Aantekeninge: Verblyfvergunning is nie outomaties habitatio nie en totale skade omvat skade gely weens inbreuk op die eiser se vervullingsbelang

by | Dec 19, 2021 | TSAR, TSAR 2022 I1

Aantekeninge: Verblyfvergunning is nie outomaties habitatio nie en totale skade omvat skade gely weens inbreuk op die eiser se vervullingsbelang

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2022, p. 143-158
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2022/i1a8

Abstract

According to the headnote attached to the most recent decision under discussion, the litigation turned on the quantification of the total loss suffered by M as alleged holder of a right of habitatio after S as reputed owner of the farm revoked the verbal agreement between the parties entitling M to occupy the dwelling ad infinitum on condition that he renovates the dwelling to a habitable state. Notwithstanding the conviction of the judges involved, it is clear that at no stage were any of the requirements for the acquisition or vesting of a limited real right of habitatio complied with. No limited real right was registered against the farm and S as the alleged grantor of the limited real right was at no stage the owner of the property. He could not have been entitled to burden the property of another with such limited real right. A contractual arrangement between the parties, however, did exist granting the claimant an entitlement to occupy the dwelling. The initially friendly relations between the litigants soured abruptly in February 2013 when S evicted M from the farm because of a supposed blasphemous comment by M. This happened after the claimant had already invested significantly in the restoration and modernisation of the old dilapidated dwelling. “The plaintiff regarded this as a repudiation of the contract between him and the defendant, accepted it as such and left the farm, effectively halting the renovation project” (par 14 read with par 5.4 of the 2016-decision). His claim for compensation of the loss suffered was held by the court to be limited to the amounts reflected in the receipts representing the cost of building material when it was acquired. It is submitted that the court should also have taken note of the loss suffered as positive interest, because the claimant forfeited the calculated benefit of life-long free occupation in the restored dwelling. Because of the underlying agreement between the parties to the litigation, the patrimonial benefit that accrued to the estate of the owner of the farm due to the objective rules of accessio cannot be classified as actionable unjustified enrichment. The principles of unjustified enrichment do not apply – the resulting detriment or loss of M was cum causa and not sine causa. The remarks of the court pointing to unjustified enrichment do not convince. Damages should have been calculated to cover the loss in positive interest of the claimant and not merely his negative interest, ie the amounts paid for the building material used in the renovation. The court, however, held: “I’m satisfied that the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to prove his claim for the costs of renovating the farmhouse on a balance of probabilities” (par 23). The last mentioned mode of quantification of the loss suffered would have been more in place where merely a delict was involved, as eg where the damaged motor vehicle should be repaired to the state it was in before the accident occurred. Had the judges in this case done a correct assessment of loss upon cancellation for breach of contract, it would have led to a respect of the rule of law and would not have been to the detriment of the claimant. The legal principles that should have been applied had already been clearly formulated more than a century ago: “The sufferer by such a breach should be placed in the position he would have occupied had the contract been performed, so far as that can be done by the payment of money, and without undue hardship to the defaulting party …” Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd (1915 AD 1 22).

 

Regspraak: Troosgeld is deel van ’n reghebbende se afsonderlike boedelbates en nie deel van die gemeenskaplike boedel nie – verpligte deling troos nie

by | Dec 19, 2021 | TSAR, TSAR 2022 I1

Regspraak: Troosgeld is deel van ’n reghebbende se afsonderlike boedelbates en nie deel van die gemeenskaplike boedel nie – verpligte deling troos nie

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2022, p. 159-171
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2022/i1a9

Abstract

Although a husband and wife married in community of property share by default, if not design, all their patrimonial assets in the common estate, the solatium or compensation received by an injured person as satisfaction for the unjustified injury to his or her personality rights is not supposed to form part of the common estate – simply because it happened to be received in the form of a patrimonial asset. It is meant to be private or separate and for the comfort of the injured only. The purpose of the compensation received as solatium is not to fill a vacuum left by the delict in the injured party’s assets, but to serve as the only mode of solace available to law to provide redress for the wrong. Other than the position where a patrimonial asset of the claimant had been damaged, eg by the negligent car accident caused by the respondent, and where the awarded damages neatly compensate the wronged party for the damage caused, thereby placing the total estate in the same position where it was before the intervening delict, the solatium paid to the injured for the non-patrimonial damages suffered by the delictual inroad on his/her personality rights is not supposed to redress a negative impact on the total estate of the wronged. The spouse of the injured party, even where they are married in community of property, would never have been able to lay claim to those personality traits or attributes of the other spouse. Personality rights, per definition, never form part of the assets of any patrimonial estate and should not be shared simply because the matrimonial property regime happens to be community of property. The legislature correctly stipulated in section 18(a) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984: “Notwithstanding the fact that a spouse is married in community of property – (a) any amount recovered by him or her by way of damages, other than damages for patrimonial loss, by reason of a delict committed against him or her, does not fall into the joint estate but becomes his or her separate property” – emphasis added. This formulation echoes what has been the legal position for ages. Along those lines Hiemstra J in Potgieter v Potgieter correctly held that the amount awarded as contumelia to the injured husband for the harm done to his personality rights by the adultery of his wife and the third party, would not form part of the joint estate but would be his separate property. In so doing, the court precluded the adulteress from further sharing in the spoils of her doing. In the underlying decision by the majority of the supreme court of appeal, however, it was held that section 18(a) should be read to be limited: “The context of s 18 must be read in its entirety, and apparent therefrom is the plain language and words used. [This] … section highlights that delictual damages received by a spouse during the course of a marriage in community of property, which are nonpatrimonial in nature (s 18(a)); and damages for bodily injuries owing to the fault of one’s spouse in terms of s 18(b) must be excluded from the division of the joint estate on divorce” (par 9 – emphasis added). In this case a very significant amount was received by the lady for the non-patrimonial loss suffered by her more than four years before the marriage had been concluded. According to the reading-in exercise of the supreme court of appeal it was not received “during the course of the marriage” and not ringfenced. As a consequence, the court upheld the appeal of the erstwhile husband after a marriage of very short duration (barely two years). He consequently successfully laid claim to fifty per cent of the more than half a million paid as non-patrimonial compensation to his wife, more than four years before he married her in community of property and only after becoming aware of the significant amount of that compensation invested by her. This decision not only flies in the face of logic and the legal principles underlying South African common law; it is in conflict with the latest developments in comparable Continental legal systems sharing the same historical and societal foundations as the South African law. This judgment provides poor consolation and it leaves a deeply imbedded discomfort, because the result is vehemently contrary to the outcome in comparable legal systems for a similar scenario. Dividing the solatium under the pretext of a division of the joint estate diminishes the solace intended for the injured.

 

Regspraak: Precarium to the rescue as deus ex machina in a hard case

by | Dec 19, 2021 | TSAR, TSAR 2022 I1

Regspraak: Precarium to the rescue as deus ex machina in a hard case

Author: Johan Scott

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of South Africa
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2022, p. 171-191
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2022/i1a10

Abstract

Die Khumalo-saak handel oor ’n bejaarde man (K) se aansoek om ’n spoliasiebevel teen L (die eienaar van ’n plaas waaroor K jare lank vir hom ’n pad na sy woning toegeëien het) wat eensklaps sy grond toegespan het en geweier het om die heksleutels aan K – ’n okkupeerder ingevolge artikel 1 van die Wet op die Uitbreiding van Sekerheid van Verblyfreg 62 van 1997, woonagtig op ’n buurplaas – te oorhandig ten einde hom in staat te stel om steeds die pad te gebruik. Ofskoon daar ’n ander pad na K se woning was, was dit uiters swak en slegs geskik vir gebruik deur 4×4 voertuie. Aangesien K net ’n ou bakkie besit het, het hy geweldig ongerief verduur as gevolg van L se optrede. L het aangevoer dat hy goeie redes gehad het vir sy optrede, onder andere bodembewaring en om wilddiewe hok te slaan, asook dat K boonop nie ingevolge ’n serwituut van via toegang oor sy plaas gehad het nie. Die grondeisehof het op grond van ’n bedenklike toepassing van artikel 22(2)(c) van die Wet op Herstel van Grondregte 22 van 1994 vir hom jurisdiksie toegeëien. Verder het die hof, strydig met die robuuste en spoedeisende aard van die mandament van spolie, die beswaar dat die applikant sy aansoek eers na twee jaar en agt maande geloods het, summier verwerp en daarnaas, ook strydig met bestaande beginsel en praktyk, in besonderhede op die meriete van K se saak ingegaan om tot die beslissing te geraak het dat daar ’n stilswyende precarium tussen K en L gesluit is, omdat L se werknemers wat sienderoë toegelaat het dat K die pad oor L se grond gebruik, as L se verteenwoordigers vir doeleindes van sluiting van die precarium-ooreenkoms bevind is. Ingevolge die normale reëls moes die prekaris, K, dus volgens die hof redelike kennis van die precarium dans, L, ontvang het voordat laasgenoemde sy plaas kon afsper. Die hof het in wese “geregtelik kennis geneem” van hierdie precarium en hom geensins gesteur aan die bestaande reëls van die kontraktereg en, in die besonder, die verteenwoordigingsreg nie. Veral oppervlakkig was die hof se behandeling van die vereiste van skending van quasi-besit vir die mandament van spolie in gevalle waar die applikant nie in daadwerklike beheer van ’n onroerende saak was nie. Die hof het hier in werklikheid deur middel van die toepassing van spoliasiebeginsels spesifieke nakoming van die precarium-kontrak gelas. Daar word betoog dat die hof uit sy pad gegaan het om K uit sy verknorsing te help, ofskoon daar in die lig van geldende regsreëls geen regverdiging vir sodanige regshulp was nie. Hoogstens het die feit dat L jarelank vir K toegelaat het om sy pad te gebruik op toestemming – ’n eensydige regshandeling wat te eniger tyd herroep kan word – neergekom en L was dus ten volle daarop geregtig om sy plaas af te sper. Daar kan verder geensins betoog word dat daar ’n grondwetlike verpligting op L gerus het om K se gebruik van die pad oor sy plaas te gedoog nie. Deur hierdie uitspraak het die hof ’n gevaarlike presedent geskep.

 

Regspraak: When Caesar must pay, Caesar must pay – the withholding of tax refunds by the South African Revenue Service

by | Dec 19, 2021 | TSAR, TSAR 2022 I1

Regspraak: When Caesar must pay, Caesar must pay – the withholding of tax refunds by the South African Revenue Service

Author: Thabo Legwaila

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2022, p. 191-204
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2022/i1a11

Abstract

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens (SAID) is verantwoordelik vir die administrasie en invordering van belasting. Ten einde hierdie mandaat effektief te verwesenlik, het die SAID verreikende magte kragtens Deel 1 van die Wet op die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens 34 van 1997. Dit gebeur dikwels dat belastingbetalers meer aan die SAID betaal as die verskuldigde belasting of dat terughoudingsagente, soos werkgewers of die betalers van rente, dividende ensovoorts, meer as die verskuldigde belasting invorder en oorbetaal aan die SAID. Dit veroorsaak ’n situasie waar die SAID die oortollige bedrag aan die belastingbetaler moet terugbetaal. Artikel 190 van die Wet op Belastingadministrasie 28 van 2011, wat gemoeid is met die terugbetalings van oorbetalings, bepaal dat die SAID ’n terugbetaling, wat rente insluit, moet maak indien ’n persoon geregtig is op die terugbetaling omdat die bedrag behoorlik terugbetaalbaar is kragtens ’n belastingwet en dit so aangetoon word in ’n aanslag of die bedrag wat betaal is meer is as die bedrag betaalbaar volgens die aanslag. Die SAID hoef egter nie ’n terugbetaling te magtig totdat ’n verifikasie, inspeksie, oudit of strafregtelike ondersoek van die terugbetaling afgehandel is nie. In die Rappa Resources-saak het die hof die situasie oorweeg waar ’n belastingbetaler geregtig was op ’n terugbetaling vanaf die SAID, maar die SAID nie die terugbetaling tydig gemaak het nie omrede die belastingbetaler aan ’n oudit onderworpe was. Die hof het bevind dat die SAID die oudit onnodig vertraag het, wat daartoe gelei het dat die terugbetaling weerhou is. As sulks het die hof bevind dat die SAID die terugbetaling moet maak en die oudit binne ’n redelike tyd moet afhandel. Die hof het egter onbehoorlike klem op die besigheidsmodel van die belastingbetaler geplaas toe dit bevind het dat wanneer die SAID ’n terugbetaling weerhou in gevalle waar dit noodsaaklik is vir die besigheidsmodel van ’n belastingbetaler, soos in hierdie geval, die oudit nie ’n onbepaalde tyd kan neem om gefinaliseer te word nie. In ’n ander saak, Top Watch (Pty) Ltd v The Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service (2018 JDR 1311 (GJ)) het die hof bevind dat die SAID nie kon bewys dat daar ’n uitstaande skuld was nie en daarom kon die SAID nie die terugbetaling weerhou nie. Hierdie vonnisbespreking wys op die SAID se versuim om die behoorlike proses ten opsigte van terugbetalings te volg, die onregverdigheid wat so ’n weerhouding vir belastingbetalers inhou en die rol wat die belastingombudkantoor gespeel het om belastingbetalers by te staan om verskuldigde terugbetalings vanaf die SAID te verkry. Dit dui verder op die SAID se inbreukmaking op belastingbetalers se reg tot finaliteit; die nadelige gevolge wat die weerhouding van terugbetalings op belastingbetalers het; en illustreer, met behulp van ’n vergelykende analise, dat die SAID se verontagsaming van die reg, wat blyk praktyk te wees vir dié belasting invorderaar, heeltemal onregverdigbaar is. Die kort vergelykende analise dui daarop dat die statutêre bepalings nie té beperkend of té problematies vir die SAID is nie.

 

Boekbesprekings: Bhauna Hansjee, Fahreen Kader and Clement Marumoagae: The Survivor’s Guide for Candidate Attorneys

by | Dec 19, 2021 | TSAR, TSAR 2022 I1

Boekbesprekings: Bhauna Hansjee, Fahreen Kader and Clement Marumoagae: The Survivor’s Guide for Candidate Attorneys

Author: NR Naidoo

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2022, p. 205-206
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2022/i1a12

Abstract

None