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 LRM v The Mnquma Local Municipality handel oor ’n geval waar ’n sekuriteitsbeampte, Tukani, in diens van die Mnquma-distriksmunisipaliteit, gedurende die nagtelike ure ’n vriend van hom te hulp gesnel het toe laasgenoemde deur ’n aanvaller met ’n mes bedreig is. Ten einde die aanvaller af te skrik, het Tukani eers twee skote met sy dienspistool in die lug afgevuur, maar toe die aanvaller geensins daardeur afgeskrik is nie, het hy ’n derde skoot gemik na die padoppervlakte langs die aanvaller se voete. Die koeël het egter opgeslaan vanaf die harde oppervlak en die muur van ’n voorafvervaardigde huis aan die oorkant van die pad deurboor, waar dit die slapende N in sy kop getref het. N het ernstige breinskade opgedoen. Sy vader (LRM) het namens N en in eie naam ’n deliktuele eis teen die munisipaliteit as Tukani se werkgewer ingestel. N se moeder (DJM) en suster (MM) wat teenwoordig was tydens die gebeure en die verwonding van N gadegeslaan en beleef het, het vorderinge weens erge trauma en senuskok teen die munisipaliteit ingestel. Die hof het op sterkte van die bewoording van dokumentasie wat Tukani se dienskontrak uitgemaak het tot die gevolgtrekking geraak dat die handeling wat hy verrig het binne die bestek van sy diensverhouding uitgevoer is. Versigtigheidshalwe het die hof egter beslis dat indien dit nie die geval sou wees nie, Tukani se handeling in voldoende noue verband met sy werkgewer se onderneming gestaan het om laasgenoemde middellik aanspreeklik te kon stel. Verder het die hof aandag bestee aan wat dit as “onregmatigheid” (“unlawfulness”) bestempel het. Ongelukkig is hierdie gedeelte van die uitspraak uiters onsamehangend, byvoorbeeld deurdat die hof die locus classicus van uitsprake wat met nalatigheid verband hou – te wete Kruger v Coetzee – voorgehou het as sou dit op onregmatigheid betrekking hê, welke bevinding as ’n growwe flater bestempel kan word.  Die logiese gevolgtrekking wat ’n mens kan maak uit die hof se behandeling van “onregmatigheid” – te wete ’n onvolledige oorsig van die nalatigheids- en kousaliteitsvereistes vir deliktuele aanspreeklikheid – is dat hierdie delikselemente verwar is met die begrip “delik”, ’n uitkoms waarvoor daar géén gesag bestaan nie en trouens as totaal onaanvaarbaar beskou kan word. Dele van dié bondige uitspraak, byvoorbeeld waar die hof tot ’n positiewe bevinding van feitelike en juridiese kousaliteit geraak het, kom neer op blote feitebevindings (decisiones) waarvoor daar geen verduideliking (ratio decidendi in tegniese sin) verskaf is nie. Dit is opmerklik dat die hof geen bevinding van onregmatigheid van Tukani se optrede gemaak het nie, ofskoon toepassing van die normaal tersake reëls sou aandui dat sy handeling wél onregmatig was weens die feit dat sy positiewe gedrag wat nadeel veroorsaak het ingevolge gevestigde reg prima facie onregmatig was en die taak aan die verweerder oorgelaat is om sodanige vermoede te weerlê, wat kennelik nie gebeur het nie. Daar kan instemming betuig word met die hof se uiteindelike bevinding dat die verweerder middellik aanspreeklik is.  In sy uitspraak het regter Smith ook versuim om ’n onderskeid te tref tussen die aard van die verskillende vorderinge wat teen die verweerder ingestel is, te wete N se eis op grond van liggaamlike beserings, LRM se eis weens die verswaring van sy onderhoudsplig teenoor N as gevolg van Tukani se handeling en, les bes, DJM en MM se vorderinge weens die veroorsaking van trauma en senuskok.  Ofskoon hierdie uitspraak as rapporteerbaar en van belang vir ander regters aangemerk is, is dit hoogs twyfelagtig dat dit enige nuttige doel sal dien as gesag vir die oplossing van probleme rakende middellike aanspreeklikheid, of die bepaling van deliktuele aanspreeklikheid deur oorweging van die aan- of afwesigheid van die erkende delikselemente.

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The recognition of and respect for the party autonomy of every legal subject of majority not limited by any personal cognitive handicap is part and parcel of the foundation of an orderly legal community governed by the rule of law. “Making rules of law discretionary or subject to value judgments may be destructive of the rule of law” (Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) 481E).
The discretionary power of a divorce court under section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 stems from before the current constitutional dispensation. Almost thirty years after the acceptance of the constitutional values of the current system, it was hoped that as time went by, the transitional exception dating to 1984 that exhibits clear elements of arbitrariness would be relied on with declining frequency. There is only a limited number of marriages still in existence concluded before November 1984 with an ante-nuptial contract providing for the proverbial “cold exclusion of all benefits” that could potentially at this late stage in the spouses’ lives be expected to end in the divorce court justifying a reliance on this section. The act limits the discretionary power to explicit conditions: it can be considered only where the divorce concerned a marriage concluded before the commencement of Act 88 of 1984 with an ante-nuptial contract that excluded accrual sharing and any form of asset sharing and in the absence of any agreement at any time between the erstwhile spouses regarding the division of their assets. Provided these conditions are met, the court can order that such assets, or such part of the assets of the other party as the court may deem just, be transferred to the first-mentioned party (s 7(3)).
In all these circumstances a valid ante-nuptial contract exists to which both parties agreed in the presence of a notary public and the applicant in reality never acquired any claim to the other party’s assets. The applicant in addition represented to the other spouse, the notary public and the public at large a claim would never be made to any of the respondent’s assets. “Reasonableness and fairness are not freestanding requirements for the exercise of a contractual right. … Acceptance of the notion that judges can refuse to enforce a contractual provision merely because it offends their personal sense of fairness and equity will give rise to legal and commercial uncertainty” (Potgieter v Potgieter NO 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) 650F-H).
In Greyling v Minister of Home Affairs ((40023/21) 2022 ZAGPPHC 311 (11 May 2022)) the court regarded the upholding of the claim of the applicant contrary to the explicit misrepresentation by the applicant that she is in agreement with the terms contained in the notarially registered ante-nuptial contract of 1989 governing the marriage, potentially fair. The court ordered the first condition in section 7(3) of Act 70 of 1979, limiting its application to pre-November 1984 marriages, unconstitutional.
This judgment may be popular and in line with what the woman in the street might regard as fair, presumably abandoning the principle of pacta sunt servanda as well as the principles underlying estoppel, but does not bode well for the upholding of the rule of law. “The court does not as yet sit, as under a palm tree, to exercise a general discretion to do what the man in the street, on a general overview of the case, might regard as fair” (Springette v Defoe 1992 2 FLR 388 391).

It is argued that legal certainty will not be enhanced should the constitutional court confirm this judgment. An alleged reliance on principles or policy exclusively based on common law jurisdictions as justification for the recognition of such a discretionary power under these circumstances, without any consideration of the position under civil law systems which indeed share common roots with specifically the South African private law system is once more an example of the demise of our jurisprudence where legal professionals seem to be unable to do proper, relevant and reliable comparative legal research.
Since the husband in the Greyling case did not even oppose the claim of his spouse (all prior to a divorce application) and chose to abide by the court’s decision, it is indeed strange that the court refrained from referring to and recognising that the parties could at any stage since 1989, have relied on section 21(1) of Act 88 of 1984 to have effected a change in their matrimonial property regime. It reeks of misuse of the court process for the court, under these circumstances, to hold as unconstitutional that part of section 7(3) as being the only possible remedy for the claimant against the perceived injustice she would be suffering on divorcing her husband because of their matrimonial property regime, is mind-blowing. The only benefit of not relying on section 21(1) would be to not be bound by the requirements contained in section 21(1)(a-c) – there are sound reasons for the proposed change; sufficient notice of the proposed change has been given to all the creditors of the spouses; and no other person will be prejudiced by the proposed change – and that would constitute misuse. Section 36(1)(e) of the constitution provides that the rights in the bill of rights may be limited but only in terms of a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom (party autonomy), taking into account all relevant factors, including less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. It is clearly not the case in instances like these.

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Die eerste saak wat riglyne verskaf oor die interpretasie van artikel 10(13) van die Wet op Handelsmerke van 1993 is onlangs in die hoogste hof van appél in LA Group (Pty) Ltd v Stable Brands (Pty) Ltd beslis. Die beslissing het ook ’n mate van duidelikheid verskaf oor die tipe gebruik van ’n handelsmerk wat as aanvaarbare bewys van gebruik beskou sal word wanneer die geldigheid van ’n handelsmerk betwis word op grond van nie-gebruik. Wat die Polo-saak hoogs ongewoon maak, indien nie uniek nie, is dat dit nie die eienaar van die handelsmerk, naamlik Ralph Lauren, was wat sy reputasie in die POLO-merke wou bevestig nie, maar ’n derde party, naamlik die respondent in die saak. Dit is na alle waarskynlikheid die eerste keer dat ’n derde party poog om die reputasie van ’n beweerde buitelandse, bekende, ongeregistreerde handelsmerk te beskerm.
Daar was twee uitsprake wat artikel 10(13) verskillend geïnterpreteer het, en dus tot verskillende gevolgtrekkings oor die feite gekom het. Hierdie artikel sal beide die minderheids- en meerderheidsuitsprake krities bespreek. ’n Aspek van die uitspraak wat kommer wek by beide die minderheids- en meerderheidsuitspraak is die oënskynlik doelbewuste vermyding van enige bespreking van die territorialiteit van handelsmerke, meer spesifiek enige vermelding van artikels 35 en 36(2) van die Wet op Handelsmerke van 1993. Op ’n letterlike interpretasie blyk die minderheid korrek te wees dat artikel 10(13) van wye belang kan wees, maar dit het nie daarin geslaag om duidelikheid te verskaf oor die moontlike wisselwerking tussen artikels 10(13) en 35, aan een kant, en artikel 36(2), aan die ander kant nie. Die versuim om die interpretasie van artikel 10(13) van die Wet op Handelsmerke van 1993 te versoen met artikel 35 (en a 36(2)) kan ernstige kommer oor die omvang van artikel 35 in die toekoms laat ontstaan. Aangesien dit nie die eienaar van die beweerd geskonde handelsmerk was wat die klaer was nie, laat die saak ook kwessies ontstaan oor die bewyslas in die vestiging van die vereiste reputasie in hierdie tipe gevalle.
Gegewe die leerstuk van die territorialiteit van handelsmerke, is ’n sekere vlak van verbruikersverwarring onvermydelik.

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With the adoption of the interim constitution in 1993, much was made of the transformative function which the new constitution, and more particularly, the bill of rights, would fulfil. There were calls to reform the law of contract, whether by means of codification, piecemeal legislation or judicial reform. This contribution focuses on judicial reform of the law of contract and the apparent lack of change since the advent of the new constitutional dispensation.
The search for a means to mitigate the strict application of the law of contract is not new. The Romans found that strict application of the law of contract could sometimes lead to unfair results. Eventually, Roman law developed a remedy, known as the exceptio doli, to mitigate the strict application of the law of contract. The courts in South Africa, from the outset, had to deal with instances where strict application of the law of contract would apparently lead to harsh results. To this end, the courts also turned to the Roman exceptio doli, but eventually, the appellate division ruled in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas (1988 3 SA 580 (A)) that the exceptio doli is not part of the South African law of contract. Since then, and particularly since the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, parties have sought to rely on the values underlying the constitution, good faith, reasonableness and equity, in an attempt to seek redress from what they viewed as the harsh effects of the law of contract.
Some trends began to develop: firstly, in some instances, judges displayed a shocking lack of knowledge of the law of contract; secondly, parties or the courts sometimes unnecessarily invoked the constitution when the common law of contract would have produced the same result; thirdly, a clear pattern of conservative majority and liberal minority opinions emerged in judgments of the courts; and lastly, the courts have tended to follow an all-or-nothing approach to matters dealing with contracts. However, in a minority opinion in Beadica 231 CC v Trustees, Oregon Trust (2020 5 SA 247 (CC)), Froneman J proposed a more nuanced approach in terms of which contractual matters can be resolved by proportionate adjustment of the contract. This kind of approach has been followed in Germany and it is proposed that the German concept of ergänzende Vertragsauslegung can guide the courts in South Africa to give greater effect to the values underlying the constitution, good faith, reasonableness and equity.