Abstract

Parties generally enter into contractual relations with the sincere intention to fulfil all the obligations created in terms of their contract. However, for various reasons, parties sometimes do not comply with the terms of their contract. Where a party fails or refuses to perform their obligations as specified in their contract, that party commits breach of contract and the normal consequences for breach then ensue. One of these consequences is that the injured party may institute a claim for damages.

The nature of this remedy has been called into question. Is a claim for damages due to breach of contract derived from the contractual relationship between the parties, or is it no more than a delictual claim presented under the guise of contract? The fundamental values underlying the law of contract are consensus and reliance, as well as freedom of contract, sanctity of contract (pacta sunt servanda), good faith and privity of contract.

Freedom of contract and sanctity of contract demand that contracts that are freely entered into must be honoured and enforced. From this arises the principle that breach of contract occurs even if the failure or refusal to abide by the contract cannot be attributed to fault in the sense of a wilful disregard of the contract or a negligent failure to abide by the contract. This is in stark contrast with delict, where fault is generally required for liability. Furthermore, reliance and good faith also demand that the parties should honour their obligations in terms of the contract. This relationship based on reliance and good faith is broken when breach occurs, with the result that there is a need to provide redress to the injured party that can be derived from the contractual relationship. Lastly, privity of contract generally limits the effects of the contract, as well as the resultant rights and duties in terms of the contract, to the parties who contracted with each other. There is no such closed notion of privity in delict.

The article aims to explore the law of contract from a historical perspective and from a comparative analysis of various jurisdictions today to determine the nature of the claim for damages due to breach of contract. It concludes that there are fundamental differences between a claim for damages due to breach and a claim for damages due to the wrongful and culpable conduct of a third party. As a result, it is clear that the claim for damages due to breach of contract is a claim ex contractu that must be distinguished from delictual claims.

Abstract

Die ontwikkeling van die African Principles on the Law Applicable to International Commercial Contracts is geïnspireer deur die noodsaak van ’n betroubare en stabiele transnasionale regsraamwerk in ooreenstemming met die verbintenis van die Afrika-Unie tot die bevordering van ekonomiese groei by wyse van die daarstelling van ’n vryehandelsone in Afrika. Die African Principles is ontwerp as pan-Afrikaanse instrument en dien as ’n modelwet vir nasionale en, in die toekoms, regionale en supranasionale wetgewing in Afrika. Dit poog om reëls oor die internasionale handelsreg op die Afrika-kontinent te harmoniseer. Die African Principles is beïnvloed deur internasionale instrumente soos die Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts en die UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, asook ander internasionale instrumente.

Met die pan-Afrika aspirasies van die African Principles, verwag ’n mens dat dit die gedeelde waardes en etiek van Afrika-samelewings weerspieël en absorbeer. Hierdie verwagting is geanker in die toenemende hoeveelheid uitsprake van sommige howe in Afrika om tradisionele Afrika-waardes en -etiek te demarginaliseer en in die Afrika-handels- en kontraktereg op te neem. Ongelukkig gee die huidige konsep van die African Principles nie uitvoering aan die groeiende oproep om tradisionele Afrika-waardes en -etiek op eiesoortige en unieke wyse te inkorporeer nie, ten spyte van die pan-Afrika omvang en toepassing daarvan. Kenmerkend van die African Principles is die verbintenis tot Westerse beginsels van individualisme en party-outonomie as ’n middel om oorgrens-kommersiële aktiwiteite op die Afrika-vasteland te bevorder.

Met hierdie artikel poog die outeur om die African Principles deur die lens van tradisionele Afrika-waardes en -filosofie te heroorweeg. Daar word besin oor die debatte en implikasies van die invoeging van tradisionele Afrika-waardes in die handels- en kontraktereg. Dit stel voor dat die bepalings in die African Principles gemodelleer word in ooreenstemming met daardie waardes.

Abstract

Weens Suid-Afrika se geskiedenis van kolonialisme en apartheid, asook ernstige ongelykheid, was dit noodsaaklik om sosio-ekonomiese regte naas burgerlike en politieke regte in die menseregtehandves van die grondwet te beskerm. Alle regte is egter nie ewe afdwingbaar nie. Indien sosio-ekonomiese regte leë beloftes blyk te wees, mag wantroue ontstaan in die verwesenliking van alle regte in die grondwet.

Artikel 184(3) van die grondwet skep ’n meganisme vir verslagdoening oor stappe ter verwesenliking van die regte rakende behuising, voedsel, water, mediese sorg, maatskaplike bystand, onderwys en omgewingsbewaring; asook die monitering van menseregte deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Menseregtekommissie. Die stelsel het egter grootliks in duie gestort. Dit mag neerkom op die verontagsaming van ’n direk opgelegde grondwetlike verpligting. Indien ander grondwetlike verpligtinge – byvoorbeeld dat die president ’n verkiesing moet afkondig – dieselfde pad loop, is ons grondwetlike demokrasie in gevaar.

Litigasie, byvoorbeeld ’n aansoek om ’n hofbevel dat een of meer respondente verklaar word om ’n grondwetlike plig te verontagsaam, mag nodig wees om die lot van armes te verbeter en die oorlewing van die grondwet te verseker.

Abstract

In EMD v Fourie (2493/2019) 2023 ZAECQBHC 46 (17 August 2023) the erstwhile couple Daniels were married in 1987. During the subsistence of their marriage, they jointly acquired an immovable property as their matrimonial home, and this was duly registered and held in joint ownership. For the acquisition of the property a loan secured with a mortgage bond by the bank was registered against the property’s title deed. Even after their divorce no amendment regarding the registration of the property held in joint ownership took place. The erstwhile wife with the couple’s children remained in occupation of the house after the husband moved out with his new wife. In time the erstwhile wife also remarried and stayed in the house with her new husband, Jacobs.

When the joint debtors encountered cash-flow problems and were unable to meet the bond payments, the house was rented to tenants. The bank eventually foreclosed on the mortgage bond and acquired an execution order from the court. Shortly before the date for the auction a knowledgeable employee of the bank materialised as the proverbial good Samaritan and suggested that with the help of “befriended attorneys” and an estate agent a “special arrangement” may be reached to safeguard the asset – akin to “pawn your car and drive it”. Eventually the wife and her new husband, masquerading as the erstwhile husband and co-owner, signed documents that in reality encompassed an agreement to sell the property for R70 000. After the transfer was duly registered the new registered owner served eviction orders on all tenants and occupiers.

The court upheld the application of the original registered co-owners and ordered a rectification of the deeds register to once more reflect the true legal position of their joint ownership. Because the erstwhile husband was not even aware of the intended scheme of his ex-wife and her new husband, the alleged real agreement did not exist. A joint owner can dispose of his/her undivided share of the interest held in co-ownership but has no entitlement to dispose of the complete undivided real right without the agreement of the other joint owners involved. Mr Daniels never had the animus transferendi dominii and the masquerading signatory Jacobs was not entitled to represent him as his agent nor to forge his signature. The purchaser never considered buying merely an undivided co-ownership share in the property and consequently there was neither an obligatory nor a real agreement.

The successful application for the rei vindicatio is founded, however, not in the nullity of the obligatory agreement nor on errors regarding the formal requirements of Act 68 of 1981 but in the fact that legally no change in the ownership occurred in the absence of a valid real agreement and consequently the true owners could rely on the rei vindicatio.

The primary defence of estoppel was correctly disposed of by Eksteen J because Mr Daniels made no representations at all to the purchaser, the registrar or the conveyancer involved and the first requirement for estoppel is always that the estoppel asserter acted on the representation made by the applicant as estoppel denier and not on representations by an imposter. The court correctly held: “He did not sign the deed of sale, nor did he sign the power of attorney to pass transfer and he was, at all times, entirely unaware of the process. As I have said Mr Jacobs forged his signature” (par 11).

It is submitted that although the outcome of the judgment is correct in so far as the “domicile” of the real right of ownership to the immovable property is concerned, it leaves some unease that the erstwhile debt secured by the mortgage bond was wiped out by the payment of that debt to the bank by the purchaser before the alleged registration of the transfer of the property in the name of the purchaser could take place. With the rectification of the unjustified registration, the property is once more registered in the names of the two original joint owners, but now it is no longer burdened by the mortgage debt. This translates to a significant unjustified enrichment of the joint owners at the cost of the duped purchaser, who was bona fide uninformed about the fraudulent chicanery of the attorneys, estate agent and Mrs Daniels and Mr Jacobs. In addition to her loss, she was burdened with the cost order.

It is also troublesome that the judgment does not mention whether the court referred the conduct of the attorneys and the estate agent involved in the fraudulent activity to the applicable governing bodies: “Ms Daniels alleged that Mr Postumous [an attorney], Mr Bekker, an estate agent, and Ms Cradock, an attorney in the employ of the fifth respondent, knew of his [ie Mr Jacobs’] true identity and that they had advised him to sign, as if he were Mr Daniels, because of the urgency of the matter” (par 6 and 9).

It ought to be considered whether the perpetrators of such fraudulent conduct should not be barred as unworthy of the professions as attorneys or as a registered estate agent.

Abstract

 In Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd (2023 5 BCLR 527 (KH), 2023 4 SA 325 (KH)) is ’n appèl oorweeg teen die bekragtiging deur die hoogste hof van appèl van die hooggeregshof se verlening van ’n interdik teen Eskom om die vermindering van kragtoevoer na die Lekwa en Ngwathe munisipaliteite op te skort, hangende die uitslag van ’n hersieningsaansoek in die hooggeregshof van Eskom se besluit om die toevoer te verminder. Eskom het die kragtoevoer ingevolge artikel 21(5) van die Wet op die Regulering van Elektrisiteit 4 van 2006 drasties verminder omdat die munisipaliteite nie hulle finansiële verpligtinge teenoor Eskom nagekom het nie. Die konstitusionele hof het die verlening van die interdik bekragtig. Die uitspraak van die hof is onderteken deur vyf regters en die mindersheiduitspraak is gesteun deur vier regters. Daar was eenstemmigheid in die uitsprake dat die vermindering van die kragtoevoer ’n uiters nadelige uitwerking gehad het op die watertoevoer, riolering, versorging van siekes en bejaardes, besoedeling van die Vaalrivier, onderwys en ekonomiese bedrywighede – ’n humanitêre en omgewingsramp was aan die ontwikkel.

In die hoofuitspraak is beslis dat die applikante die hof daarvan oortuig het dat verskillende handvesregte van die inwoners feitelik aangetas of bedreig was, naamlik die regte op menswaardigheid, lewe, toegang tot gesondheidsorg, voedsel, water, onderwys en op ’n omgewing wat nie skadelik vir gesondheid en welsyn is nie. Insoverre hier ook sosiale regte ter sprake was, was dit ’n geval van direkte skending of bedreiging en nie ’n geval van ’n versuim om die regte te bevorder en te verwesenlik nie. Volgens die minderheidsuitspraak kon die applikante nie bewys dat hulle steun op ’n prima facie reg nie. Die enigste reg waarop die applikante volgens die minderheid kon steun, is ’n reg op elektrisiteit en die minderheid kon nie daarvan oortuig word dat só ’n reg in die handves van regte of enige ander regsreël erken word nie.

Die minderheid se eng benadering hou geen rekening met die feit dat die beskermingsvelde van handvesregte so oorvleuel dat dieselfde handeling meerdere regte kan aantas en dat grondwette dikwels afsonderlike regte waarborg vir sekere persone (bv kinders) of teen aantasting deur sekere handelinge (bv die administratiewe handelinge en handelinge om die pleging van misdade te ondersoek en te straf) nie.

Sosiale regte beskerm gedrag en belange, byvoorbeeld lewe, menswaardigheid en fisiese en psigiese integriteit teen inmenging deur optrede binne die raamwerk van byvoorbeeld toegang tot geskikte behuising, gesondheidsorg, voedsel, water, maatskaplike sekerheid en onderwys. ’n Argument dat elektrisiteitsvoorsiening beskou kan word as ’n instrument om sekere handvesregte te beskerm of te bevorder, is volgens die minderheid onaanvaarbaar omdat instrumente om regte te bevorder nie deel van die “subjek van regte” is nie en, word in dieselfde paragraaf bygevoeg, omdat die staat ’n wye diskresie het om te besluit watter metodes gevolg moet word. Die vereiste in artikels 26(2) en 27(2) dat die staatsmaatreëls redelik moet wees, is aangehaal maar nie verduidelik nie.

Die sosiale regte in die grondwet is soos al die ander regte verskans en beregbaar en die beperkings wat gestel word ten opsigte van die uitoefening van diskresies om regte te beperk, moet altyd uitgespel word. Die minderheid se lukrake benadering en waarskuwing oor die wye bevoegdheid van die staat sal hopelik nie in toekomstige hofbeslissings gevolg word nie.

Abstract

 This is one of the rare cases in which the plaintiff based his action on Aquilian, and not pauperien principles after suffering a broken wrist when he fell during an effort to retreat when accosted by two small dogs belonging to the defendant. The barking dogs threatened the plaintiff while he was standing on the sidewalk next to the defendant’s property, after they had escaped through the gate of the property which had been opened to allow the latter’s wife access.

The court had difficulty in determining the true factual situation, because the sets of evidence presented by the opposing parties were irreconcilable. On the strength of the methodology presented in the leading judgment of Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Group Ltd v Martell et Cie the court unconvincingly opted to accept the plaintiff’s version. The defendant was also prevented from presenting arguments in respect of certain traits of the dogs, due to defects in his heads of argument.

Although the court indirectly addressed the issue of wrongfulness, its main thrust was an attempt to decide whether the owner had been negligent in failing to keep his dogs under control and preventing them from threatening the defendant and other members of public. Relying on the definition of negligence presented in Mukheiber v Raath, which displays a preference for the concrete approach to foreseeability, the court concluded that the defendant had been negligent and is therefore liable to compensate the plaintiff in such sum as may be agreed or determined in due course.

It is illustrated how the court failed in presenting a judgment in accordance with a method suggested by Bosielo JA in a paper presented in 2013, which contains the following steps: (a) introduction; (b) facts; (c) issues; (d) law; (e) application; (f) remedy; and (g) order (earning the acronym IFILARO). Of particular note is the court’s failure to present a concise but sufficiently detailed account of the facts, and to apply relevant legal rules and principles to the facts. It is intimated that if the existing case law had been thoroughly scrutinised and applied, a finding that the harm in casu had not been reasonably foreseeable to the diligens paterfamilias might have followed, rendering the defendant not liable.