Abstract

There are indications of an unduly deferential attitude towards the justices of the Constitutional Court when they pronounce on profound moral issues which deeply affect the moral fabric of South African society. A key to addressing this deference is to demonstrate the divergent approaches of the Constitutional Court when making such pronouncements. An awareness of these differing approaches has the potential to influence civil society to participate confidently in the process of giving the Constitutional text representative forms of meaning and, in the process, of buttressing democracy. As an illustration of the divergencies stemming from the Constitutional Court regarding fundamental moral matters, the most important of all the rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 has been chosen, namely, the right to life, more specifically pertaining to the death penalty and abortion. Accompanying this is a critical investigation into a foundational hermeneutic chosen by the Constitutional Court when giving content to the right to life, namely, ubuntu. Also, naturally emanating from this contribution is the advancement of right to life jurisprudence in South Africa.