n teologiese of kerklike rol kan aanvaar deur aan hulself die mag, kundigheid en wysheid toe te eien om te besluit wát wel deel behoort te vorm van ’n godsdienstige geloof en oortuiging, en wat ’n noodsaaklike of nie-noodsaaklike gebruik van ’n sekere godsdiens is. Godsdienstige oortuigings en gelowe is subjektief van aard. Hulle kan vreemd, onlogies, irrasioneel, onrealisties of selfs bygelowig wees. Tensy in stryd met ander fundamentele menseregte, verdien dit grondwetlike beskerming. Die grondslag waarop ’n hof voorgee om irrasionele verskynsels te beoordeel deur sy eie siening op die geval af te dwing met verwysing na rasionele beginsels, letterkundige en skriftuurlike bronne, laat ruimte om die regsgeldigheid van howe en hul betrokkenheid by leerstellige aangeleenthede te bevraagteken.

Aantekeninge: Die internet of things en afstandbeheerde afskakel van toestelle – kontrakteervryheid en ander geykte regsbeginsels by spolie, vergeet en/of verwar?

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

Aantekeninge: Die internet of things en afstandbeheerde afskakel van toestelle – kontrakteervryheid en ander geykte regsbeginsels by spolie, vergeet en/of verwar?

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 96-113
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a6

Abstract

The internet of things enables the owner or possessor of devices (ie movable property) to remotely disable them when they are under the unlawful physical control of unauthorised persons. In this article the author reviews more that 2 000 years of legal history to show that those erstwhile authorised holders who ceased to be such holders and still have the devices under their unlawful physical control are not treated by the law as lasting possessors with long lasting status as possessors in durable and peaceful possession who are able to bring the mandament van spolie against the owner or possessor for an order to reactivate the devices. The same applies to the thief caught red-handed by the owner, the latter is not the spoliator but the spoliatus. Freedom to contract is one of the fundamental competencies of legal subjects who have attained majority. Unless a contractor is exercising the alleged freedom in a way that is in conflict with public policy, contracting parties are free to construct the clauses to their agreement at will, and a contracting party cannot plead mala fides after representing to his/her counter-party consensus with the terms of their agreement. Since Roman law times an owner can come to an agreement with a subject renting his property on the terms of the rent agreement. The owner of a car may rent his vehicle to the lessee after agreeing on what the daily rent will be, how many kilometres will be included in the daily tariff and what every additional kilometre will cost. It may also be agreed that the rented vehicle may not be used for cross-border travel because of the risk of hijacking involved and it may be agreed that any breach of the contract will entitle the owner to switch off the engine management system via a built-in remote control system to prevent any further use of the vehicle in contravention of the terms of the contract. Many a secondary or tertiary institution has incorporated into the terms and conditions of the agreement with its students, governing the use of the tablets or computers provided by the institution to the disadvantaged students who are unable to acquire their own devices, the possibility of remotely freezing the device when it is misused or fraudulently being disposed of to a third party under the guise of alleged theft by an unknown person. The disabling of the device should not be classified as spoliation by the institution as the real spoliatus if it was agreed that the student will merely hold the device on behalf of the owner as legal possessor.  Although it has been the legal position since Roman law times that the lessee in principle only holds the rented object on behalf of the owner as the legal possessor, nothing prevents a risk-averse owner from including ex abundanti cautela a clause in the agreement stating that he retains possession throughout the rental period and the lessee only acts as his vassal or holder exercising the corpus element of possession on behalf of the owner as legal possessor. The owner will throughout the term of the rent have the animus domini and the lessee merely the animus tenendi.  If in such circumstances the lessee in contravention of the stated terms of the agreement does enter the prohibited border-crossing area with the rented vehicle, he should not be heard to complain about spoliation if the owner uses the agreed-to remote-control function to prevent the vehicle from crossing the border. In reality the owner as spoliatus was merely exercising contra spolie to regain control over his vehicle after the erstwhile lessee had spoliated the owner by this clandestine change in the lessee’s animus from the animus tenendi to the animus rem sibi habendi without the consent of the owner and in contravention of the well-known rule nemo sibi ipse causam possessionis mutare potest. The erstwhile lessee should not be sanctioned in his self-righteous conduct as the active spoliator by a successful application to court for the mandament van spolie. Up to the clandestine change of his animus the lessee had never been in peaceful undisturbed legal possession of the vehicle or computer device. A spoliation order against a party other than the spoliator is logically beyond the scope of the purpose of the mandament to prevent a person from taking the law into his own hands, because he was merely the holder on behalf of the owner while the owner was throughout the legal possessor.  The only remedies available to the erstwhile lessee should be contractual remedies if he asserts that the owner acted in breach of the contract by remotely switching off the vehicle engine management functions. A spoliation order is not available if it is being used to enforce a merely personal right, such as a contractual right of a lessee to use the rented object in accordance with the lease agreement. The risk of long court delays should also not be shifted onto the prudent owner in such circumstances, resulting in the erstwhile lessee continuing to self-righteously misuse the property of the lessor with the added risk that when the latter does succeed to court in three years’ time the vehicle is long lost and unretrievable after the illegal border crossing and the erstwhile lessee is a hopelessly insolvent peregrinus. The same principles apply when the breach of contract is founded on any other misconduct of the lessee. Notwithstanding a clear term incorporated in the applicable rent agreement allowing the owner of the Scania trucks forming the crux of the case under discussion, in its sole discretion to be entitled to terminate the rental agreement forthwith by a relevant breach of contract, to remotely disable the vehicles and take immediate possession of the abandoned disabled vehicles at the cost of the hirer, the court awarded the erstwhile lessee the mandament van spolie against the owner who disabled and retrieved its vehicles after a clear breach of contract by the erstwhile lessee. It bodes ill for institutions and owners of property made available to their students or lessees who are by agreement merely holding on behalf of the owner as legal possessor if this unconvincing decision should be seen as a new precedent regarding contra spolie. The legal possessor can never simultaneously be defined as the spoliator of his own property that was per agreement to be held by another as his vassal if the latter in reality clandestinely changed his animus tenendi and by doing so acted as the legal spoliator against the owner as spoliatus. The court order against the owner to return the trucks and their keys, with the operating systems activated, to the applicant’s possession who has not been in possession before the spoliation, is unconvincing.

Aantekeninge: The distribution of educational qualifications and earning power upon divorce

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

Aantekeninge: The distribution of educational qualifications and earning power upon divorce

Author: E Bonthuys

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of the Witwatersrand
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 114-124
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a7

Abstract

 ’n Onlangse uitspraak van ’n Malawiese hof in Tewesa v Tewesa het beslis dat ’n vrou geregtig was op finansiële vergoeding vir die bydrae wat sy gemaak het tot haar man se tersiêre kwalifikasies, nadat hy, kort na sy gradeplegtigheid ’n egskeidingsgeding aanhangig gemaak het. Alhoewel die rede vir hierdie beslissing nie baie duidelik uit die saak blyk nie, is dit nogtans ’n interessante ontwikkeling en bespreek die outeur met hierdie bydrae die moontlikhede vir ’n soortgelyke beslissing in ’n Suid-Afrikaanse hof.  Die ekonomiese waarde van kwalifikasies en ander verdienvermoëns word tans nie as ’n bate gesien wat by egskeiding verdeel kan word nie, maar verlies aan toekomstige verdienvermoë is al vir ’n geruime tyd in verskeie reëls van die kontraktereg, deliktereg en versekeringsreg erken én vergoed. Daar is ook (redelik vae) aanduidings dat dieselfde konsep in familiereg erkenning begin verwerf, veral in sake oor universele vennootskappe tussen ongetroude pare.  In hierdie bydrae word ondersoek tot welke mate die huidige egskeidingsreg so ’n eis sou kon akkommodeer. ’n Eis vir verbeurdverklaring van voordele ingevolge artikel 9(1) van die Wet op Egskeiding in dieselfde omstandighede as dié in die Tewesa-saak sou moontlik kon slaag in gevalle waar ’n hof die man se optrede as ernstige wangedrag sou beskou. Die wye diskresie wat howe het om ’n herverdeling van bates ingevolge artikel 7(3) van die Egskeidingswet te bewerkstellig en die fokus van hierdie wetsbepaling op bydraes tot die ander eggenoot se boedel sou ook moontlik tot erkenning van ’n soortgelyke eis lei, maar daar is ’n aantal probleme wat die toepaslikheid van beide hierdie bepalings van die wet kon belemmer. Meer belowend is ’n eis vir onderhoud na egskeiding ingevolge artikel 7(2) van dieselfde wet omdat dit ’n hof toelaat om beide die bestaande en toekomstige verdienvermoëns van beide gades in ag te neem. ’n Onderhoudsbevel wat gekombineer is met ’n bevel vir herverdeling onder die sogenaamde skoonbreuk-beginsel toon die grootste potensiaal om hierdie soort van eise aan te spreek. Die laaste gedeelte van die bydrae ondersoek die breër kwessie van eise vir verdienvermoë, spesifiek of die gade wat die bydrae gemaak het moet eis vir haar eie verminderde verdienvermoë, en of sy sou kon kies om te eis vir haar eggenoot se vergrote verdienvermoë.

Regspraak: Can the body corporate insist that the purchaser of a sectional title unit at a sale in execution pay or secure not only outstanding levies but also other amounts the body corporate claims are due by the unit owner such as interest on arrears, legal costs and interest on non-paid legal costs before the body corporate will issue the levy clearance certificate for transfer required in terms of section 15b3(a)(i)(aa) of the Sectional Titles Act?

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

Regspraak: Can the body corporate insist that the purchaser of a sectional title unit at a sale in execution pay or secure not only outstanding levies but also other amounts the body corporate claims are due by the unit owner such as interest on arrears, legal costs and interest on non-paid legal costs before the body corporate will issue the levy clearance certificate for transfer required in terms of section 15b3(a)(i)(aa) of the Sectional Titles Act?

Author: CJ Van der Merwe

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of Stellenbosch
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 125-139
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a8

Abstract

 Ingevolge artikel 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) van die Wet op Deeltitels mag die registrateur nie oordrag van ’n deeltiteleenheid registreer nie tensy ’n transportbesorger bevestig dat die regspersoon gesertifiseer het dat alle gelde verskuldig ten opsigte van die bedoelde eenheid betaal is of dat sekerheidstelling vir betaling tot bevrediging van die regspersoon verskaf is. By die eksekusieverkoping in die Marsh Rose-saak het die koper, Steinmuller, onderneem om sekerheidstelling te verskaf dat alle gelde verskuldig aan die regspersoon deur die vorige eienaar deur hom betaal sal word. Toe Steinmuller en die regspersoon nie kon ooreenkom oor die bedrag van die sekerheidstelling nie, nader Steinmuller die hof a quo vir ’n toepaslike bevel en die hof beslis dat Steinmuller R250 000 in die trustrekening van sy prokureur moet betaal as onherroeplike sekerheidstelling vir betaling van die geld verskuldig aan die regspersoon. Op appèl na die volbank van die hooggeregshof in Johannesburg, bevestig die meerderheidsuitspraak dat die hof moet besluit of die regter a quo bevoeg was om te bepaal dat skuld wat aan Steinmuller gedelegeer is, slegs agterstallige heffings insluit. Volgens die minderheiduitspraak moet die bedrag wat as sekerheidstelling aangebied word nie slegs agterstallige heffings nie, maar álle gelde verskuldig deur die vorige eienaar insluit. Volgens die minderheidsuitspraak berus hierdie standpunt op ’n algemene aanspraak op sekerheidstelling en die feit dat die regspersoon geregtig is op alle gelde vir sy finansiële voortbestaan. Daar word aangetoon dat hierdie aanspraak slegs betrekking het op gevalle waar die eienaar van die eenheid insolvent is en alle gelde ingevolge artikel 89(1) van die Wet op Insolvensie as deel van die koste van tegeldemaking aan die regspersoon uitbetaal moet word, voordat oordrag kan geskied.  Die meerderheidsuitspraak is korrek dat slegs die verskuldigde skuld van die vorige eienaar aan Steinmuller gedelegeer is. Wat regskoste betref beslis die meerderheidsuitspraak dat slegs regskoste wat getakseer is deur die regspersoon of waarop die partye ingevolge reël 25(4) van Aanhangsel 1 van die Regulasies op die Wet op die Bestuur van Deeltitelskemas ooreengekom het, afgedwing kan word. Die meerderheidsuitspraak beslis verder dat rente op agterstallige heffings en nie-betaalde regskoste slegs verskuldig is indien dit bevestig word deur ’n skriftelike trusteebesluit ingevolge reël 21(3)(c) van Aanhangsel 1 van die Regulasies op die Wet op die Bestuur van Deeltitelskemas. Ten slotte word aangevoer dat die regspersoon in plaas van die hofaansoek, die goedkoper en spoediger proses ingevolge artikel 39(1)(c) van die Wet op die Ombuddiens vir Gemeenskapskemas kon gevolg het. Volgens daardie proses sou die beregter moes bepaal of die skuld gedelegeer aan Steinmuller verkeerdelik bepaal is of onredelik was en indien wel, dit tot die korrekte bedrag aanpas.

Regspraak: Huweliksgoedereregtelike bedeling lukraak terugwerkend gewysig én die betrokkenes se handelingsbevoegdheid só verminder?

by | Dec 16, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2023 I1

Regspraak: Huweliksgoedereregtelike bedeling lukraak terugwerkend gewysig én die betrokkenes se handelingsbevoegdheid só verminder?

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 140-156
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a9

Abstract

Legal certainty will be severely jeopardised should it be possible at whim to proclaim the applicable matrimonial property regime governing spouses’ assets and liabilities to have been changed retroactively. The legislature prescribed clearly defined prerequisites to be met before any change regarding a couple’s matrimonial property regime can be sanctioned by the high court and then only for the future, but never with retrospective force. Under the dualistic systems that apply in South Africa since 1652 it has always been recognised that individuals living according to customary or indigenous law may by default govern their matrimonial property regimes and the law of husband  and wife according to the applicable norms of indigenous law. By default these marriages were out of community of property although a couple could agree to change the default position and have their consensus in this regard registered.  The couple M was married according to customary law in the erstwhile Eastern Cape in 1980 and the marriage was never registered. The default position should accordingly govern the matrimonial property regime of the couple resulting in no community of property and no accrual system. The husband’s legal capacity and competencies were consequently not restricted by the qualifications contained in section 15 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 because that chapter of the act was not applicable to a customary marriage concluded in 1980 and which is by default out of community of property. When the husband as registered sole owner in 2010 entered into a valid sale agreement to transfer his immovable property on the Cape Flats to the first respondent nothing hampered or restricted the parties’ capacity to enter into the applicable obligatory or real agreements. The property was subsequently validly transferred in the Deeds Register to the purchaser. The plaintiff’s claim as widow of the seller who since passed away, to have the property “retransferred” into her name because the sale and transfer was allegedly in contravention of section 15 of Act 88 of 1984, is unconvincing although the court held otherwise. The crux of the matter is not whether the first respondent should be safeguarded against the consequences of an alleged invalid agreement by the husband who acted without the involvement of his wife in 2010 by a reliance on section 15(9)(a) of that act. The emphasis should have been on how the alleged amendment of section 7(2) of Act 120 of 1998 in June 2021 could be deemed to apply retrospectively after the sale and transfer had validly been concluded for eleven years before the poorly formulated amendment of the act became law in June 2021. A contract of sale that was validly concluded cannot retrospectively become invalid because the legislature changed the requirements for the type of contract more than a decade later.  The court’s point of departure for its judgment is, however, that the deceased was married in community of property: “The Recognition of Customary Marriages Amendment Act 1 of 2021, which came into operation on 1 June 2021, among others, amended section 7 of the RCMA that all marriages, which were entered into before or after the enactment of the RCMA, are regarded as in community of property unless such consequences are specifically excluded by the spouses in an antenuptial contract” (par 20). This, notwithstanding the clear legal position regarding the default matrimonial property regime for all indigenous marriages concluded before the commencement of Act 120 of 1998: out of community of property. The legislature was supposed to adhere to the decision of the constitutional court in 2017 in Ramuhovhi v President of the Republic of South Africa (2018 2 SA 1 (CC)) to amend section 7(1) of Act 120 of 1998 with regard to polygamous marriages and not to alter the legal position regarding monogamous marriages that were governed without any found negative consequences by section 7(2) of that act. Although the legislature neglected to explicitly declare that this amendment of section 7(2) should have no impact retrospectively, the implications of this poorly conceived judgment will necessitate a re-opening of all the millions of estates of people who have been married according to a customary marriage since 1652 because all those marriages will now be deemed to have been in community of property with the consequential implications for the distribution of all assets of the spouses involved with the dissolution of the marriages after the demise of the dying spouse. The legislature would have caused less harm if it read with comprehension the clear order of the constitutional court: “In terms of s 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, this order does not invalidate a winding up of a deceased estate that has been finalised or the transfer of marital property that has been effected.”